Friday, October 18, 2024
“Symposium” by Plato (translated by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff)
Friday, June 21, 2024
“Protagoras” by Plato (translated by Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell).
Friday, September 22, 2023
“Gorgias” by Plato (translated by Donald J. Zeyl)
Friday, March 17, 2023
“Critias” by Plato (translated by Diskin Clay)
This dialogue is mainly a single speech by Critias. The speech is on the ancient mythical war between Athens and Atlantis. He first references the wealth and power of Athens’ ancient past, “For it is in the train of Leisure that Mythology and Inquiry into the Past arrive in cities, once they have observed that in the case of some peoples the necessities of life have been secured, but not before.” He claims that, back then, Athens was governed more like Plato’s proposed Republic, “Now, at that time, the other classes of citizens who dwelt in our city were engaged in manufacture and producing food from the earth, but the warrior class that had originally been separated from them by god-like men lived apart. They had all that was appropriate to their training and education. None of them had any private possession, but they thought of all their possessions as the common property of all, and they asked to receive nothing from the other citizens beyond what they needed to live.”
The dialogue ends abruptly, mid-sentence, and without conclusion. Towards its end, Critias describes the manner and morals of Atlantis in its own heyday, “For many generations and as long as enough of their divine nature survived, they were obedient unto their laws and they were well disposed to the divinity they were kin to. They possessed conceptions that were true and entirely lofty. And in their attitude to disasters and chance events that constantly befall men and in their relations with one another they exhibited a combination of mildness and prudence, because, except for virtue, they held all else in disdain and thought of their present good fortune of no consequence. They bore their vast wealth of gold and other possessions without difficulty, treating them as if they were a burden. They did not become intoxicated with luxury of the life their wealth made possible; they did not lose their self-control and slip into decline, but in their sober judgment they could see distinctly that even their very wealth increased with their amity and its companion, virtue. But they saw that both wealth and concord decline as possessions become pursued and honored. And virtue perishes with them as well…. But when the divine portion in them began to grow faint as it was often blended with great quantities of mortality and as their human nature gradually gained ascendancy, at that moment, in their inability to bear their great good fortune, they became disordered…. Inwardly they were filled with an unjust lust for possessions and power.”
Friday, March 3, 2023
“Menexenus” by Plato (translated by Paul Ryan)
This dialogue was known in antiquity as the “Funeral Oration” and is mainly comprised of a speech that Socrates claims was handed down to him by Aspasia, Pericles’ renown mistress. Socrates tells Menexenus that he takes no responsibility for its contents, themes, and veracity. Still, Menexenus has his doubts about who is the speech’s real author. The oration concerns Athens’ war dead and the themes of courage, virtue, glory, and heroism. Socrates begins, “Indeed, dying in war looks like a splendid fate in many ways…. They became brave by being sons of brave fathers. Let us, therefore, extoll first their noble birth, second their rearing and education. After that, let us put on view the deeds they performed, showing that they were noble and worthy of their birth and upbringing.”
Socrates proceeds to recount not only Athens’ recent war heroes, but first goes back, past the Peloponnesian War even, to the ancient wars with Persia. He begins with Athens’ most illustrious ancestors. “Those men were fathers not only of our bodies but of our freedom, ours and that of everyone on this continent.” He then continues to boast about Athens, “The opinion gained currency that our city could never be defeated in war, not even by all mankind. And that belief was true. We were overcome by our own quarrels, not by other men; by them we remain undefeated to this day, but we conquered ourselves and suffered defeat at our won hands.” After all, the more recent loss to Sparta in the Peloponnesian War and the Civil War of the Thirty Tyrants have to be explained away.
Finally, Socrates returns to the valor of the war dead and what the present generation of Athenians owe to their ancestors, “We must remember the fallen, and every man, just as in war, must encourage their descendants not to desert the ranks of their ancestors and not to yield to cowardice and fall back…. Free to live on ignobly, we prefer to die nobly rather than subject you and your descendants to reproach and bring disgrace on our fathers and all our ancestors. We consider the life of one who has brought disgrace on his own family no life…. Do whatever you do to the accompaniment of valor, knowing that without it all possessions and all ways of life are shameful and base. For neither does wealth confer distinction on one who possesses it with cowardice (the riches of a man like that belong to another, not himself) nor do bodily beauty and strength, when they reside in a worthless and cowardly man, seem to suit him…. All knowledge cut off from rectitude and the rest of virtue has the look of low cunning, not wisdom…. For a man with self-respect nothing is more disgraceful than to make himself honored not through himself, but through his ancestors’ glory…. For that man’s life is best arranged for whom all, or nearly all, the things that promote happiness depend on himself.”
Friday, February 10, 2023
“Lysis” by Plato (translated by Stanley Lombardo)
In this dialogue, with an unnamed companion, Socrates recounts a discussion he has had with two noble youths, Lysis and Menexenus, at a wrestling school. The theme of their discussion was the meaning and nature of friendship. As often for Socrates, the discussion ends with no resolution, even to the definition of friendship. Instead, Socrates takes the group around in circles, poking at this and that aspect of friendship. At first, the definition seems so simple, as Socrates addresses the two boys, “And friends have everything in common, as the saying goes; so in this respect the two of you won’t differ, that is, if what you said about being friends is true.”
At the outset, Socrates discloses, “You know how it is, everybody is different: one person wants to own horses, another dogs, another wants money, and another fame. Well, I’m pretty lukewarm about those things, but when it comes to having friends I’m absolutely passionate, and I would rather have a good friend than the best quail or gamecock known to man, and, I swear by Zeus above, more than any horse or dog. There’s no doubt in my mind, by the Dog, that I would rather possess a friend than all Darius’ gold, or even than Darius himself. That’s how much I value friends and companions.”
After leading the boys around for a bit, Socrates proposes, “Those who are already wise no longer love wisdom, whether they are gods or men. Nor do those love it who are so ignorant that they are bad, for no bad and stupid man loves wisdom. There remain only those who have this bad thing, ignorance, but have not yet been made ignorant and stupid by it. They are conscious of not knowing what they don’t know. The upshot is that those who are bad do not, and neither do those who are good…. We have discovered for sure what is a friend and what it is a friend to. For we maintain that in the soul and in the body and everywhere, that which is neither good nor bad itself is, by the presence of evil, a friend to the good.”
Not so fast. Later Socrates asks, “Can it really be, as we were just saying, that desire is the cause of friendship, and that what desires is a friend to that which it desires, and is so whenever it does so? And that what we were saying earlier about being a friend was all just chatter…. A thing desires what it is deficient in…. And the deficient is a friend to that in which it is deficient…. And it becomes deficient where something is taken away from it…. Then it is what belongs to oneself, it seems, that passionate love and friendship and desire are directed towards…. And if you two are friends with each other, then in some way you naturally belong to each other…. And if one person desires another, my boys, or loves him passionately, he would not desire him or love him passionately or as a friend unless he somehow belonged to his beloved either in his soul or in some characteristic, habit, or aspect of his soul…. What belongs to us by nature has shown itself to us as something we must love.” In the end, Socrates admits, “These people here will go away saying that we are friends of one another—for I count myself in with you—but what a friend is we have not yet been able to find out.”
Friday, January 27, 2023
“Laches” by Plato (translated by Rosamond Kent Sprague)
This dialogue is on the Greek concept of andreia, literally meaning manliness, but most often translated by moderns as courage. Socrates and his interlocutors begin by seeking to define the concept and then to ruminate on its worth. As in many of Plato’s Socratic dialogues, there is no satisfactory conclusion to the debate. The pretext of the conversation is the proper manner for the general education of two particular noble youth and, only secondarily, the benefits of instilling courage in them. To that end, Socrates initially comments, “I think it is by knowledge that one ought to make decisions, if one is to make them well, and not by majority rule.”
Nicias gives due praise, of sorts, to Socrates’ methods, “Whoever comes into close contact with Socrates and associates with him in conversation must necessarily, even if he began by conversing about something quite different in the first place, keep on being led about by the man’s arguments until he submits to answering questions about himself concerning both his present manner of life and the life he has lived hitherto. And when he does submit to this questioning, you don’t realize that Socrates will not let him go before he has well and truly tested every last detail…. I think that a man who does not run away from such treatment but is willing, according to the saying of Solon, to value learning as long as he lives, not supposing that old age brings him wisdom of itself, will necessarily pay more attention to the rest of his life.”
For Socrates, it is necessary to strip away the layers and to get down to the nature of the thing in itself—in this case, courage. “Whenever a man considers a thing for the sake of another thing, he is taking counsel about that thing for the sake of which he was considering, and not about what he was investigating for the sake of something else.” As is his want, Socrates leads the debate around in circles, questioning conclusions just previously agreed to and pushing the point of argument to all its extremes, “Now foolish daring and endurance was found by us to be not only disgraceful but harmful, in what we said earlier…. But now, on the contrary, we are saying that a disgraceful thing, foolish endurance, is courage.” There is no conclusion to this dialogue, but Socrates does propose, “In addition to courage, I call temperance and justice and everything else of this kind parts of virtue. Don't you?”
Friday, January 6, 2023
“Charmides” by Plato (translated by Rosamond Kent Sprague)
This dialogue is a long digression on the definition of temperance and on its possible worth. The editor, John M. Cooper, interjects, “The subject of discussion is the virtue of ‘sophrosune’, here translated ‘temperance’—but there is no adequate translation in modern European languages. Sophrosune means a well-developed consciousness of oneself and one’s legitimate duties in relation to others (where it will involve self-restraint and showing due respect) and in relation to one’s own ambitions, social standing, and the relevant expectations as regards to one’s own behavior. It is an aristocrat’s virtue par excellence, involving a sense of dignity and self-command.” The dialogue ends without being adequately resolved, but the reader goes on quite the journey, as Socrates guides through many twists and turns of thought along the way.
First, Socrates tries to confirm with Critias a working definition of temperance, “Then only the temperate man will know himself and will be able to examine what he knows and does not know, and in the same way he will be able to inspect other people to see when a man does in fact know what he knows and thinks he knows, and when again he does not know what he thinks he knows, and no one else will be able to do this. And being temperate and temperance and knowing oneself amount to this, to knowing what one knows and does not know.” Socrates continues, “Let us now grant this point, that the existence of a science of science is possible…. If this is perfectly possible, is it any more possible to know what one knows and does not know? We did say, I think, that knowing oneself and being temperate consisted in this?” Socrates is still perplexed, “I still don’t understand how knowing what one knows and does not know is the same thing as knowledge of self…. If temperance is only the science of science and absence of science, it will not be able to distinguish the doctor who knows the particulars of his art from the one who does not know them but pretends or supposes he does, nor will it recognize any other genuine practitioner whatsoever, except the man in its own field, the way other craftsmen do.”
Socrates is still not satisfied with their concept of temperance, “If, as we assumed in the beginning the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know (and that he knows the former but not the latter) and were able to investigate another man who was in the same situation, then it would be of the greatest benefit to us to be temperate. Because those of us who had temperance would live lives free from error and so would all those who were under our rule…. If temperance really ruled over us and were as we now define it, surely everything would be done according to science…. But whether acting scientifically would make us fare well and be happy, this we have yet to learn.”
Finally, Socrates admonishes Critias for leading him astray, after all, “All this time you’ve been leading me right round in a circle and concealing from me that it was not living scientifically that was making us fare well and be happy, even if we possessed all the sciences put together, but that we have to have this one science of good and evil…. Then this science, at any rate, is not temperance, as it seems, but that one of which the function is to benefit us. For it is not a science of science and absence of science but of good and evil. So that, if this latter one is beneficial, temperance would be something else for us.” Socrates concludes, “We conceded that there was a science of science when the argument did not allow us to make this statement. Again, we conceded that this science knew the tasks of the other sciences, when the argument did not allow us to say this either, so that our temperate man should turn out to be knowing, both that he knows things he knows and does not know things he does not know. And we made this concession in the most prodigal manner, quite overlooking the impossibility that a person should in some fashion know what he does not know at all—because our agreement amounts to saying he knows things he does not know…. It has very insolently exposed as useless the definition of temperance which we agreed upon and invented earlier.”
Friday, December 9, 2022
“Cratylus” by Plato (translated by C.D.C. Reeve)
This dialogue, by Plato, involves Socrates debating both Hermogenes and Cratylus. It focuses on the concept of names, their origins, and their innate correctness. Socrates suggests, “It’s the work of a rule-setter, it seems, to make a name. And if names are to be given well, a dialectician must supervise him…. So Cratylus is right in saying that things have natural names, and that not everyone is a craftsman of names, but only someone who looks to the natural name of each thing and is able to put form into letters and syllables…. This much is clearer than before, that names do possess some sort of natural correctness and that it isn’t every man who knows how to name things well.”
Later on in the discussion, Socrates considers the history of naming, “We are most likely to find correctly given names among those concerned with the things that by nature always are, since it is proper for their names to be given with the greatest care…. If we ever get hold of a name that isn’t composed out of other names, we’ll be right to say that at last we’ve reached an element, which cannot any longer be carried back to other names…. And if primary names are indeed names, they must make the things that are as clear as possible to us…. We said that the correctness of a name consists in displaying the nature of the thing it names…. Now, a name is an imitation, just as a painting or portrait is…. Both convention and usage must contribute something to expressing what we mean when we speak…. When you know what a name is like, and it is like the thing it names, then you also know the thing.”
Socrates concludes by assessing whether the name or the thing itself is what must first be comprehended. “The name-giver might have made a mistake at the beginning and then forced the other names to be consistent with it…. That’s why every man must think a lot about the first principles of any thing and investigate them thoroughly to see whether or not it’s correct to assume them…. It seems like it must be possible to learn about the things that are, independently of names…. It’s really the case that one can learn about things through names and that one can also learn about them through themselves…. It is far better to investigate them and learn about them through themselves than to do so through their names.”
Friday, June 17, 2022
“Meno” by Plato (translated by G.M.A. Grube)
This short dialogue has Socrates speaking with Meno, a young aristocrat from Thessaly, about the nature of virtue. Particularly, they are interested in figuring out whether virtue is innate or whether it can be learned. In fact, Meno initially asks, “Can you tell me, Socrates, can virtue be taught? Or is it not teachable but the result of practice, or is it neither of these, but men possess it by nature or in some other way?” After some typically frustrating Socratic back and forth, Meno remains apoplectic, “But, Socrates, do you really not know what virtue is?” Socrates responds typically, “Not only that, my friend, but also that, as I believe, I have never met anyone else who did know.”
Before revealing his answer in his usual roundabout manner, Socrates delves into a couple fruitful asides. The first is on the nature of shape and color. Socrates states, “Let us try to tell you what shape is. See whether you will accept that it is this: Let us say that shape is that which alone of existing things always follows color…. From this you may understand what I mean by shape, for I say this of every shape, that a shape is that which limits a solid; in a word, a shape is the limit of a solid.” Secondly (and more famously), Socrates delves into the paradox of knowledge and learning, the so-called Meno’s Paradox, “Do you realize what a debater’s argument you are bringing up, that a man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not know? He cannot search for what he knows—since he knows it, there is no need to search—nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for.”
Next, Socrates goes into yet another digression on the Sophists and their inability to teach virtue. He then recites a litany of the great men of Athens and pontificates on their inabilities to teach their own sons virtue, at one point even insulting Anytus, Meno’s host while in Athens. Socrates is not deterred, concluding by speaking about the Athenian statesman (not the historian), “Reflect that Thucydides too brought up two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, that he educated them well in all other things. They were the best wrestlers in Athens…. He belonged to a great house; he had great influence in the city and among other Greeks, so that if virtue could be taught he would have found the man who could make his sons good men, be it a citizen or a stranger, if he himself did not have the time because of his public concerns. But, friend Anytus, virtue certainly cannot be taught.” The implications for the sons of Athens (and their qualities) are left unsaid.
Socrates, finally, wraps up this debate (largely with himself), letting both Anytus and Meno off the hook. Socrates concludes, “True opinion is in no way a worse guide to correct action than knowledge. It is this that we omitted in our investigation of the nature of virtue, when we said that only knowledge can lead to correct action, for true opinion can do so also…. For true opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good, but they are not willing to remain long, and they escape from a man’s mind, so they are not worth much until one ties them down by (giving) an account of the reason why. And that, Meno, my friend, is recollection, as we previously agreed. After they are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, and then they remain in place. That is why knowledge is prized higher than correct opinion…. And that only these two things, true belief and knowledge, guide correctly, and that if a man possesses these he gives correct guidance. The things that turn out right by some chance are not due to human guidance, but where there is correct human guidance it is due to two things, true belief and knowledge…. Now because it cannot be taught, virtue no longer seems to be knowledge…. Therefore, if it is not through knowledge, the only alternative is that it is through right opinion that statesmen follow the right course for their cities. As regards knowledge, they are no different from soothsayers and prophets…. Virtue would be neither an inborn quality nor taught, but comes to those who possess it as a gift from the gods which is not accompanied by understanding.”
Friday, December 31, 2021
“Phaedrus” by Plato (translated by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff)
Friday, September 10, 2021
“Theaetetus” by Plato (translated by M.J. Levett & Myles Burnyeat)
Friday, April 16, 2021
“Ion” by Plato (translated by Paul Woodruff)
This is a short dialogue between Socrates and Ion, a rhapsode (a reciter of the poetry of Homer), on his profession, the nature of poetry, mastery of knowledge, and divine inspiration. Socrates asserts, “You are powerless to speak about Homer on the basis of knowledge or mastery. Because if your ability came by mastery, you would be able to speak about all the other poets as well. Look, there is an art to poetry as a whole…. That’s not a subject you have mastered—speaking well about Homer; it’s a divine power that moves you…. The Muse makes some people inspired herself, and then through those who are inspired a chain of other enthusiasts is suspended. You know, none of the epic poets, if they’re good, are masters of their subject; they are inspired, possessed, and that is how they utter all those beautiful poems…. For a poet is an airy thing, winged and holy, and he is not able to make poetry until he becomes inspired and goes out of his mind and his intellect in his possession he will always lack the power to make poetry or sing prophecy.” One must remember what Socrates has already said about poets, and Homer in particular, corrupting the well-ordered city-state in “Republic” and “Phaedrus” through their madness as opposed to philosophers. Socrates also cannot help but to get in one little dig at Ion, contrasting himself, “As for me, I say nothing but the truth, as you’d expect from an ordinary man.”
Friday, April 2, 2021
“Euthydemus” by Plato (translated by Rosamond Kent Sprague)
In this dialogue Socrates discusses with his friend, Crito, the teachings of two Sophists, Euthydemus, and his brother, Dionysodorus. On the surface, Socrates seems to be praising their style of argumentation. He even recommends that he and Crito go to the brothers to take lessons in reasoning. Socrates states, “These two are first of all completely skilled in body, being highly adept at fighting in armor and able to teach this skill to anyone else who pays them a fee; and then they are the ones best able to fight the battle of the law court and to teach other people both how to deliver and how to compose the sort of speeches suitable for the courts…. They have now mastered the one form of fighting they had previously left untried; as a result, not a single man can stand up to them, they have become so skilled in fighting in arguments and in refuting whatever may be said, no matter whether it is true or false.” The reader might already question whether this is damning them with faint praise.
In the course of relating to Crito the back and forth between the Sophists and him, Socrates describes the preeminent value of the right kind of wisdom. He argues, “Even if all the gold in the world should be ours with no trouble and without digging for it, we should be no better off—no, not even if we knew how to make stones into gold would the knowledge be worth anything. For unless we also knew how to use the gold, there appeared to be no value in it…. Nor does there seem to be any value in any other sort of knowledge which knows how to make things, whether money making or medicine or any other such thing, unless it knows how to use what it makes…. Again, if there exists the knowledge to make men immortal, but without the knowledge of how to use this immortality, there seems to be no value in it, if we are to conclude anything from what has already been settled.”
Socrates also discusses with Crito those advisors to politicians who wish to dip their toes into both the worlds of knowledge and action. “These are the persons, Crito, whom Prodicus describes as occupying the no-man’s-land between the philosopher and the statesman. They think that they are the wisest of men, and that they not only are but seem to be so in the eyes of so many, so that no one else keeps them from enjoying universal esteem except the followers of philosophy…. They regard themselves as very wise, and reasonably so, since they think they are not only pretty well up in philosophy but also in politics. Yes, their conceit of wisdom is quite natural because they think they have as much of each as they need; and, keeping clear of both risk and conflict, they reap the fruits of wisdom…. Plausibility, is just what it does have, Crito, rather than truth. It is no easy matter to persuade them that a man or anything else which is between two things and partakes of both is worse than one and better than the other in the case where one of the things is good and the other evil; and that in the case where it partakes of two distinct goods, it is worse than either of them with respect to the end for which each of the two (of which it is composed) is useful…. Now if philosophy is a good, and so is the activity of the statesman (and each has a different end), and those partaking of both are in between, then these men are talking nonsense, since they are inferior to both.”
Socrates concludes by defending philosophy from the philosophers, not to mention the Sophists. “In every pursuit most of the practitioners are paltry and of no account whereas the serious men are few and beyond price…. Pay no attention to the practitioners of philosophy, whether good or bad. Rather give serious consideration to the thing itself.”
Friday, March 5, 2021
“Laws” by Plato (translated by Trevor J. Saunders)
This is Plato’s longest dialogue. It deals with establishing the proper laws for the founding of a hypothetical colony as a new State. An unnamed Athenian gives most of the answers as he debates Clinias, a Cretan, and Megillus, a Spartan, as they travel along from Cnossus together. First, the Athenian lays out the list of supreme human and divine benefits. “Health heads the list of the lesser benefits, followed by beauty; third comes strength, for racing and other physical exercises. Wealth is fourth—not “blind” wealth, but the clear-sighted kind whose companion is good judgment—and good judgment itself is the leading “divine” benefit; second comes the habitual self-control of a soul that uses reason. If you combine these two with courage, you get (thirdly) justice; courage itself lies in fourth place.” The lawmaker’s role is to encourage these virtues. “At every stage the lawgiver should supervise his people, and confer suitable marks of honor or disgrace…. He must use the laws themselves as instruments for the proper distribution of praise and blame.”
The lawmaker must use education to inculcate these higher virtues in the populus. “The earliest sensations that a child feels in infancy are of pleasure and pain, and this is the route by which virtue and vice first enter the soul…. I call ‘education’ the initial acquisition of virtue by the child, when the feelings of pleasure and affection, pain and hatred, that well up in his soul are channeled in the right courses before he can understand the reason why…. Virtue is this general concord of reason and emotion…. Education, then, is a matter of correctly disciplined feelings of pleasure and pain.” However, there is a difference. "Pleasant and painful things come to a stop simultaneously, whereas good things and bad ones do not, because they are in fact different things.” The proper education of a child is no easy task. “Of all wild things, the child is the most unmanageable: an unusually powerful spring of reason, whose waters are not yet canalized in the right direction, makes him sharp and sly, the most unruly animal there is.” A well-served education must last throughout a man’s life. “We do not hold the common view that a man’s highest good is to survive and simply continue to exist. His highest good is to become as virtuous as possible and to continue to exist in that state as long as life lasts.”
Next, the Athenian begins by detailing the aims in the basic formation of the State. “A state ought to be free and wise and enjoy internal harmony, and that is what the lawgiver should concentrate on in his legislation…. There are two mother-constitutions, so to speak, which you could fairly say have given birth to all the others. Monarchy is the proper name for the first, and democracy for the second…. It is absolutely vital for a political system to combine them… if it is to enjoy freedom and friendship applied with good judgment.”
The Athenian realizes that in every successful State there must be rulers who stand below the laws. “Such people are usually referred to as ‘rulers’, and if I have called them ‘servants of the laws’ it’s not because I want to mint a new expression but because I believe that the success or failure of a state hinges on this point more than on anything else…. If law is the master of the government and the government is its slave, then the situation is full of promise.” Laws must both be written down and embedded within the traditions of the society. “All the rules we are now working through are what people generally call ‘unwritten customs’, and all this sort of thing is precisely what they mean when they speak of ‘ancestral law’…. Although ‘laws’ is the wrong term for these things, we can’t afford to say nothing about them, because they are the bonds of the entire social framework, linking all written and established laws with those yet to be passed. They act in the same way as ancestral customs dating from time immemorial, which by virtue of being soundly established and instinctively observed, shield and protect existing written law…. We must do our best not to omit anything, great or small, whether ‘laws’, ‘habits’, or ‘institutions’, because they are all needed to bind a state together, and the permanence of the one kind of norm depends on that of the other.”
The Athenian adds some words of caution. “We should treat as the biggest enemy of the entire state the man who makes the laws into slaves, and the state into the servant of a particular interest, by subjecting them to the diktat of mere men.” Men must also know their place in society. “A reckless lack of respect for one’s betters is effrontery of peculiar viscousness, which springs from a freedom of inhibitions that has gone much too far.” The rulers and teachers bare the most responsibility. “Total ignorance over an entire field is never dangerous or disastrous; much more damage is done when a subject is known intimately and in detail, but has been improperly taught.” Vice is common to the common man, but the select few must rise above such pettiness. “Only a small part of mankind—a few highly-educated men of rare natural talent—is able to steel itself to moderation when assailed by various needs and desires; given the chance to get a lot of money, it’s a rare bird that’s sober enough to prefer a modest competence to wealth.”
Finally, the Athenian concludes by detailing the laws relationship to social relations and the common weal. “It is vital that men should lay down laws for themselves and live in obedience to them; otherwise they will be indistinguishable from wild animals of the utmost savagery. The reason is this: no man has sufficient natural gifts both to discern what benefits men in their social relationships and to be constantly ready and able to put his knowledge to the best practical use. The first difficulty is to realize the proper object of true political skill is not the interest of private individuals but the common good. This is what knits a state together, whereas private interests make it disintegrate. If the public interest is well served, rather than the private, then the individual and the community alike are benefited.” That is why, in the ideal State, reason must rule over all. “Knowledge is unsurpassed by any law or regulation; reason, if it is genuine and really enjoys its natural freedom, should have universal power: it is not right that it should be under the control of anything else, as though it were some sort of slave…. Law and regulation, which embody general principles… cannot provide for every individual case.”
In this exemplary society, dictated by the Athenian, obedience and lack of freedom among its citizens is a feature of the system, not a bug. “The vital point is that no one, man or woman, must ever be left without someone in charge of him; nobody must get into the habit of acting alone and independently…. In peace and war alike we must give our constant attention and obedience to our leader, submitting to his guidance even in tiny details…. In short, we must condition ourselves to an instinctive rejection of the very notion of doing anything without our companions; we must live a life in which we never do anything, if possible, except by combined and united action as members of a group…. This is what we must practice in peacetime, right from childhood—the exercise of authority over others and submission to them in turn. Freedom from control must be uncompromisingly eliminated from the life of all men, and of all the animals under their dominion.”