Friday, January 28, 2022

“Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China” by Tao Jiang

This is a contemporary comparative analysis of the various moral-political systems of thought constructed by the most famous philosophers of the pre-Qin (xianqin) era. “The collapse of the normative Zhou order, which had represented the ideal of peace and prosperity, was the backdrop of all classical thinkers during the pre-Qin period. Almost all classical thinkers were trying to reconstitute such a lost order by appealing to ritual (or tradition), (human) nature, objective standards that included moral and penal codes, or some combination of these, in order to imagine, conceptualize, and construct a new world that was morally compelling and/or politically alluring.”


Jiang begins with Confucius. “The most important contribution by Confucius in Chinese history was his attempt to start formulating a coherent and compelling moral universe that could regulate personal virtues, familial-social relationships, and political governance, under the general rubric of Dao, the Way…. [The period] from the founding of Zhou in 1045 to the early ninth century BCE was [for Confucius] the epitome of culture and order, represented by wen and li, respectively, in the Analects, with the former referring to the cultural patterns of the Zhou and the latter to its ritual system.” Confucius claimed, “When human beings perform ritual, they put the things of the world in synchronization with the dao.” Jiang continues, “Ren, a homophone and cognate of human (ren), has been universally recognized as the singular moral virtue touted in the Analects.” Ren was a kind of meta-virtue, “frequently translated as humaneness, humanity, human-heartedness, authoritative or consummate conduct, virtue, or the Good.” Classical Chinese moral philosophy was concerned with the differences between particularist and universalist virtues, especially when the values of family and politics conflicted. Confucius tried to extend certain particularist familial virtues to the universal political sphere. “His focus was on the extension of familial sentiment of xiao ti to the more universalist sentiment of caring for people (ai ren).”


Mencius was a Confucian, who, nonetheless, formed his own unique moral project. “Between Confucius and Mencius the ground for reasoning shifted from a ritual- and tradition-based moral-political norm to a human-nature based one…. Mencius turned to (ethicized) human nature as the ground of moral reasoning and refashioning a humane world order. Essentially, the conceptual anchor of the Mencian political thought is human nature (xing), not institutional order (li)…. Ren, which is the singular virtue and moral ideal in the Analects, appears to have been “demoted” to one of four cardinal virtues, along with righteousness (yi), propriety (li), and wisdom (zhi), that are constitutive of the heavenly endowed human nature.” Furthermore, “whereas Confucius connects sacrifice with ren (humaneness) (Analects 15.9), Mencius associates sacrifice with yi (righteousness) (Mengzi 6A10)…. Like ren, yi also has two dimensions in the Mencius: familial and political. In the familial domain, it is understood as deference to one’s elder brother (4A27) or one’s elders (7A15); in the political arena, it refers to the virtue of a minister being fiercely loyal to his lord (1A1).” Jiang elaborates, “The extensionist Mencius operates on the assumption of congruity among desirable goods, whether material or moral, whereas the sacrificialist Mencius is much more clear-eyed about the tension involved among desirable goods, as well as that between the familial and political domains…. The more radical strand of Mencian thought… is premised upon the sacrificialist virtue of yi, as opposed to the extensionist virtue of ren.” Mencius claimed, “When the Way prevails in the world, the Way accompanies the gentleman (in all his conducts). When the Way does not prevail in the world, the gentleman follows the Way to the grave (or sacrifices himself to the Way).”


Mozi believed in a universalist moral-political project. “One of the greatest contributions of the Mohists to Chinese philosophy lies in their remarkable endeavor to move the gravity of philosophical reasoning from a debate focusing on personal intuitions or inclinations to one emphasizing objective criteria that are publicly accessible and defendable…. The Mohist Heaven is an omniscient, benevolent, and impartial supernatural agent…. For the Mohists, Heaven’s intent is not a primarily voluntarist concept, but rather a rational one. Heaven’s supremacy lies not in its arbitrariness and ultimate unintelligibility, but in its rationality and objectiveness which is universal and not biased in favor of the privileged…. The idea of jian ai is one of the most, if not the single most, fundamental moral teachings of Mozi…. Jian ai has been translated as universal love, universal care, concern for everybody, inclusive care, and impartial care…. Mohists embraced justice and impartiality, on the one hand, while advocating rather heavy-handed means to enforce universal standards of impartiality, on the other…. Youwei justice, a human vision of impartiality enshrined in the Mohist project, would require a high degree of socialization and socio-political engineering…. It was Mozi and the Mohists who vigorously applied the Golden Rule to ren and pushed Confucius’ idea of caring for the people to its logical conclusion of caring for all, often to the exasperation of later Confucians like Mencius who accused the Mohists of being unfilial (Mencius 3B/9).”


The Laoists also started from a universalist framework, but took it in a very different direction. “Normatively, wuwei is aligned with justice, impartiality, accommodations, and non-interference, whereas youwei is aligned with humaneness, partiality, differentiation, and interference. The Laoists were on the side of wuwei and its associated normative values…. Wuwei justice, touted in the Laozi, is naturally operative in the cosmos and, from this perspective, human effort is seen as disruptive to such an operation due to the inherent limitation of human knowledge, capability, and partialist inclinations…. Ideally for Laozi, justice should be left to Heaven as any human effort at justice would be too heavy-handed, on the one hand, while forcing humans to forsake naturally endowed human inclinations, on the other. Humans should aim at preserving our natural inclinations within the familial, kinship, or small local communal environment…. Laozi only recognized the familial as naturally human, making large societies undesirable and unnatural for humans.” Laozi stated, “The world is a sacred vessel (shen qi) and nothing should be done to it. Whoever does anything to it will ruin it; whoever lays hold of it will lose it (DDJ 29).”


Jiang explicitly compares the Laoist and Mohist conceptions of justice. “Whereas Mohist justice appeals to publicly articulated and uniformly applied standards, the Laoist justice operates in the darkness or in mystery; whereas the Mohist justice requires heavy intervention from leaders to impose uniform standards, the Laoist justice abhors such heavy-handedness; whereas the Mohist justice anticipates a large and unified political entity in their pursuit of universal justice, the Laoists call for small communities in order to save humanity from the onslaught of mass socialization and the corruption of the benign natural human inclinations in service to nefarious objectives while leaving the project of universal justice to Heaven/Dao since it is beyond human capacity…. For Laozi, the impartiality of Heaven and the partiality of human sentiments render the universalist ambition in the Mohist project untenable, since only Heaven is impartial and universal, whereas humans are not.”


Jiang refers to the Legalist School as the fajia thinkers. These thinkers were interested in constructing a universalist system, but their means would entail massive state intervention and blind deference from the people. “The fajia thinkers effort to formulate an impartial political order for the sake of all people points to the critical value of justice and impartiality in their political thought. Moreover, many of the fajia thinkers problematized personal virtues they considered to be at odds with the interest of the state and instead touted professional virtues of specialization and impersonal application of standards when an official was acting on behalf of the state…. What made Shen Dao’s call for the sagely emulation of nature radically different from Laozi’s was the former’s attempt to engineer the entire political apparatus so that it was modeled after the way nature was perceived to operate…. Shen Dao’s attitude toward human dispositions (qing), widely shared among the fajia thinkers, was that they should be taken as given, rather than obsessing over whether they can be reformed or not…. An effective political system is one that channels those dispositions for public good…. [The fajia thinkers’] ambitious and daring sociopolitical engineering of the entire human realm to model after the natural world was one of the most consequential developments in Chinese political history…. Fa in the Shenzi fragments focused on “the standards or laws instituted by the ruler” (2016, 46), whose “defining features is its fixity and lack of bias” (2016, 47)…. For Shen Dao, an enforced procedure, without bias or favors, was more important than the particular result it generated.” Shen Dao stated, “If one discards the Way and [its proper] techniques and gives up standards and measurements, seeking to understand all under heaven through the understanding of one man, whose understanding could be sufficient for this (Shenzi 107)?”


Zhuangzi was a Daoist, who lived towards the end of the Classical period. “Zhuangzi’s overarching intellectual project is that of personal freedom…. Zhuangist freedom is best understood as a critique of the Confucian (and by extension Mohist) way of structuring and ordering the world through rituals (and laws or standards in the case of Mohists)…. Zhuangzi stood out as someone who prioritized and privileged the personal over the familial and the political domains…. Zhuangzi tries to redeem the heartmind, attuning it to the Dao, so that it can be liberated from the ritually regulated lifeworld in the pursuit of personal freedom…. For Zhuangzi, personal freedom and ritual-based ethical norms were fundamentally incommensurable…. Whereas the Confucians are preoccupied with the imperative of humaneness and the Mohists with justice, the Zhuangists are resisting such an all-pervasive understanding of moral-political norms which are fundamentally relational in nature. Instead, the Zhuangists want to preserve a domain that is unregulated/undifferentiated (hundun) and open (tong) wherein one can roam freely (you).” In a passage in the Zhuangzi, he puts into the mouth of Confucius this distinction, “They [the Zhuangists] are the sort that roams beyond the guidelines (fangwai). I am the sort that roams within the guidelines (fangnei).” Zhuangzi stated, “The sage, taking Heaven as his model, values the genuine and is untrammeled by custom.”


Xunzi was a Confucian, who, nonetheless, incorporated aspects of Mohist and fajia thought into his philosophical system. He was most concerned with ritual and, compared to Confucius and Mencius, was more universalist and less beholden to particularist familial virtues. Along with other Confucians, however, Xunzi was concerned with cultivating and elevating personal humanist virtues, at least amongst the wise. “Xunzi touted the human qualities of distinction-making, righteousness, and community-building to counter disruptive human qualities, such as desires, competition, and chaos…. Xunzi highlighted the givenness of desire as well as its chaotic nature in the human condition, similar to views about human nature by the early fajia thinkers, but he saw ritual as the most effective way to cope with such a condition in bringing about orderliness through making right distinction, distribution, and division in the constitution of a flourishing human community that emulates the cosmic order characterized as hierarchical and constant…. Xunzi could no longer take for granted that there was a Heaven that cared about human affairs or that humans should model themselves after Heaven in search for solutions to the deepening moral, social, and political crises. Instead, he made a powerful case that humans were completely responsible for their own world. His rejection of human nature as a source of moral-political order was part of his effort to maintain a link between the heavenly and the human due to his understanding of human nature as given by Heaven and the indifference of Heaven to human affairs….. Xunzi’s ritual is the synthesis of these heavenly and humanly attributes, the product of the sagely deliberate efforts, that result in the establishment of a moral order. This synthesized moral order (li) is characterized by orderliness (zhi), humaneness (ren), rightness (yi), hierarchy (fen), taking positive attributes from the Heavenly (orderliness and hierarchy) and the humanly (humaneness and rightness). Such a ritual-based moral order represents the ideal of humane justice in Xunzi’s formation…. The nourishing function of ritual is front and center in Xunzi’s conception of ritual.” Xunzi claimed, “Heaven does not stop producing winter because humans dislike cold, Earth does not stop being broad because humans dislike huge distances, and the gentleman does not cease his conduct because of the chatter of petty men…. The gentleman makes his way based on what is constant, whereas the petty man calculates what he can accomplish.” Furthermore, Xunzi advised, “The gentleman makes things his servants. The petty man is servant to things.”


Jiang closes with the paramount fajia thinker, Han Feizi, who lived just before the consolidation of the warring states into a unified empire by the Qin. Han Feizi incorporated Mohist ideas of a universalist Heaven with previous fajia thought on the role of the State, its ruler, its ministers, and its bureaucracy. “The fajia thinkers, including Han Feizi, believed that there was no moral solution to the crisis at hand due to tensions or even conflicts among moral ideals, on the one hand, and the failure of moral education in inculcating even those non-disputed moral virtues, on the other. Furthermore, the fajia thinkers saw morals as politically irrelevant at best and politically disruptive or subversive at worst. For them, morals were little more than the facade employed by cunning people, especially powerful ones in proximity to the ruler, to obfuscate their selfishness by appealing to high-sounding ideals…. A political order should not be built on the ideal of a morally perfect sage because the source of political authority should not derive from moral virtues of a ruler at all…. The virtues touted in Han Feizi’s philosophy in a ruler were humility and self-constraint, rather than benevolence and righteousness…. The highest moral value in Han Feizi’s philosophy was the institutional virtue of impartiality. Han Feizi claimed, “Hardly ten men of true integrity and good faith can be found today, and yet the offices of the state number in the hundreds. If they must be filled by men of integrity and good faith, then there will never be enough men to go around…. Therefore the way of the enlightened ruler is to unify the laws instead of seeking wise men.”


Jiang concludes historically, with how these competing philosophies were merged and practically implemented across Chinese imperial rule, “Confucianism, with its accommodationist philosophical disposition and partialist moral orientation, was best positioned, politically and intellectually, to deal with the universal state that was set up to operate on the fajia impersonal and bureaucratic framework under mostly mediocre and often deeply flawed rulers.”


Friday, January 21, 2022

“On Getting Better” by Adam Phillips

This collection of essays by Phillips is a companion to his collection “On Wanting to Change.” In these writings, Phillips focuses on what it would mean to be cured. He begins provocatively, “Clearly any politics not bent on improving society would not be politics, but would a personal life not bent on self-improvement not be a life, or at least not a life worth taking seriously?” Phillips suggests a psychoanalytic answer, “The cure here, from a psychoanalytic point of view, is the cure of an inhibition…. To be cured, then, is to be leading one’s preferred life.” However, satisfaction, as opposed to pleasure, is a culturally mediated phenomenon. “What is acculturation if not the formulation, tacitly or otherwise, of the individual’s aims and objectives?” The real problem for the analysand might be her own self-cure. “If the patient is suffering from their self-cure then it might be the wish for the cure that they are suffering from. Not that they have, as it were, found the wrong cure, but that the idea of cure has waylaid them. They have sought solutions as a way of taking insufficient interest in their problems.” Roger Money-Kyrle makes the claim, “The primary aim of psychoanalysis, in opposition to the avowed aim of all other therapeutic methods, is not to cure but to make conscious.” Following in the vein of William James and the American pragmatists, Phillips suggests, “The truth of our desire — if that is a useful way of talking — can only ever be an experiment and a risk. Psychoanalysis suggests that knowing and wanting don’t necessarily go together.” He continues, “Here in brief is James’s credo: replace the divine with the human wherever necessary and useful; believe and consider true whatever you need to believe, even God, in order to be the person you want to be; and be mindful, and admiring where you can, of the preceding generations that give you a language — the only language you have — to make a new language out of…. The pragmatically open-minded would never close their minds.” In the end, however, “without objects of desire, we wouldn’t know what to do with ourselves.”


Friday, January 14, 2022

“On What Matters: Volume 3” by Derek Parfit

This is the final volume in Parfit’s posthumously published treatise. He begins by defending the concept of objective normative moral truths. “There are some normative truths which can be plausibly claimed to be natural facts…. These truths are naturalistic facts in the sense that they might be empirically discovered…. No such claims apply, I believe, to reason-involving normative truths…. These truths cannot be explained in naturalistic terms, nor could we have empirical evidence for or against our beliefs in these truths.” Similarly to mathematical truths, Parfit believes in the reality of these moral truths. “In the meta-ethical debates of the last seventy years, few people have suggested, and then only briefly, that there are any such non-ontological non-natural truths.”


Parfit believes that these normative moral truths are what matters. “When I claim that some things matter in the purely normative reason-implying sense, I don’t claim to be describing what most people believe…. I claim that if, as I believe, we have such reasons, these are the reasons that are most important…. Non-Naturalists like me believe, some things matter in the purely normative reason-implying sense…. What matters depends in part on the sense in which things matter. It also matters in which sense things matter, since some ways of mattering matter less. Things may matter, we can add, in more than one sense.”


Finding out what objectively matters is of utmost importance. “We could not discover how it would be best to live unless there are some truths that we might discover…. On this view, epistemic reasons are facts that count in favour of having some belief…. I believe this concept of normative reason cannot be helpfully analysed in other terms. We should expect that some concepts are too fundamental to be helpfully analysed…. We have such reasons to try to do various things that are in themselves worth doing, such as discovering truths, creating or preserving beauty, and achieving several other good and worthwhile aims.”


Parfit spends a good deal of all three volumes trying to square Kantian Deontology with both Act and Rule Consequentialism. “We should not assume Consequentialists must accept some view about well-being that is either purely hedonistic, or claims that our well-being consists only in the fulfillment of some of our desires. Consequentialists can believe that there are other ways in which our lives can go better or worse for us…. On this view, if we are morally bad and act wrongly, these facts would not merely cause our lives to go worse, but would be in themselves ways in which our lives would go worse…. The goodness of outcomes can depend in part on whether our acts are right or wrong…. We are not claiming both that the wrongness of these acts makes them bad and that their badness makes them wrong. We are claiming that the deontic badness of these wrong acts makes these people’s lives go non-deontically worse.”


Parfit believes he can square Sidgwick’s Common Sense Morality with a form of Rule and Motive Consequentialism. “I believe that things would on the whole go better if, rather than always wanting and trying to act in optimific ways, we had certain other motives and tried to follow certain other rules…. When some act would affect the well-being of very many people, these effects may make this act either morally required, or wrong, even if the effects on each person would be very small and might be imperceptible…. Imperceptible amounts of pain, and other such harms, seem to most of us to be below any plausible threshold of moral significance. If we are Rule Consequentialists, however, we deny that each of these acts is made to be wrong by this act’s effects. These acts are wrong, we believe, when and because they are condemned by optimific rules. Whether some rule is optimific depends on whether things would on the whole go better if most of us, or many of us, accepted and tried to follow this rule…. We ought to act on the principles or rules that are optimific, uniquely universally willable, and not reasonably rejectable…. We could then more justifiably believe that there are some objective irreducibly normative truths, some of which are moral truths.”


Parfit concludes, “Life can be wonderful as well as terrible, and we shall increasingly have the power to make life good. Since human history may only be just beginning, we can expect that future humans, or supra-humans, may achieve some great goods that we cannot now even imagine…. If we are the only rational beings in the Universe, as some recent evidence suggests, it matters even more whether we shall have descendants or successors during the billions of years in which that would be possible. Some of our successors might live lives and create worlds that, though failing to justify past suffering, would have given us all, including those who suffered most, reasons to glad that the Universe exists.”

Friday, January 7, 2022

“On Wanting to Change” by Adam Phillips

This collection of essays by Phillips focuses on the idea of conversion. “Conversion was once the profoundest instance of personal and cultural change.” While Phillips begins by discussing the religious, he also parses the concept in its secular contexts. “Both psychoanalysis and American Pragmatism are driven by a desire to help the individual keep things moving…. They promote — American Pragmatism far more than psychoanalysis — the strangely radical, modern political idea that how we want to change can have something to do with how we do change. Change as choice rather than fate. Change as something we make…. We are the only animals for whom radical change can be an object of desire…. What haunts all religions — and then all secular therapies — is that the wish for change may be in excess of the capacity for change.”


Phillips delves into the psychoanalysis. “Conversion, that is to say — in its psychoanalytic version — is a way of not having to change. It is the way the individual sustains the desires that sustain her…. We never change, we convert…. It was indeed the seminal observation from which psychoanalysis developed — that feelings and desires could be converted into their opposite, into apparently unrelated ideas, into physical symptoms…. Conversion, then, in its psychoanalytic sense, is a cover story…. It is a reconfiguring rather than a radical transformation. Indeed, conversion is in the service of sustaining the very thing that is supposedly being replaced.”


Phillips views conversion as opposed to education. It is a closing off of paths and possibilities. “It is, I think, integral to liberal societies to assume that education and conversion are distinct, if not actually at odds with each other…. Conversion tends to be a cure for scepticism; a narrowing of the mind that frees the mind…. Conversion is a conversation that has failed…. Conversion depends on a supposedly known outcome…. Perhaps the opposite of conversion is experiment.” 


A conversion often seeks to simplify the ambiguities raised throughout one’s life. “Conversion experiences, at their most minimal, minimise, or at least regulate, what are felt to be the essential and most paralysing contradictions of a divided self.” However, what was there before never completely goes away. “In conversion experiences there has to be something there to be converted; the new can only be made out of the old…. The key, as it were, to conversion is whatever it is in someone that resists conversion. Conversion after all may change everything by keeping everything the same…. People are also what you can’t make of them, or make them into. We are, too, the conversions we have resisted; and indeed the conversions we are tempted by.”


Conversion is the end point. “Conversion proposes the kind of change that makes other or future forms of change unthinkable. It is the kind of change that renders all future change redundant…. Conversion experiences must, by definition, dispel scepticism. Ultimately it is doubt that has to be converted.” The tension of conversion is the tension of living within civilization. “The Freudian individual is a convert: converted by acculturation to acculturation: converted both to civilization and to being one of its discontents.” The struggle is life. “It has been difficult for us to find pleasures that are sufficiently sustaining; pleasures that convince us, so to speak, that our lives are worth the suffering.”