Showing posts with label Joel Mokyr. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Joel Mokyr. Show all posts

Friday, February 6, 2026

“Two Paths to Prosperity: Culture and Institutions in Europe and China, 1000-2000” by Avner Greif, Joel Mokyr, and Guido Tabellini

This book is a comparative institutional analysis between the economies of China and Western Europe from 1000-2000 AD. As such, it paints in rather broad strokes. Still, some common themes resound. But first, some facts on the ground. “China’s population had grown from about 50 or 60 million in the early 700s AD to about 100 million toward the turn of the millennium. During the Northern Song period (960–1127 AD), population growth is estimated to have averaged around a rate of 0.87 percent per year…. The capital city of the Northern Song Empire, Kaifeng, had reached 1 million inhabitants…. [In contrast, the] European population in 1000 AD was about the same as in 200 AD…. Song China employed advanced agricultural techniques, including the use of new rice varieties, extensive irrigation systems, terrace farming, crop rotation, and fertilizers. Its canals and waterways supported an extensive trade network. Northern China was not only the world’s most populous trading area, it also produced large amounts of iron, much of it for military use…. The compass, gunpowder, and the printing press—that Francis Bacon famously coined as the major inventions of the millennium—all originated in China…. As early as the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279), Chinese ships navigated to India and to East Africa…. Foreign trade was a major source of revenue, and the government issued paper money…. China had a strong and effective unitary state, while Europe was virtually stateless…. China was able to preserve its state infrastructure despite frequent and intense internal wars. The state had maintained its coercive capacity and was able to subordinate and force cooperation from Chinese elites…. During the Song Dynasty, central tax revenue is estimated to have approached one-tenth of the country’s total output, and it could support an army of about 1 million soldiers.”


How did the Great Reversal occur? First, more basic facts. “Around 1850, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in China was about one-fifth of that in Great Britain, one-fourth of the Netherlands’, and less than half of Italy’s…. Several European nation-states had developed sophisticated and inclusive political institutions and boasted significant state capacity, with tax revenues around 10 percent of national GDP in the second half of the nineteenth century…. By contrast, Chinese state capacity had declined, with tax revenues falling below 2 percent of GDP (Zhang 2022, p. 4), and political institutions remaining autocratic.” 


Mokyr et al. begin to tease out the why of this Great Reversal. “When nation-states finally began to emerge in the late Middle Ages, European rulers had to bargain with a plurality of local elites to earn their cooperation, leading to the formation of more inclusive political institutions. In China, despite frequent internal struggles, centralized and autocratic state infrastructure never disappeared…. In Europe, for example, innovators found it easier to escape censorship and the persecution of so-called heretics because sovereign states competed for intellectual and economic supremacy and were often in conflict with each other.… Scientists and innovators, when at risk of persecution, could flee to neighboring countries for refuge. In a similar vein, frequent wars forced emerging European states to invest in tax capacity (Gennaioli and Voth 2015) and in military technology (Hoffman, 2015), both of which accelerated the process of urbanization.”


One major area of difference between Western Europe and China was their system of ethics and morals. “A universalistic value system is one where altruism and moral sentiments are not very sensitive to social distance: moral beliefs are applied with similar strength in interactions with friends and strangers. By contrast, in a communitarian value system, altruism and moral sentiments are much stronger toward socially close people than toward strangers.”


Which moral system a community believes in has a large effect on their cultural and institutional development. “In China, cooperation was increasingly sustained by kin-based social networks, the clan being the prototypical organization. In Europe, a different kind of social organization gradually emerged among unrelated individuals…. We refer to these organizations as “corporations.” Examples of such corporations can be traced all the way to the Middle Ages and thereafter: fraternities, guilds, monastic and religious orders, universities and academic associations, self-governing cities, and the modern business corporation…. Chinese kin-based organizations and European corporations performed seemingly similar functions essential to the effective organization of social life: they shared risk, provided individual protection, facilitated market transactions, provided financing, organized education, provided religious services, settled disputes, and assisted the state in collecting taxes and providing military resources. Yet they differed in one key respect: with whom one cooperated. Chinese clans and lineages were associations of individuals who claimed to descend from a common patrilineal ancestor. European corporations were associations of individuals unrelated by kin, who got together for a specific purpose…. Chinese clans and lineages were multipurpose organizations: the same kin-based network provided a variety of local public goods and club goods: ancestral ceremonies and worship, risk sharing and protection, financing, dispute settlement, and so on. Many (but not all) European corporations were instead formed for a primary specific purpose…. Chinese kin-based organizations created a firm partition of society along the lines of mutually exclusive and ascriptive dynastic groups, which often competed with each other. For all intents and purposes, there were no exit options…. European society was formed by dense overlapping networks and associations, which fostered a cultural practice of cooperation and conflict resolution among unrelated individuals in a variety of domains…. Chinese clans were typically hierarchical organizations based on seniority…. European corporations, instead being associations of unrelated individuals, carefully regulated collective decisions through consensual practices.”


Mokyr et al. continue by stressing the cultural differences that influenced the interpersonal interactions within the societies of China and Western Europe. “During the Song Dynasty, neo-Confucianism became the dominant social and intellectual culture in China…. A series of doctrines governing both personal and public life, neo-Confucianism emphasized kin-based values as the basis of social order. Interpersonal relations, including cooperation, were to be governed by filial loyalty, strict gender hierarchy, and respect among relatives…. Beginning in the early Middle Ages, the Latin (Catholic) Church actively discouraged a variety of practices that had traditionally strengthened and consolidated kin networks, such as adoption, polygamy, concubinage, consanguineous marriage, and nonconsensual marriage. Violating these bans carried the threat of harsh punishment, including social sanction and religious excommunication…. These Church policies influenced the European family structure: the extended family gradually became less important and was replaced by the smaller nuclear family…. Christian culture, as elucidated by the Church, also strongly rejected the values associated with patrilineal descent groups and strengthened the commitment toward bilateral descent (i.e., from both parents), which was already part of the post-Roman Germanic tradition.”


The laws of China and Western Europe, themselves shaped by culture, in turn shaped the societies they governed in a self-reenforcing loop. “In China, where the state was stronger from the beginning, the legal system was designed top-down with two main goals: to maintain peace and stability and to govern the relations between the public administration and its subjects. Civil law played only a secondary role because commercial disputes were primarily resolved by clans through arbitration and compromise…. In Europe, by contrast, where the state was initially much weaker, the legal system had a bottom-up origin, and corporations influenced its evolution both on the demand and the supply side. The prevalence of impersonal exchange and contractual arrangements among unrelated individuals created a demand for external enforcement and well-functioning legal institutions, which provided the basis for the evolution of commercial and civil law. Legal principles first appeared in private contractual agreements within and between corporations. Over time, they evolved as best practices in communities of merchants…. First, the legal system defined and clarified the nature of corporations as separate legal entities and holders of specific rights…. Second, the emergence of legal institutions very early in European history coincided with the beginning of the formation of states. Their coevolution thus influenced how political institutions developed. The administration of justice and law enforcement was among the first functions performed by European sovereigns…. The legislative and executive sovereign authority would be limited by a preexisting body of law, and the courts would uphold the principle (if not the practice) of equality before the law. The early emergence of judicial state functions in Europe also explains the growing influence acquired by national parliaments.”


Furthermore, state capacity was wielded in different manners in China and Western Europe. “The Chinese state had a long tradition of relying on a powerful and effective central bureaucracy to fulfill its aims…. They were selected through a demanding civil service exam that required lengthy preparation and extensive training in Confucian doctrine. This meritocratic process had several advantages from the perspective of regime stability. It created a cohesive social group of talented administrators who shared a basic ethic and a very similar education, all with a large stake in preserving the regime…. [In Europe,] the Church deliberately enhanced European political fragmentation by strategically undermining the centralization of political powers between and within emerging nation-states…. Self-governing cities, too, exerted a key influence over the evolution of

European political institutions, enhancing the effects of political fragmentation. Like Chinese clans, autonomous cities in Europe—known as

“communes”—enforced tax collection and contributed to other aspects of

decentralized administration. Unlike Chinese clans, however, communes enjoyed exclusive control over their territories. This feature enhanced their bargaining power against sovereigns…. Sovereigns had to concede political rights to self-governing cities in exchange for the additional tax resources. Often, these political rights took the form of representation in national parliaments…. China too had large urban centers, but they had little autonomy and did not play an important role in decentralized state administration.”


Mokyr et al. discuss why the Industrial Revolution took place in Western Europe. They stress that although many major advances first happened in England, it was a Europe-wide phenomenon, the rest of Western Europe was never far behind. “The Industrial Revolution was driven by a host of scientific and technological innovations. European corporations were at the heart of the creation and accumulation of knowledge, following centuries-old norms and traditions. Monasteries, universities, and later scientific societies—all corporate organizations—played a crucial role in creating the conditions that made the Industrial Revolution possible…. The polycentric nature of political power and competition among fragmented states allowed innovators to escape censorship and suppression. Second, the Catholic Church, despite its ambiguous and often inconsistent relationship with useful knowledge, on balance created conditions that proved conducive to technological progress…. [Third,] the state had conceded some manner of political representation to business interests, which limited state interference with wealth accumulation and the functioning of markets…. In China, by contrast, knowledge accumulation and education were largely controlled by the state administration…. Mandarins and other government officials largely controlled the market of ideas and the course of intellectual innovation. Moreover, the Chinese bureaucracy increasingly privileged the study of traditional Confucian doctrine, bent primarily on social peace and preserving regime stability…. European corporations contributed to economic progress in two additional ways. First, they facilitated the creation of thick and well-functioning financial markets and the diffusion of long-distance trade…. The second way that the corporation facilitated European industrialization was via its model for the organization of production. In a capitalist firm, investment decisions are made by capital owners who are also the residual claimants of the returns from investment, while labor earns a fixed wage. This organization of production creates strong incentives to invest in labor-saving innovations because the returns accrue to those who control the investment decisions.”


Finally, Mokyr et al. conclude by reasserting their broader thesis for how Western Europe was able to leapfrog China during the course of the second millennium. “Current cultural traits often reflect features of a more distant social and political environment. Our analysis of the Great Reversal points to another mechanism of cultural persistence and influence: the embedding of specific cultural traits into social organizations…. The effects of culture are not only direct; they are also mediated by social organizations that are complementary with specific cultural traits. Once in place, these social organizations are hard to dismantle, and they contribute to the spread and maintain the cultural foundations on which they are built…. The fundamental challenge of state formation is how to scale up cooperation from the local to the national level…. Scaling up cooperation among strangers poses new challenges and requires different social arrangements…. In Europe, peaceful resolution of internal political conflicts and the emergence of inclusive institutions were facilitated by social practices that encouraged cooperation among strangers.”


Friday, September 29, 2017

“A Culture of Growth” by Joel Mokyr

I have long been searching for a book that adequately explains Europe’s rise to dominance in world affairs. For obvious reasons, I found genetic explanations distasteful and geographic reasons incomplete. Yet the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, colonial appropriation, and global hegemony must not have occurred purely by happenstance. Contingency had its role, but Mokyr’s book argues a unique cultural milieu that gained prominence around the sixteenth century led not only to the West’s propulsion, but, more importantly, its ability to stay on top the global stage. 

Mokyr’s book is a combination of the disciplines of economics and cultural evolution. He seeks to explain why between 1500-1700 AD Europe’s material wealth grew exponentially while the rest of the world remained at just about a subsistence level economy. He suggests it was a unique culture that developed across Europe. Mokyr accepts Boyd and Richerson’s definition of culture as “a set of beliefs, values, and preferences, capable of affecting behavior, that are socially (not genetically) transmitted and that are shared by some subset of society.” Mokyr continues, “the advantage of models of cultural evolution is that they are contingent and concern ex ante probabilities rather than deterministic causal models. In other words, they force us to recognize that things could have turned out differently than they did with fairly minor changes in initial conditions or accidents along the way.” He begins his argument by claiming that knowledge is a public good, non-rivalrous and non-excludable. As such, “economists suspect knowledge tends to be chronically underproduced.” 

Mokyr suggests that the largest factor in Europe’s success was its encouragement of invention over tradition. “If the culture is heavily infused with respect of ancient wisdom so that any intellectual innovation is considered deviant and blasphemous, technological creativity will be similarly constrained.” It was individualism that promoted heterodox ideas that challenged boundaries and created outside the box solutions to old problems. There was a sense that the ancients did not know everything and that the classical period was not a golden age to be cherished and preserved, but a starting point of knowledge to be built upon. These were radical ideas in Europe at the time, when recently heretics were burned at the stake and non-Aristotelean and non-Ptolemaic teachings were grounds for dismissal from Oxford’s colleges. 

For cultural evolution to succeed one must have variation. For good ideas to win out there must be many ideas to choose from. These ideas must be inheritable. There must be a mechanism to have them passed on and diffused, both vertically (generationally) and horizontally (geographically).  There also must be a repository of shared knowledge, since no individual brain could hope to master and remember all the group learning of human society. In all societies, there is a small leadership of cultural entrepreneurs who synergize and transform latent and prevailing thoughts. They do not make up ideas ex novo, but take the zeitgeist of the day, reshape it, and transform the cultural milieu. Europe succeeded, in large part, because it was culturally homogenous while politically diffuse. “This unity derived from both Europe’s classical heritage and widespread use of Latin as the lingua franca of intellectuals, and the Christian Church.” However, the small nation states that warred for political and religious reasons created small arenas where ideas could be tested against one another. Successful ideas were copied regardless of the religious affiliation of the inventor, because rulers could not afford to get behind in the technological arms race. Heretics could easily escape across borders, where they were often welcomed as the enemy of one’s enemy and given patronage and protection. There they could smuggle back innovations through the newly ubiquitous printing press. 

Europe created a competition for ideas, but also an atmosphere where both propositional and practical knowledge flourished and were combined and reinterpreted. Scientists, mathematicians, and philosophers interacted with engineers, explorers, cartographers, and farmers to create inventions that helped the lives of everyday man, while also reconceptualizing the metaphysical reality of humanity. The distinctions between intellectuals and artisans blurred. That combination was powerful. Christianity encouraged a homocentric worldview where nature was expected to bend to the will of man. Science, in the puritanical view, became the study of God’s creation and inventions, discoveries, and technical improvements were not seen as heretical, but the blessings of God. “The ideal life was one that efficiently deployed one’s ability for personal advantage and public service and glorified God by maximizing one’s material resources.” It was Weber’s Protestant ethic at work. “The systematic and meticulous study of God’s creation was the closest a Calvinist could get to an inscrutable deity that could not be grasped by the cultivated intellect.” 

The two men who contributed most to this sea change were Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton. Bacon felt “knowledge ought to bear fruit in production, science ought to be applicable to industry, and it was people’s sacred duty to improve and transform the material conditions of life.” His method was a bottom-up empirical induction, rather than the deductive philosophizing favored by Aristotle and Descartes. Bacon wanted facts, datum, and proof: a proto-positivist. Newton expanded on this thirst for quantification and measurement. He was not interested in a grand encompassing system, but more modest truths. 

The Republic of Letters codified a system to share knowledge across national boundaries and religious sects. Through prestige and censure, the system also rewarded individuals for generating useful knowledge and new concepts. It finally paid reputationally and financially (through patronage), to be original. The Republic of Letters was a clearinghouse for new ideas that rewarded “property rights” through crediting the inventor. The main rules “were freedom of entry, contestability, that is, the right to challenge any form of knowledge, transnationality, and a commitment to placing new knowledge in the public domain.” Furthermore, qualitatively, it prized different kinds of knowledge. “The most important of these were the ever-growing use of mathematics where it was applicable (astronomy and mechanics), the validity of experimental data in those fields where experiments were possible, and the collection and careful taxonomy of empirical observations where neither of these approaches worked (e.g., in botany and entomology).” The Republic of Letters created a merit based system which encapsulated a single European group mind, where people could build on the knowledge of others through shared notes, papers, and books. 

The last section of Mokyr’s book contrasts China of the same period. Mokyr reveals that in the Song Dynasty of the eleventh and twelfth centuries imperial China was actually leaps and bounds ahead of all of Europe. Measured by increased use in fossil fuels, iron, textiles, transport, agricultural productivity, and internal trade, the Song were on the verge of industrialization. But by 1500-1700 AD things had stagnated and even retrograded into decay. The culture did not sustain innovation and growth. Education was a state run monopoly that consisted entirely of Confucian classics and traditional writings. Examinations stressed rote memorization. The best students went exclusively into the civil service after studying only ancient philosophy. Medicine, mathematics, astronomy, and agriculture were held in low esteem. Confucianism denigrated all manual labor. There was a strict divide between scholars and artisans. Books and encyclopedic knowledge were kept in the hands of the Mandarin elite. The large geographical landmass, ruled centrally, instilled a homogeneity of thought. “Stability and domestic peace were increasingly regarded as an overriding value, and this included intellectual stability.” Heretical views were suppressed and rarely spread. Li Zhi, Wang Yangming, and Xu Guangqi all individually rose high in the bureaucracy, and had enlightened ideas regarding experimentation, practical applications of inventions, and even quasi-Epicurean philosophy, but their ideas did not survive beyond them. Neo-Confucians viewed world history as steadily in decline and antiquity was upheld as an ideal. 

Mokyr concludes by suggesting that European growth was sustained through two complimentary ideas: “the concept that knowledge and the understanding of nature can and should be used to advance the material conditions of humanity, and the belief that power and government are there not to serve the rich and powerful but society at large.”