“Spinoza: Life and Legacy” by Johnathan I. Israel

This biography of the philosopher, Baruch Spinoza, checks in at over twelve hundred pages. It has many digressions—about the two seventeenth century Anglo-Dutch wars, disputes amongst the many Protestant sects in Holland, a history of the Sephardim in Europe, as well as potted histories of Descartes and Hobbes, amongst others. All the asides give relevant, if excessive, background into Spinoza’s milieu.

To contemporaries, Spinoza was considered a heretic and an atheist, kicked out of his own synagogue in Amsterdam for his radical beliefs. He believed that all of nature was God. “Except God, no substance can be or be conceived.” Furthermore, he did not believe in free will, but instead a completely necessary consequentialism. “All things which follow from the absolute nature of any of God’s attributes have always had to exist and be infinite…. In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way…. The will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary one.” Israel expands, “Spinoza is especially concerned to reject all aspects of theological thinking that envisage mankind as a privileged segment of nature…. Hence, an important general consequence of Spinoza’s identifying God with nature is the removal of all conscious intent or purpose from God’s creative power, his sweeping denial of all divine teleology.”

Spinoza broke off from writing his great philosophical treatise, “The Ethics,” because he felt the political situation in the Netherlands demanded an immediate response in the kind of his “Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.” This book was a mix of biblical hermeneutics combined with anti-monarchist politics. Spinoza states, “If, finally, we remember that everybody’s loyalty to the state, like their faith in God, can only be known from their works, that is, from their charity toward their neighbor, it will not be doubted that the best state accords everyone the same liberty to philosophize as we showed that faith likewise allows.” He continues, “It is not the purpose of the state to turn people from rational beings into beasts or automata, but rather to allow their minds and bodies to develop in their own way in security and enjoy the free use of reason…. Therefore the true purpose of the state is in fact freedom…. [The] chief feature of a democratic state is that its excellence is valued much more highly in peace than in war.” Spinoza believed in a overriding social contract amongst citizens of a democratic republic. “No one can rightly obey God if they do not adapt pious observance to the public interest to which everyone is bound, and do not, as a consequence, obey all the decrees of the sovereign power.”

Spinoza believed scripture, whether Christian or Jewish, properly understood, is universal in its teachings. “What is most universally declared in Scripture (whether by prophets, scribes, or Christ) is that God exists, is one, and omnipotent, that he alone should be venerated and cares for all, favouring above others those who venerate him and love their neighbour as themselves, etc.” Spinoza sought to debunk the relevance of all occurrences of miracles in the Bible. “Miracles and ignorance I equate because those who try to erect the existence of God and religion on miracles seek to reveal something obscure by something more obscure which they are completely ignorant of.” On Jewish law, Spinoza opined, “With their state now dissolved, there is no doubt the Jews are no more bound by the Law of Moses than they were before the commencement of their community and state. For while dwelling among other peoples, before the Exodus from Egypt, they possessed no special laws, being bound only by the natural law along with the law of the state in which they were living, so far as it did not conflict with the natural divine law.” He continues by stressing that the Christian Apostles were simply teachers who were trying to convince others through philosophy, “The Apostles always employ arguments, so that they seem to be engaged in a debate rather than prophesying.” On Paul of Tarsus, Spinoza declares, “The long deductions and arguments of Paul, such as in the Epistle to the Romans, were not written on the basis of supernatural revelation. Rather, the Apostles’ modes of discourse and discussion very plainly reveal that they wrote their Epistles not on the basis of divine command and revelation, but simply that of their own natural judgment…. Finally, [Paul] says no one is blessed unless he has the mind of Christ in him (Romans 8:9) whereby undoubtedly one may understand God’s laws as eternal truths.” Spinoza continues, “All Christ’s teaching consists primarily of moral doctrine…. There can be no doubt that many disputes and schisms have arisen because different Apostles constructed religion on different foundations.”

In “The Ethics,” Spinoza describes the good life, “It is the part of a wise man, I say, to restore and refresh himself with moderate and pleasant food and drink, and also pleasant smells, with the beauty of vigorous plants, with decoration, music, games that exercise the body, theatre and all else of this sort which we all can enjoy without causing harm to another…. Such a style of life accords best both with our principles and the common practice…. The greater the joy we are affected with, the higher the perfection to which we ascend, that is the more we participate in the divine nature…. Nothing forbids our pleasure except a grim and sad superstition. For why is it more proper to relieve our hunger and thirst than to rid ourselves of melancholy?” Furthermore, for Spinoza, ethics is in harmony with human nature, rightly reasoned. “Virtue is nothing but acting from the laws of one’s own nature…. [Reason only requires] everyone love himself, seek his own advantage, what is really useful to him, and desire what will really lead men to greater perfection, and finally, that everyone should strive to preserve his own being as far as he can…. We ought to want virtue for its own sake.”

On the foundational basis of morality, Spinoza concludes, “For whether or not the moral teachings themselves receive the form of law, or are legislation from God himself, they are nevertheless divine and salutary, and the good stemming from virtue and love of God will be just as desirable whether we receive it from God as judge, or from the necessity of the divine nature. Nor are the bad things ensuing from evil actions and passions any less fearful because they follow from them necessarily. Thus, whether we do those thing that we do necessarily or contingently, we are still led by hope and fear.” His last words on the good life were, “No life, therefore is a life worth living without understanding, and things are good only insofar as they aid men to enjoy the life of the mind, which is defined by knowledge; while, on the contrary, only those things hindering man from perfecting his reason and leading a rational life can by us be called bad.”

“Theological-Political Treatise” by Baruch Spinoza (translated by Samuel Shirley)

This short text by Spinoza lays out what he sees as the differences in force between religious and civil law. The treatise is also a defense of liberalism, democracy, freedom of conscience, and free speech. As for all of his philosophical works, it was originally written in Latin as the “Tractatus Theologico-Politicus”. Spinoza begins by discussing the Judeo-Christian religious tradition and, specifically, the prophets. “Prophecy is inferior to natural knowledge, which needs no sign, but of its own nature carries certainty…. Moreover, the certainty afforded by prophecy was not a mathematical certainty, but only a moral certainty.” To this end, Spinoza discusses the means of God’s actions and the role of the natural order. “By God’s direction I mean the fixed and immutable order of Nature, or chain of events…. The universal laws of Nature according to which all things happen and are determined are nothing but God’s eternal decrees, which always involve eternal truth and necessity.”

According to Spinoza, it is man’s knowledge of God that makes him a moral creature. “Since the love of God is man’s highest happiness and blessedness, and the final end and aim of all human action, it follows that only he observes the Divine Law who makes it his object to love God not through fear of punishment nor through love of some other thing such as sensual pleasure, fame and so forth, but from the mere fact that he knows God, or knows that the knowledge and love of God is the supreme good. So the sum of the Divine Law and its chief command is to love God as the supreme good…. If we now consider the nature of the natural Divine Law as we have just explained it we shall see: 1. That it is of universal application, or common to all mankind. For we have deduced it from human nature as such…. 2. That it does not demand belief in historical narratives of any kind whatsoever. For since it is merely a consideration of human nature that leads us to this natural Divine Law, evidently it applies equally to Adam as to any other man, and equally to a man living in a community as to a hermit…. 3. We see that the natural Divine Law does not enjoin ceremonial rites, that is, actions which in themselves are of no significance and are termed good merely by tradition…. For the natural light of reason enjoins nothing that is not within the compass of reason…. 4. Finally, we see that the supreme reward of the Divine Law is the law itself, namely, to know God and to love him in true freedom with all our heart and mind.”

For Spinoza, the existence of God is a necessity. “It is only in concession to the understanding of the multitude and the defectiveness of their thought that God is described as a lawgiver or ruler, and is called just, merciful and so on, and that in reality God acts and governs all things solely from the necessity of his own nature and perfection, and his decrees and volitions are eternal truths, always involving necessity.”

After discussing the Torah, Spinoza brings in the teachings of Christ. “Although religion as preached by the Apostles—who simply related the story of Christ—does not come within the scope of reason, yet its substance, which consists essentially in moral teachings, as does the whole of Christ’s doctrine, can be readily grasped by everyone by the natural light of reason.” Spinoza continues on the properties of the Divine Law, “There can be no doubt that the Divine Law has come down to us in this respect uncorrupted. From the Scripture itself we learn that its message, unclouded by any doubt or any ambiguity, is in essence this, to love God above all, and one’s neighbor as oneself…. For this is the basis of the whole structure of religion; if it is removed, the entire fabric crashes to the ground…. Knowledge of God is God’s gift, not a command…. God through his prophets asks no other knowledge of himself than the knowledge of his divine justice and charity…. God is supremely just and supremely merciful, that is, the one perfect pattern of the true life…. The intellectual knowledge of God which contemplates his nature as it really is in itself—a nature which men cannot imitate by a set rule of conduct nor take as their example—has no bearing on the practice of a true way of life, on faith, and on revealed religion, and that consequently men can go far away in this matter without sinning.”

For Spinoza, obedience is the paramount requisite of religion. “The aim of Scripture is simply to teach obedience…. The message of the Gospel is one of simple faith; that is, belief in God and reverence for God, or—which is the same thing—obedience to God…. It is also undeniable that he who by God’s commandments loves his neighbor as himself is truly obedient and blessed according to the Law…. Scripture does not require us to believe anything beyond what is necessary for fulfilling of the said commandment…. Therefore the commandment is the one and only guiding principle for the entire common faith of mankind, and through this commandment alone should be determined all the tenets of faith that every man is duty bound to accept…. All else can legitimately be inferred simply by the process of reason.”

Spinoza expands on the nature of reason and how it complements religion. “Neither is theology required to be subordinate to reason nor reason to theology…. Each has its own domain. The domain of reason, as we have said, is truth and wisdom, the domain of theology is piety and obedience…. Theology defines its religious dogmas only so far as suffices to secure obedience, and it leaves it to reason to decide exactly how these dogmas are to be understood in respect of truth; for reason is in reality the light of the mind…. Theology thus understood, if you consider its precepts and moral teaching, will be found to agree with reason; and if you look to its purpose and end, it will be found to be in no respect opposed to reason, and is therefore valid for all men.”

Finally, Spinoza touches on politics and the nature of the State. “There is nobody who does not desire to live in safety free from fear, as far as is possible. But this cannot come about as long as every individual is permitted to do just as he pleases, and reason can claim no more right than hatred and anger…. In order to achieve a secure and good life, men had necessarily to unite in one body. They therefore arranged that the unrestricted right naturally possessed by each individual should be put into common ownership, and that this right should no longer be determined by the strength and appetite of the individual, but by the power and will of all together…. They had to bind themselves by the most stringent pledges to be guided in all matters only by the dictates of reason…. Every state must necessarily preserve its own form, and cannot be changed without incurring the danger of utter ruin.”

“Ethics” by Baruch Spinoza (translated by Samuel Shirley)

Spinoza’s treatise builds up a system of ethics from the most basic foundations. His method is to posit definitions, axioms, and propositions, and then validate them through proofs, scholiums, and corollaries. Spinoza begins with Part I, “Concerning God.” First, some definitions: “By substance I mean that which is in itself and is conceived through itself…. By God I mean an absolutely infinite being, that is, substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence…. That thing is said to be free [liber] which exists solely from the necessity of its own nature, and is determined to action by itself alone.” Proposition 8 states: “Every substance is necessarily infinite.” Scholium 2 of that proposition expounds, in part: “Those who do not know the true causes of things confuse things…. So too, those who confuse the divine nature with human nature easily ascribe to God human emotions…. But if men were to attend to the nature of substance, they would not doubt at all the truth of Proposition 7…. For by substance they would understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that the knowledge of which does not require the knowledge of any other thing.” Spinoza’s proofs are very detailed and build brick by brick from the ground up. The treatise also gets a little tedious at the start. Later, Spinoza states, “All things depend on the power of God. For things to be able to be otherwise than as they are, God’s will, too, would necessarily have to be different. But God’s will cannot be different (as we have just shown most clearly from the consideration of God’s perfection). Therefore, neither can things be different.” Proven.

Part II concerns “Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind.” Here Spinoza delves a bit into the nature of the will and its freedom. “If by intellect is meant clear and distinct ideas only, I grant that the will extends more widely than the intellect, but I deny that the will extends more widely than perceptions, that is, the faculty of conceiving…. Suspension of judgment is really a perception, not free will…. I grant that the imaginings of the mind, considered in themselves, involve no error (see Sch. Pr. 17, II). But I deny that a man makes no affirmation insofar as he has a perception…. The will is a universal term predicated of all ideas and signifying only what is common to all ideas, namely, affirmation, the adequate essence of which, insofar as it is thus conceived as an abstract term, must be in every single idea, and the same in all in this respect only…. There is nothing in ideas that constitutes the form of falsity…. It is important to note here how easily we are deceived when we confuse universals with particulars, and mental constructs [entia rationis] and abstract terms with real.” He concludes Part II by dealing with virtue, fortune, and contingency. “We clearly understand how far astray from the true estimation of virtue are those who, failing to understand that virtue itself and the service of God are happiness itself and utmost freedom, expect God to bestow on them highest rewards in return for their virtue and meritorious actions as if in return for the basest slavery…. [Virtue] teaches us what attitude we should adopt regarding fortune, or the things that are not in our power, that is, the things that do not follow from our nature; namely, to expect and to endure with patience both faces of fortune.”

Part III is titled “Concerning the Origin and Nature of the Emotions.” Spinoza believes that the only three basic emotions are pleasure, pain, and desire. All the other emotions derive from these three. He begins with a definition, “By emotion [affectus] I understand the affections of the body by which the body’s power of activity is increased or diminished, assisted or checked, together with the ideas of these affections.” He believes that the conatus, the tendency toward self-preservation and activity, is the most basic purpose of man. “The conatus with which each thing endeavors to persist in its own being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself.” For man, desire precedes the good. “We do not endeavor, will, seek after or desire because we judge a thing to be good. On the contrary, we judge a thing to be good because we endeavor, will, seek after and desire it.” He states, “Pleasure is man’s transition from a state of less perfection to a state of greater perfection…. Pain is man’s transition from a state of greater perfection to a state of less perfection…. I say “transition,” for pleasure is not perfection itself. If a man were to be born with the perfection to which he passes, he would be in possession of it without the emotion of pleasure.”

Part IV deals with the topic, “Of Human Bondage, Or the Strength of the Emotions.” We are beginning to delve into Spinoza’s system of ethics proper. He feels that there is a tug between the reason of the mind and the base emotions. “I assign the term “bondage” to man’s lack of power to control and check the emotions. For a man at the mercy of his emotions is not his own master but is subject to fortune, in whose power he so lies that he is often compelled, although he sees the better course, to pursue the worse.” Spinoza continues, “Desire is the very essence of man…. Since reason demands nothing contrary to nature, it therefore demands that every man should love himself, should seek his own advantage (I mean his real advantage), should aim at whatever really leads a man toward greater perfection, and, to sum it all up, that each man, as far as in him lies, should endeavor to preserve his own being…. Since virtue (Def. 8, IV) is nothing other than to act from the laws of one’s own nature, and since nobody endeavors to preserve his own being (Pr. 7, III) except from the laws of his own nature, it follows firstly that the basis of virtue is the very conatus to preserve one’s own being, and that happiness consists in a man’s being able to preserve his own being. Secondly, it follows that virtue should be sought for its own sake, and that there is nothing preferable to it or more to our advantage, for the sake of which it should be sought.”

Next, Spinoza seeks to spell out the advantages of civil society between men. “Nothing is more advantageous to man than man. Men, I repeat, can wish for nothing more excellent for preserving their own being than that they should all be in such harmony in all respects that their minds and bodies should compose, as it were, one mind and one body, and that all together should endeavor as best they can to preserve their own being, and that all together they should aim at the common advantage of all…. It follows that men are governed by reason, that is, men who aim at their own advantage under the guidance of reason, seek nothing for themselves that they would not desire for the rest of mankind; and so are just, faithful, and honorable…. Knowledge of good and evil is (Pr. 8, IV) the emotion of pleasure or pain insofar as we are conscious of it, and therefore every man (Pr, 28, III) necessarily seeks what he judges to be good and avoids what he judges to be evil. But this appetite is nothing other than man’s very essence or nature.”

Spinoza also deals with the concepts of natural rights and their diminution in society. “Every man exists by the sovereign natural right, and consequently by the sovereign natural right every man does what follows from the necessity of his nature…. In order that men may live in harmony and help one another, it is necessary for them to give up their natural right and to create a feeling of mutual confidence that they will refrain from any action that may be harmful to another…. Society can be established, provided that it claims for itself the right that every man has of avenging himself and deciding what is good and what is evil; and furthermore if it has the power to prescribe common rules of behavior and to pass laws to enforce them, not by reason, which is incapable of checking the emotions (Sch. Pr. 17, IV), but by threats…. Wrongdoing is therefore nothing other than disobedience, which is therefore punishable only by the right of the State…. In a state of nature nothing can be said to be just or unjust; this is so only in a civil state…. Justice and injustice, wrongdoing and merit, are extrinsic notions, not attributes that explicate the nature of the mind.”

Spinoza, nonetheless, next posits on right conduct, obeying proper reason. “A free man thinks of death least of all things, and his wisdom is a meditation of life.” He has a practical concept of dealing with the masses of the ignorant. “The free man who lives among ignorant people tries as far as he can to avoid receiving favors from them…. Every man judges what is good according to his own way of thinking (Sch. Pr. 39, III). Thus the ignorant man who has conferred a favor on someone will value it according to his own way of thinking…. To avoid both the hatred of the ignorant and the need to comply with their expectations, and so as to make reason his sole ruler, he will endeavor as far as he can to avoid their favors.” Spinoza is also practical in the application of courage. “For a free man timely retreat is as much a mark of courage as is fighting, the free man chooses flight by the same courage or spiritedness as he chooses battle.”

Finally, Spinoza returns to the idea of external fortune, contingency, and fate. “Human power is very limited and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes, and so we do not have absolute power to adapt to our purposes things external to us. However, we shall patiently bear whatever happens to us that is contrary to what is required by consideration of our own advantage, if we are conscious that we have done our duty and that our power was not extensive enough for us to have avoided the said things, and that we are a part of the whole of Nature whose order we follow…. We can desire nothing but that which must be, nor, in an absolute sense, can we find contentment in anything but truth.”

The final Part V of Spinoza’s treatise is titled, “Of the Power of the Intellect, Or of Human Freedom.” He advises following fixed rules in governing one’s day to day affairs. “The best course we can adopt, as long as we do not have perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to conceive a right method of living, or fixed rules of life, and to commit them to memory and continually apply them to particular situations that are frequently encountered in life, so that our casual thinking is thoroughly permeated by them and they are always ready to hand.” He ends with a last bit of healthy advice and an exultation, “If the road I have pointed out as leading to this goal seems very difficult, yet it can be found. Indeed, what is so rarely discovered is bound to be hard. For if salvation were ready to hand and could be discovered without great toil, how could it be that it is almost universally neglected? All things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.”