Showing posts with label Plato. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Plato. Show all posts

Friday, October 18, 2024

“Symposium” by Plato (translated by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff)

This semi-drunken dinner party is perhaps Plato’s most famous dialogue. All the guests speak on the theme of love and Socrates gets the last word, at least before a fall-down drunk Alcibiades stumbles into the party. Socrates begins by relating the words of a woman, Diotima, who has taught him the true meaning of love. He relates that she said, “Those who love wisdom fall in between those two extremes [of being wise and ignorant]. And Love is one of them, because he is in love with what is beautiful, and wisdom is extremely beautiful. It follows that Love must be a lover of wisdom and, as such, is in between being wise and ignorant.” She continues speaking to Socrates, “I conclude that you thought Love was being loved, rather than being a lover. I think that’s why Love struck you as beautiful in every way: because it is what is really beautiful and graceful that deserves to be loved, and this is perfect and highly blessed; but being a lover takes a different form.” Love has two parts- the object being loved and the lover. One has attained its perfection and one is still striving.

Diotima also speaks of life having a continuity without necessarily a connectedness in a similar vein to Derrick Parfit. She states, “Even while each living thing is said to be alive and to be the same—as a person is said to be the same from childhood till he turns into an old man—even then he never consists of the same things, though he is called the same, but he is always being renewed and in other respects passing away, in his hair and flesh and bones and blood and his entire body. And it’s not just in his body, but in his soul, too, for none of his manners, customs, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, or fears ever remains the same.” We might seem to be the same person, but we are continually changing, while maintaining some continuity with our previous selves.

When Alcibiades makes his speech he talks about the man he wishes he was. He says, “All that matters is just what I most neglect…. The moment I leave [Socrates’] side, I go back to my old ways: I cave in to my desire to please the crowd…. I’m doing nothing about my way of life, though I have already agreed with him that I should.” As Agnes Callard has stated, Alcibiades aspires to be a different man. His moral compass is in the process of changing. He is fighting to become a better man, but he cannot let go of his lust for fame and public glory.

Finally, Alcibiades praises the unique wisdom of Socrates. He states, “If you were to listen to his arguments, at first they’d strike you as totally ridiculous; they’re clothed in words as course as the hides worn by the most vulgar satyrs. He’s always going on about pack asses, or blacksmiths, or cobblers, or tanners; he’s always making the same tired old points in the same tired old words. If you are foolish, or simply unfamiliar with him, you’d find it impossible not to laugh at his arguments. But if you see them when they open up like the statues [of Silenus], if you go behind their surface, you’ll realize that no other arguments make any sense. They’re truly worthy of a god, bursting with figures of virtue inside. They’re of great—no, of the greatest—importance for anyone who wants to become a truly good man.” True praise for the esoteric philosophy of Socrates.

Friday, June 21, 2024

“Protagoras” by Plato (translated by Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell).

In “Protagoras” Plato has Socrates recall a debate he has had with the sophist, Protagoras. Socrates has to urge Protagoras not to give long winded speeches, but to debate him succinctly. Socrates states, “To me, the mutual exchange of a dialogue is something quite distinct from a public address.” The back and forth in conversation is how Socrates prefers to probe for the truth.

In this dialogue, the questions entertained are whether virtue can be taught, and, perhaps even more importantly, what exactly the definition of virtue is to begin with, particularly whether virtue is one thing or can be many. Socrates starts out by explicitly stating that virtue cannot be taught. He says, “The wisest and best of our citizens are unable to transmit to others the virtues that they possess…. I just don’t think that virtue can be taught.” However, Protagoras claims that, while in other fields of expertise one is wise to only let the experts take the lead, in claims of justice and politics, everyone, particularly in democratic Athens, believes that they are qualified to judge. He states, “But when the debate involves political excellence, which must proceed entirely from justice and temperance, they accept advice from anyone, and with good reason, for they think that this particular virtue, political or civic virtue, is shared by all, or there wouldn’t be any cities…. They will say that everyone ought to claim to be just, whether they are or not, and that it is madness not to pretend to justice, since one must have some trace of it or not be human.” The sense of justice in us all is what makes us human, what makes us social, what allows us to develop cities and live together.

Socrates later asks, “Is virtue a single thing, with justice and temperance and piety its parts, or are the things I have just listed all names for a single entity?” There is quite the back and forth between the two philosophers, culminating in a debate on the nature of courage, of knowledge, of pleasure, of self-control, of aspiration, and on goodness and badness. Socrates prods Protagoras, “Those who make mistakes with regard to the choice of pleasure and pain, in other words, with regard to good and bad, do so because of a lack of knowledge, and not merely a lack of knowledge but a lack of that knowledge you agreed was measurement…. So that is what “being overcome by pleasure” is—ignorance in the highest degree…. Are not all actions leading toward living painlessly and pleasantly honorable and beneficial? And isn’t honorable activity good and beneficial?… Then if the pleasant is the good, no one who knows or believes there is something else better than what he is doing, something possible, will go on doing what he had been doing when he could be doing what is better. To give in to oneself is nothing other than ignorance, and to control oneself is nothing other than wisdom…. Now, one goes willingly towards the bad or what he believes to be bad; neither is it in human nature, so it seems, to want to go toward what one believes to be bad instead of to the good. And when he is forced to choose between one of two bad things, no one will choose the greater if he is able to choose the lesser…. If what I said up to now is true, then would anyone be willing to go toward what he dreads, when he can go toward what he does not?… When the courageous fear, their fear is not disgraceful; nor when they are confident is their confidence disgraceful…. So, can we conclude that cowardice is ignorance of what is and is not to be feared?… So the wisdom about what is and is not to be feared is courage and is the opposite of this ignorance?”

In the end, it is Protagoras who points out to Socrates that their positions have seemed to have changed. While pushing the point that virtue is one thing alone, knowledge, Socrates has admitted that it can indeed be taught. Protagoras states that someone looking on at their debate might claim, “Socrates and Protagoras, how ridiculous you are, both of you. Socrates, you said earlier that virtue cannot be taught, but now you are arguing the very opposite and have attempted to show that everything is knowledge—justice, temperance, courage—in which case, virtue would appear to be eminently teachable. On the other hand, if virtue is anything other than knowledge, as Protagoras has been trying to say, then it clearly would be unteachable. But, if it turns out to be wholly knowledge, as you now urge, Socrates, it would be very surprising indeed if virtue could not be taught. Now Protagoras maintained at first that it could be taught, but now he thinks the opposite, urging that hardly any of the virtues turn out to be knowledge. On that view, virtue could hardly be taught at all.”

Friday, September 22, 2023

“Gorgias” by Plato (translated by Donald J. Zeyl)

On the surface, this dialogue deals with the merits of oratory, but, more deeply, it also delves into how a man should live and what role justness plays in this good life. Through the course of this dialogue Socrates deals with three sophist interlocutors in succession, Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles. In turn, they make the case that the powerful live the good life. These sophists argue, particularly, that it is the successful politicians, rulers, and tyrants who truly live well. Socrates disagrees. He states, “Doing what’s unjust is actually the worst thing there is…. I wouldn’t want either, but if had to be one or the other, I would choose suffering over doing what’s unjust…. I say that the admirable and good person, man or woman, is happy, but that the one who’s unjust and wicked is miserable.” Socrates will not be swayed by the consensus of the crowd. “Nevertheless, though I’m only one person, I don’t agree with you. You don’t compel me; instead you produce many false witnesses against me and try to banish me from my property, the truth…. I disregard the things held in honor by the majority of people, and by practicing truth I really try, to the best of my ability, to be and to live as a very good man, and when I die, to die like that…. Choose the orderly life, the life that is adequate to and satisfied with its circumstances at any given time instead of the insatiable, undisciplined life.” 

Callicles denigrates philosophers as skilled in practicing an art only fit for children. For him, greatness lies in the oratory of politicians, skilled in the practice of persuading the masses. Socrates, in turn, questions how Callicles judges what makes a life worthy of being deemed good. “Do you also think as we [philosophers] do that the end of all action is what’s good, and that we should do all other things for its sake, but not it for their sake?… So we should do the other things, including pleasant things, for the sake of good things, and not good things for the sake of pleasant things…. As long as [the soul is] corrupt, in that it’s foolish, undisciplined, unjust and impious, it should be kept away from its appetites and not be permitted to do anything other than what will make it better…. So to be disciplined is better for the soul than lack of discipline.”

Finally, Socrates tries to get at the purpose of oratory, its uses, and how it jives with both the truth and the good. Socrates is particularly concerned with the effect of politician’s speeches on the mass of citizens and on the good of the city as a whole. “Do you think that orators always speak with regard to what’s best? Do they always set their sights on making the citizens as good as possible through their speeches? Or are they, too, bent upon the gratification of the citizens, and, slighting the common good for the sake of their own private good, do they treat the people like children, their sole attempt being to gratify them?” Socrates makes the distinction between the common will and the common weal. For Socrates, it is a great stain on even those Athenian politicians deemed great by posterity, such as Pericles and Cimon, that they left the citizenry in poorer shape than how they found them. “Shouldn’t he [the politician], according to what we agreed just now, have turned [the citizens] out more just instead of more unjust?… I’m not criticizing these men either, insofar as they were servants to the city. I think rather that they proved to be better servants than the men of today, and more capable of satisfying the city’s appetites. But the truth is that in redirecting its appetites and not giving in to them, using persuasion or constraint to get the citizens to become better, they were really not much different from our contemporaries.” Socrates contrasts the purpose of his own speeches with those of all these politicians. “I believe that I’m one of a few Athenians—so as not to say I’m the only one, but the only one among our contemporaries—to take up the true political craft and practice the true politics. This is because the speeches I make on each occasion do not aim at gratification but at what’s best.”

Socrates ends by recapping his view on the just and noble life. “For it’s a difficult thing, Callicles, and one that merits much praise, to live your whole life justly when you’ve found yourself having ample freedom to do what’s unjust…. Doing what’s unjust is more to be guarded against than suffering it, and that it’s not seeming to be good but being good that a man should take care of more than anything, both in his public and his private life.” For Socrates, these are the skills that all men must aspire to before they even contemplate a life concerned with politics. A citizenry composed of men unconcerned with justice is bound to be rotten, no matter their political system. Each man should first concern himself with his own soul, before trying to persuade others. “Nothing terrible will happen to you if you really are an admirable and good man, one who practices excellence. And then, after we’ve practiced it together, then at last, if we think we should, we’ll turn to politics, or then we’ll deliberate about whatever subject we please, when we’re better at deliberating than we are now. For it’s a shameful thing for us, being in the condition we appear to be in at present—when we never think the same about the same subjects, the most important ones at that—to sound off as though we’re somebodies. That’s how far behind in education we’ve fallen.”

Friday, March 17, 2023

“Critias” by Plato (translated by Diskin Clay)

This dialogue is mainly a single speech by Critias. The speech is on the ancient mythical war between Athens and Atlantis. He first references the wealth and power of Athens’ ancient past, “For it is in the train of Leisure that Mythology and Inquiry into the Past arrive in cities, once they have observed that in the case of some peoples the necessities of life have been secured, but not before.” He claims that, back then, Athens was governed more like Plato’s proposed Republic, “Now, at that time, the other classes of citizens who dwelt in our city were engaged in manufacture and producing food from the earth, but the warrior class that had originally been separated from them by god-like men lived apart. They had all that was appropriate to their training and education. None of them had any private possession, but they thought of all their possessions as the common property of all, and they asked to receive nothing from the other citizens beyond what they needed to live.”


The dialogue ends abruptly, mid-sentence, and without conclusion. Towards its end, Critias describes the manner and morals of Atlantis in its own heyday, “For many generations and as long as enough of their divine nature survived, they were obedient unto their laws and they were well disposed to the divinity they were kin to. They possessed conceptions that were true and entirely lofty. And in their attitude to disasters and chance events that constantly befall men and in their relations with one another they exhibited a combination of mildness and prudence, because, except for virtue, they held all else in disdain and thought of their present good fortune of no consequence. They bore their vast wealth of gold and other possessions without difficulty, treating them as if they were a burden. They did not become intoxicated with luxury of the life their wealth made possible; they did not lose their self-control and slip into decline, but in their sober judgment they could see distinctly that even their very wealth increased with their amity and its companion, virtue. But they saw that both wealth and concord decline as possessions become pursued and honored. And virtue perishes with them as well…. But when the divine portion in them began to grow faint as it was often blended with great quantities of mortality and as their human nature gradually gained ascendancy, at that moment, in their inability to bear their great good fortune, they became disordered…. Inwardly they were filled with an unjust lust for possessions and power.”


Friday, March 3, 2023

“Menexenus” by Plato (translated by Paul Ryan)

This dialogue was known in antiquity as the “Funeral Oration” and is mainly comprised of a speech that Socrates claims was handed down to him by Aspasia, Pericles’ renown mistress. Socrates tells Menexenus that he takes no responsibility for its contents, themes, and veracity. Still, Menexenus has his doubts about who is the speech’s real author. The oration concerns Athens’ war dead and the themes of courage, virtue, glory, and heroism. Socrates begins, “Indeed, dying in war looks like a splendid fate in many ways…. They became brave by being sons of brave fathers. Let us, therefore, extoll first their noble birth, second their rearing and education. After that, let us put on view the deeds they performed, showing that they were noble and worthy of their birth and upbringing.”


Socrates proceeds to recount not only Athens’ recent war heroes, but first goes back, past the Peloponnesian War even, to the ancient wars with Persia. He begins with Athens’ most illustrious ancestors. “Those men were fathers not only of our bodies but of our freedom, ours and that of everyone on this continent.” He then continues to boast about Athens, “The opinion gained currency that our city could never be defeated in war, not even by all mankind. And that belief was true. We were overcome by our own quarrels, not by other men; by them we remain undefeated to this day, but we conquered ourselves and suffered defeat at our won hands.” After all, the more recent loss to Sparta in the Peloponnesian War and the Civil War of the Thirty Tyrants have to be explained away.


Finally, Socrates returns to the valor of the war dead and what the present generation of Athenians owe to their ancestors, “We must remember the fallen, and every man, just as in war, must encourage their descendants not to desert the ranks of their ancestors and not to yield to cowardice and fall back…. Free to live on ignobly, we prefer to die nobly rather than subject you and your descendants to reproach and bring disgrace on our fathers and all our ancestors. We consider the life of one who has brought disgrace on his own family no life…. Do whatever you do to the accompaniment of valor, knowing that without it all possessions and all ways of life are shameful and base. For neither does wealth confer distinction on one who possesses it with cowardice (the riches of a man like that belong to another, not himself) nor do bodily beauty and strength, when they reside in a worthless and cowardly man, seem to suit him…. All knowledge cut off from rectitude and the rest of virtue has the look of low cunning, not wisdom…. For a man with self-respect nothing is more disgraceful than to make himself honored not through himself, but through his ancestors’ glory…. For that man’s life is best arranged for whom all, or nearly all, the things that promote happiness depend on himself.”


Friday, February 10, 2023

“Lysis” by Plato (translated by Stanley Lombardo)

In this dialogue, with an unnamed companion, Socrates recounts a discussion he has had with two noble youths, Lysis and Menexenus, at a wrestling school. The theme of their discussion was the meaning and nature of friendship. As often for Socrates, the discussion ends with no resolution, even to the definition of friendship. Instead, Socrates takes the group around in circles, poking at this and that aspect of friendship. At first, the definition seems so simple, as Socrates addresses the two boys, “And friends have everything in common, as the saying goes; so in this respect the two of you won’t differ, that is, if what you said about being friends is true.”


At the outset, Socrates discloses, “You know how it is, everybody is different: one person wants to own horses, another dogs, another wants money, and another fame. Well, I’m pretty lukewarm about those things, but when it comes to having friends I’m absolutely passionate, and I would rather have a good friend than the best quail or gamecock known to man, and, I swear by Zeus above, more than any horse or dog. There’s no doubt in my mind, by the Dog, that I would rather possess a friend than all Darius’ gold, or even than Darius himself. That’s how much I value friends and companions.”


After leading the boys around for a bit, Socrates proposes, “Those who are already wise no longer love wisdom, whether they are gods or men. Nor do those love it who are so ignorant that they are bad, for no bad and stupid man loves wisdom. There remain only those who have this bad thing, ignorance, but have not yet been made ignorant and stupid by it. They are conscious of not knowing what they don’t know. The upshot is that those who are bad do not, and neither do those who are good…. We have discovered for sure what is a friend and what it is a friend to. For we maintain that in the soul and in the body and everywhere, that which is neither good nor bad itself is, by the presence of evil, a friend to the good.”


Not so fast. Later Socrates asks, “Can it really be, as we were just saying, that desire is the cause of friendship, and that what desires is a friend to that which it desires, and is so whenever it does so? And that what we were saying earlier about being a friend was all just chatter…. A thing desires what it is deficient in…. And the deficient is a friend to that in which it is deficient…. And it becomes deficient where something is taken away from it…. Then it is what belongs to oneself, it seems, that passionate love and friendship and desire are directed towards…. And if you two are friends with each other, then in some way you naturally belong to each other…. And if one person desires another, my boys, or loves him passionately, he would not desire him or love him passionately or as a friend unless he somehow belonged to his beloved either in his soul or in some characteristic, habit, or aspect of his soul…. What belongs to us by nature has shown itself to us as something we must love.” In the end, Socrates admits, “These people here will go away saying that we are friends of one another—for I count myself in with you—but what a friend is we have not yet been able to find out.”


Friday, January 27, 2023

“Laches” by Plato (translated by Rosamond Kent Sprague)

This dialogue is on the Greek concept of andreia, literally meaning manliness, but most often translated by moderns as courage. Socrates and his interlocutors begin by seeking to define the concept and then to ruminate on its worth. As in many of Plato’s Socratic dialogues, there is no satisfactory conclusion to the debate. The pretext of the conversation is the proper manner for the general education of two particular noble youth and, only secondarily, the benefits of instilling courage in them. To that end, Socrates initially comments, “I think it is by knowledge that one ought to make decisions, if one is to make them well, and not by majority rule.”


Nicias gives due praise, of sorts, to Socrates’ methods, “Whoever comes into close contact with Socrates and associates with him in conversation must necessarily, even if he began by conversing about something quite different in the first place, keep on being led about by the man’s arguments until he submits to answering questions about himself concerning both his present manner of life and the life he has lived hitherto. And when he does submit to this questioning, you don’t realize that Socrates will not let him go before he has well and truly tested every last detail…. I think that a man who does not run away from such treatment but is willing, according to the saying of Solon, to value learning as long as he lives, not supposing that old age brings him wisdom of itself, will necessarily pay more attention to the rest of his life.”


For Socrates, it is necessary to strip away the layers and to get down to the nature of the thing in itself—in this case, courage. “Whenever a man considers a thing for the sake of another thing, he is taking counsel about that thing for the sake of which he was considering, and not about what he was investigating for the sake of something else.” As is his want, Socrates leads the debate around in circles, questioning conclusions just previously agreed to and pushing the point of argument to all its extremes, “Now foolish daring and endurance was found by us to be not only disgraceful but harmful, in what we said earlier…. But now, on the contrary, we are saying that a disgraceful thing, foolish endurance, is courage.” There is no conclusion to this dialogue, but Socrates does propose, “In addition to courage, I call temperance and justice and everything else of this kind parts of virtue. Don't you?”


Friday, January 6, 2023

“Charmides” by Plato (translated by Rosamond Kent Sprague)

This dialogue is a long digression on the definition of temperance and on its possible worth. The editor, John M. Cooper, interjects, “The subject of discussion is the virtue of ‘sophrosune’, here translated ‘temperance’—but there is no adequate translation in modern European languages. Sophrosune means a well-developed consciousness of oneself and one’s legitimate duties in relation to others (where it will involve self-restraint and showing due respect) and in relation to one’s own ambitions, social standing, and the relevant expectations as regards to one’s own behavior. It is an aristocrat’s virtue par excellence, involving a sense of dignity and self-command.” The dialogue ends without being adequately resolved, but the reader goes on quite the journey, as Socrates guides through many twists and turns of thought along the way.


First, Socrates tries to confirm with Critias a working definition of temperance, “Then only the temperate man will know himself and will be able to examine what he knows and does not know, and in the same way he will be able to inspect other people to see when a man does in fact know what he knows and thinks he knows, and when again he does not know what he thinks he knows, and no one else will be able to do this. And being temperate and temperance and knowing oneself amount to this, to knowing what one knows and does not know.” Socrates continues, “Let us now grant this point, that the existence of a science of science is possible…. If this is perfectly possible, is it any more possible to know what one knows and does not know? We did say, I think, that knowing oneself and being temperate consisted in this?” Socrates is still perplexed, “I still don’t understand how knowing what one knows and does not know is the same thing as knowledge of self…. If temperance is only the science of science and absence of science, it will not be able to distinguish the doctor who knows the particulars of his art from the one who does not know them but pretends or supposes he does, nor will it recognize any other genuine practitioner whatsoever, except the man in its own field, the way other craftsmen do.”


Socrates is still not satisfied with their concept of temperance, “If, as we assumed in the beginning the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know (and that he knows the former but not the latter) and were able to investigate another man who was in the same situation, then it would be of the greatest benefit to us to be temperate. Because those of us who had temperance would live lives free from error and so would all those who were under our rule…. If temperance really ruled over us and were as we now define it, surely everything would be done according to science…. But whether acting scientifically would make us fare well and be happy, this we have yet to learn.”


Finally, Socrates admonishes Critias for leading him astray, after all, “All this time you’ve been leading me right round in a circle and concealing from me that it was not living scientifically that was making us fare well and be happy, even if we possessed all the sciences put together, but that we have to have this one science of good and evil…. Then this science, at any rate, is not temperance, as it seems, but that one of which the function is to benefit us. For it is not a science of science and absence of science but of good and evil. So that, if this latter one is beneficial, temperance would be something else for us.” Socrates concludes, “We conceded that there was a science of science when the argument did not allow us to make this statement. Again, we conceded that this science knew the tasks of the other sciences, when the argument did not allow us to say this either, so that our temperate man should turn out to be knowing, both that he knows things he knows and does not know things he does not know. And we made this concession in the most prodigal manner, quite overlooking the impossibility that a person should in some fashion know what he does not know at all—because our agreement amounts to saying he knows things he does not know…. It has very insolently exposed as useless the definition of temperance which we agreed upon and invented earlier.”


Friday, December 9, 2022

“Cratylus” by Plato (translated by C.D.C. Reeve)

This dialogue, by Plato, involves Socrates debating both Hermogenes and Cratylus. It focuses on the concept of names, their origins, and their innate correctness. Socrates suggests, “It’s the work of a rule-setter, it seems, to make a name. And if names are to be given well, a dialectician must supervise him…. So Cratylus is right in saying that things have natural names, and that not everyone is a craftsman of names, but only someone who looks to the natural name of each thing and is able to put form into letters and syllables…. This much is clearer than before, that names do possess some sort of natural correctness and that it isn’t every man who knows how to name things well.”


Later on in the discussion, Socrates considers the history of naming, “We are most likely to find correctly given names among those concerned with the things that by nature always are, since it is proper for their names to be given with the greatest care…. If we ever get hold of a name that isn’t composed out of other names, we’ll be right to say that at last we’ve reached an element, which cannot any longer be carried back to other names…. And if primary names are indeed names, they must make the things that are as clear as possible to us…. We said that the correctness of a name consists in displaying the nature of the thing it names…. Now, a name is an imitation, just as a painting or portrait is…. Both convention and usage must contribute something to expressing what we mean when we speak…. When you know what a name is like, and it is like the thing it names, then you also know the thing.”


Socrates concludes by assessing whether the name or the thing itself is what must first be comprehended. “The name-giver might have made a mistake at the beginning and then forced the other names to be consistent with it…. That’s why every man must think a lot about the first principles of any thing and investigate them thoroughly to see whether or not it’s correct to assume them…. It seems like it must be possible to learn about the things that are, independently of names…. It’s really the case that one can learn about things through names and that one can also learn about them through themselves…. It is far better to investigate them and learn about them through themselves than to do so through their names.”


Friday, June 17, 2022

“Meno” by Plato (translated by G.M.A. Grube)

This short dialogue has Socrates speaking with Meno, a young aristocrat from Thessaly, about the nature of virtue. Particularly, they are interested in figuring out whether virtue is innate or whether it can be learned. In fact, Meno initially asks, “Can you tell me, Socrates, can virtue be taught? Or is it not teachable but the result of practice, or is it neither of these, but men possess it by nature or in some other way?” After some typically frustrating Socratic back and forth, Meno remains apoplectic, “But, Socrates, do you really not know what virtue is?” Socrates responds typically, “Not only that, my friend, but also that, as I believe, I have never met anyone else who did know.”


Before revealing his answer in his usual roundabout manner, Socrates delves into a couple fruitful asides. The first is on the nature of shape and color. Socrates states, “Let us try to tell you what shape is. See whether you will accept that it is this: Let us say that shape is that which alone of existing things always follows color…. From this you may understand what I mean by shape, for I say this of every shape, that a shape is that which limits a solid; in a word, a shape is the limit of a solid.” Secondly (and more famously), Socrates delves into the paradox of knowledge and learning, the so-called Meno’s Paradox, “Do you realize what a debater’s argument you are bringing up, that a man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not know? He cannot search for what he knows—since he knows it, there is no need to search—nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for.”


Next, Socrates goes into yet another digression on the Sophists and their inability to teach virtue. He then recites a litany of the great men of Athens and pontificates on their inabilities to teach their own sons virtue, at one point even insulting Anytus, Meno’s host while in Athens. Socrates is not deterred, concluding by speaking about the Athenian statesman (not the historian), “Reflect that Thucydides too brought up two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, that he educated them well in all other things. They were the best wrestlers in Athens…. He belonged to a great house; he had great influence in the city and among other Greeks, so that if virtue could be taught he would have found the man who could make his sons good men, be it a citizen or a stranger, if he himself did not have the time because of his public concerns. But, friend Anytus, virtue certainly cannot be taught.” The implications for the sons of Athens (and their qualities) are left unsaid.


Socrates, finally, wraps up this debate (largely with himself), letting both Anytus and Meno off the hook. Socrates concludes, “True opinion is in no way a worse guide to correct action than knowledge. It is this that we omitted in our investigation of the nature of virtue, when we said that only knowledge can lead to correct action, for true opinion can do so also…. For true opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good, but they are not willing to remain long, and they escape from a man’s mind, so they are not worth much until one ties them down by (giving) an account of the reason why. And that, Meno, my friend, is recollection, as we previously agreed. After they are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, and then they remain in place. That is why knowledge is prized higher than correct opinion…. And that only these two things, true belief and knowledge, guide correctly, and that if a man possesses these he gives correct guidance. The things that turn out right by some chance are not due to human guidance, but where there is correct human guidance it is due to two things, true belief and knowledge…. Now because it cannot be taught, virtue no longer seems to be knowledge…. Therefore, if it is not through knowledge, the only alternative is that it is through right opinion that statesmen follow the right course for their cities. As regards knowledge, they are no different from soothsayers and prophets…. Virtue would be neither an inborn quality nor taught, but comes to those who possess it as a gift from the gods which is not accompanied by understanding.”


Friday, December 31, 2021

“Phaedrus” by Plato (translated by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff)

This dialogue begins with a discourse on love, with Phaedrus recounting a speech by Lysias about love’s defects, then Socrates responding with a speech of his own. The dialogue then moves to a discussion on the merits and truths of oratory and writing, in general, before concluding. As Phaedrus recounts, “Lysias argues that it is better to give your favors to someone who does not love you than to someone who does.” Socrates’ speech meanders before getting to the theme of love. First he suggests, “each of us is ruled by two principles which we follow wherever they lead: one is our inborn desire for pleasures, the other is our acquired judgement that pursues what is best…. Now when judgement is in control and leads us by reasoning toward what is best, that sort of self-control is called ‘being in your right mind’; but when desire takes command in us and drags us without reasoning toward pleasure, then its command is known as ‘outrageousness’.” Socrates then goes on to define love, specifically, “the unreasoning desire that overpowers a person’s considered impulse to do right and is driven to take pleasure in beauty, its force reinforced by its kindred desires for beauty in human bodies—this desire, all-conquering in its forceful drive, takes its name from the words for force (rhome) and is called eros.” Socrates goes on to describe the blinding nature of being in love, “it [the soul] forgets mother and brothers and friends entirely and doesn’t care at all if it loses its wealth through neglect. And as for proper and decorous behavior, in which it used to take pride, the soul despises the whole business. Why, it is even willing to sleep like a slave, anywhere, as near to the object of its longing as it is allowed to get! That is because in addition to its reverence for one who has such beauty, the soul has discovered that the boy is the only doctor for all that terrible pain. This is the experience we humans call love.” However, Socrates points out that madness is sometimes beneficial to the soul, but only when provided by the gods. “In fact the best things we have come from madness, when it is given as a gift of the god…. If anyone comes to the gates of poetry and expects to become an adequate poet by acquiring expert knowledge of the subject without the Muses’ madness, he will fail, and his self-controlled verses will be eclipsed by the poetry of men who have been driven out of their minds.” It is left as questionable if madness is too high a price for the soul to pay, whether in poetry or in love.

Phaedrus and Socrates shift gears towards the end of their dialogue and begin to discuss the merits of rhetoric. Socrates responds that rhetoric is useless and empty without a firm basis in philosophy. “The reason they [orators] cannot define rhetoric is that they are ignorant of dialectic. It is their ignorance that makes them think they have discovered what rhetoric is when they have mastered only what it is necessary to learn as preliminaries…. We need to determine the nature of something—of the body in medicine, of the soul in rhetoric. Otherwise, all we’ll have will be an empirical and artless practice.” Socrates goes on to emphasize that true knowledge cannot be written down in permanence. First, Socrates channels the spirit of Ammon-Ra speaking to Thoth, the inventor and god of writing, “You have not discovered a potion for remembering, but for reminding; you provide your students with the appearance of wisdom, not with its reality. Your invention [of writing] will enable them to hear many things without being properly taught, and they will imagine that they have come to know much while for the most part they will know nothing. And they will be difficult to get along with, since they will merely appear to be wise instead of really being so.” Then Socrates, in his own voice, goes on to state that written philosophy cannot truly teach those who are still ignorant. “Those who think they can leave written instructions for an art, as well as those who accept them, thinking that writing can yield results that are clear or certain, must be quite naive and truly ignorant…. Otherwise, how could they possibly think that words written down can do more than remind those who already know what the writing is about?” Plato, through Socrates, seems to be warning us to take his own dialogues with a grain of salt. Are his own writings, as well, only valuable to those with a previous understanding of their obscure truths? Socrates does seem to caution about the spreading of philosophy to the uninitiated, only through the written word. “When it has once been written down, every discourse roams about everywhere, reaching indiscriminately those with understanding no less than those who have no business with it, and it doesn’t know to whom it should speak and to whom it should not.” Socrates ends this dialogue by recapping the basic foundations one needs to first master, before being able to speak wisely. “First, you must know the truth concerning everything you are speaking or writing about; you must learn how to define each thing in itself; and, having defined it, you must know how to divide it into kinds until you reach something indivisible. Second, you must understand the nature of the soul, along the same lines; you must determine which kind of speech is appropriate to each kind of soul, prepare and arrange your speech accordingly, and offer a complex and elaborate speech to a complex soul and a simple speech to a simple one. Then, and only then, will you be able to use speech artfully, to the extent that its nature allows it to be used that way, either in order to teach or in order to persuade.”

Friday, September 10, 2021

“Theaetetus” by Plato (translated by M.J. Levett & Myles Burnyeat)

This is another dialogue on the nature of epistemology. It does not end with a satisfactory definition of knowledge. Or, at least, a neat and tidy one. Socrates lays out the purpose, speaking to Theaetetus early on. “You were not asked to say what one may have knowledge of, or how many branches of knowledge there are. It was not with any idea of counting these up that the question was asked; we wanted to know what knowledge itself is.” From there Socrates, Theaetetus, and Theodorus try to work out a satisfactory theory of knowledge.

Theaetetus begins by agreeing with Protagoras, who tried to equate knowledge with perception. Socrates summarizes the tenets of Protagoras’ pupils. They “maintain (a) that all things are in motion and (b) that for each person and each city, things are what they seem to them to be. And upon this basis you will inquire whether knowledge and perception are the same thing or different things.” Socrates responds with his own thoughts, “my perception is true for me—because it is always a perception of that being which is peculiarly mine; and I am judge, as Protagoras said, of things that are, that they are, for me; and of things that are not, that they are not…. If whatever the individual judges by means of perception is true for him; if no man can assess another’s experience better than he, or can claim authority to examine another man’s judgment and see if it be right or wrong; if, as we repeatedly said, only the individual himself can judge of his own world, and what he judges is always true and correct: how could it ever be, my friend, that Protagoras was a wise man, so wise as to think himself fit to be the teacher of other men.” Socrates is saying that if all men’s perceptions were equally judged as correct knowledge, then there would be no need for wise teachers to school ignorant pupils on the truth. Instead, everyone’s perceptions would be equally true. Socrates continues, “if all things are in motion, every answer, on whatever subject, is equally correct, both ‘it is thus’ and ‘it is not thus’—or if you like ‘becomes’, as we don’t want to use any expressions which will bring our friends to a standstill…. One must not even use the word ‘thus’; for this ‘thus’ would no longer be in motion; nor yet ‘not thus’ for here again there is no motion. The exponents of this theory need to establish some other language; as it is, they have no words that are consistent with their hypothesis—unless it would perhaps suit them best to use ‘not at all thus’ in a quite indefinite sense…. We do not yet concede to [Protagoras] that every man is the measure of all things, if he be not a man of understanding. And we are not going to grant that knowledge is perception, not at any rate on the line of inquiry which supposes that all things are in motion.”

Socrates and Theaetetus continue trying to hammer out a definition of knowledge, but it is elusive. Whenever they get close, a refutation is found and the answer escapes them. Socrates states, “we have determined that to ‘possess’ knowledge is one thing and to ‘have’ it is another; accordingly we maintain that it is impossible for anyone not to possess that which he has possession of, and thus, it never happens that he does not know something he knows. But he may yet make a false judgment about it. This is because it is possible for him to ‘have’, not the knowledge of this thing, but another piece of knowledge instead. When he is hunting for one piece of knowledge, it may happen, as they fly about, that he makes a mistake and gets hold of one instead of another…. It follows that a man who has knowledge of something is ignorant of this very thing not through want of knowledge but actually in virtue of his knowledge.” Socrates goes on to state the difference between judgement and knowledge. “Now when a man gets a true judgment about something without an account, his soul is in a state of truth as regards that thing, but he does not know it; for someone who cannot give and take an account of a thing is ignorant about it. But when he has also got an account of it, he is capable of all this and is made perfect in knowledge.” Having built up this definition of knowledge, Socrates, himself, appears intent on once again knocking it down. He states, “We said that the man who defines knowledge as correct judgment together with an account would choose one of three meanings for ‘account’.” Theaetetus responds, “The first was, a kind of vocal image of thought; the one we have just discussed was the way to the whole through the elements” which have both been discredited. Socrates reveals the third and final meaning, “What the majority of people would say—namely, being able to tell some mark by which the object you are asked about differs from all other things.” Socrates addresses this final meaning of ‘account’, “if ‘adding an account’ means that we are required to get to know the differentness, not merely judge it, this most splendid of our accounts of knowledge turns out to be a very amusing affair. For getting to know of course is acquiring knowledge, isn’t it?… So, it seems, the answer to the question ‘What is knowledge?’ will be ‘Correct judgment accompanied by knowledge of the differentness’—for this is what we are asked to understand by the ‘addition of an account.’… And it is surely just silly to tell us, when we are trying to discover what knowledge is, that it is correct judgment accompanied by knowledge, whether of differentness or of anything else? And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither perception nor true judgment, nor an account added to true judgment.” It seems that defining knowledge properly has all of us going around in circles. But the journey itself has, perhaps, been worth the effort.

Friday, April 16, 2021

“Ion” by Plato (translated by Paul Woodruff)

This is a short dialogue between Socrates and Ion, a rhapsode (a reciter of the poetry of Homer), on his profession, the nature of poetry, mastery of knowledge, and divine inspiration. Socrates asserts, “You are powerless to speak about Homer on the basis of knowledge or mastery. Because if your ability came by mastery, you would be able to speak about all the other poets as well. Look, there is an art to poetry as a whole…. That’s not a subject you have mastered—speaking well about Homer; it’s a divine power that moves you…. The Muse makes some people inspired herself, and then through those who are inspired a chain of other enthusiasts is suspended. You know, none of the epic poets, if they’re good, are masters of their subject; they are inspired, possessed, and that is how they utter all those beautiful poems…. For a poet is an airy thing, winged and holy, and he is not able to make poetry until he becomes inspired and goes out of his mind and his intellect in his possession he will always lack the power to make poetry or sing prophecy.” One must remember what Socrates has already said about poets, and Homer in particular, corrupting the well-ordered city-state in “Republic” and “Phaedrus” through their madness as opposed to philosophers. Socrates also cannot help but to get in one little dig at Ion, contrasting himself, “As for me, I say nothing but the truth, as you’d expect from an ordinary man.”

Friday, April 2, 2021

“Euthydemus” by Plato (translated by Rosamond Kent Sprague)

In this dialogue Socrates discusses with his friend, Crito, the teachings of two Sophists, Euthydemus, and his brother, Dionysodorus. On the surface, Socrates seems to be praising their style of argumentation. He even recommends that he and Crito go to the brothers to take lessons in reasoning. Socrates states, “These two are first of all completely skilled in body, being highly adept at fighting in armor and able to teach this skill to anyone else who pays them a fee; and then they are the ones best able to fight the battle of the law court and to teach other people both how to deliver and how to compose the sort of speeches suitable for the courts…. They have now mastered the one form of fighting they had previously left untried; as a result, not a single man can stand up to them, they have become so skilled in fighting in arguments and in refuting whatever may be said, no matter whether it is true or false.” The reader might already question whether this is damning them with faint praise.


In the course of relating to Crito the back and forth between the Sophists and him, Socrates describes the preeminent value of the right kind of wisdom. He argues, “Even if all the gold in the world should be ours with no trouble and without digging for it, we should be no better off—no, not even if we knew how to make stones into gold would the knowledge be worth anything. For unless we also knew how to use the gold, there appeared to be no value in it…. Nor does there seem to be any value in any other sort of knowledge which knows how to make things, whether money making or medicine or any other such thing, unless it knows how to use what it makes…. Again, if there exists the knowledge to make men immortal, but without the knowledge of how to use this immortality, there seems to be no value in it, if we are to conclude anything from what has already been settled.”


Socrates also discusses with Crito those advisors to politicians who wish to dip their toes into both the worlds of knowledge and action. “These are the persons, Crito, whom Prodicus describes as occupying the no-man’s-land between the philosopher and the statesman. They think that they are the wisest of men, and that they not only are but seem to be so in the eyes of so many, so that no one else keeps them from enjoying universal esteem except the followers of philosophy…. They regard themselves as very wise, and reasonably so, since they think they are not only pretty well up in philosophy but also in politics. Yes, their conceit of wisdom is quite natural because they think they have as much of each as they need; and, keeping clear of both risk and conflict, they reap the fruits of wisdom…. Plausibility, is just what it does have, Crito, rather than truth. It is no easy matter to persuade them that a man or anything else which is between two things and partakes of both is worse than one and better than the other in the case where one of the things is good and the other evil; and that in the case where it partakes of two distinct goods, it is worse than either of them with respect to the end for which each of the two (of which it is composed) is useful…. Now if philosophy is a good, and so is the activity of the statesman (and each has a different end), and those partaking of both are in between, then these men are talking nonsense, since they are inferior to both.”


Socrates concludes by defending philosophy from the philosophers, not to mention the Sophists. “In every pursuit most of the practitioners are paltry and of no account whereas the serious men are few and beyond price…. Pay no attention to the practitioners of philosophy, whether good or bad. Rather give serious consideration to the thing itself.”


Friday, March 5, 2021

“Laws” by Plato (translated by Trevor J. Saunders)

This is Plato’s longest dialogue. It deals with establishing the proper laws for the founding of a hypothetical colony as a new State. An unnamed Athenian gives most of the answers as he debates Clinias, a Cretan, and Megillus, a Spartan, as they travel along from Cnossus together. First, the Athenian lays out the list of supreme human and divine benefits. “Health heads the list of the lesser benefits, followed by beauty; third comes strength, for racing and other physical exercises. Wealth is fourth—not “blind” wealth, but the clear-sighted kind whose companion is good judgment—and good judgment itself is the leading “divine” benefit; second comes the habitual self-control of a soul that uses reason. If you combine these two with courage, you get (thirdly) justice; courage itself lies in fourth place.” The lawmaker’s role is to encourage these virtues. “At every stage the lawgiver should supervise his people, and confer suitable marks of honor or disgrace…. He must use the laws themselves as instruments for the proper distribution of praise and blame.”


The lawmaker must use education to inculcate these higher virtues in the populus. “The earliest sensations that a child feels in infancy are of pleasure and pain, and this is the route by which virtue and vice first enter the soul…. I call ‘education’ the initial acquisition of virtue by the child, when the feelings of pleasure and affection, pain and hatred, that well up in his soul are channeled in the right courses before he can understand the reason why…. Virtue is this general concord of reason and emotion…. Education, then, is a matter of correctly disciplined feelings of pleasure and pain.” However, there is a difference. "Pleasant and painful things come to a stop simultaneously, whereas good things and bad ones do not, because they are in fact different things.” The proper education of a child is no easy task. “Of all wild things, the child is the most unmanageable: an unusually powerful spring of reason, whose waters are not yet canalized in the right direction, makes him sharp and sly, the most unruly animal there is.” A well-served education must last throughout a man’s life. “We do not hold the common view that a man’s highest good is to survive and simply continue to exist. His highest good is to become as virtuous as possible and to continue to exist in that state as long as life lasts.” 


Next, the Athenian begins by detailing the aims in the basic formation of the State. “A state ought to be free and wise and enjoy internal harmony, and that is what the lawgiver should concentrate on in his legislation…. There are two mother-constitutions, so to speak, which you could fairly say have given birth to all the others. Monarchy is the proper name for the first, and democracy for the second…. It is absolutely vital for a political system to combine them… if it is to enjoy freedom and friendship applied with good judgment.”


The Athenian realizes that in every successful State there must be rulers who stand below the laws. “Such people are usually referred to as ‘rulers’, and if I have called them ‘servants of the laws’ it’s not because I want to mint a new expression but because I believe that the success or failure of a state hinges on this point more than on anything else…. If law is the master of the government and the government is its slave, then the situation is full of promise.” Laws must both be written down and embedded within the traditions of the society. “All the rules we are now working through are what people generally call ‘unwritten customs’, and all this sort of thing is precisely what they mean when they speak of ‘ancestral law’…. Although ‘laws’ is the wrong term for these things, we can’t afford to say nothing about them, because they are the bonds of the entire social framework, linking all written and established laws with those yet to be passed. They act in the same way as ancestral customs dating from time immemorial, which by virtue of being soundly established and instinctively observed, shield and protect existing written law…. We must do our best not to omit anything, great or small, whether ‘laws’, ‘habits’, or ‘institutions’, because they are all needed to bind a state together, and the permanence of the one kind of norm depends on that of the other.”


The Athenian adds some words of caution. “We should treat as the biggest enemy of the entire state the man who makes the laws into slaves, and the state into the servant of a particular interest, by subjecting them to the diktat of mere men.” Men must also know their place in society. “A reckless lack of respect for one’s betters is effrontery of peculiar viscousness, which springs from a freedom of inhibitions that has gone much too far.” The rulers and teachers bare the most responsibility. “Total ignorance over an entire field is never dangerous or disastrous; much more damage is done when a subject is known intimately and in detail, but has been improperly taught.” Vice is common to the common man, but the select few must rise above such pettiness. “Only a small part of mankind—a few highly-educated men of rare natural talent—is able to steel itself to moderation when assailed by various needs and desires; given the chance to get a lot of money, it’s a rare bird that’s sober enough to prefer a modest competence to wealth.”


Finally, the Athenian concludes by detailing the laws relationship to social relations and the common weal. “It is vital that men should lay down laws for themselves and live in obedience to them; otherwise they will be indistinguishable from wild animals of the utmost savagery. The reason is this: no man has sufficient natural gifts both to discern what benefits men in their social relationships and to be constantly ready and able to put his knowledge to the best practical use. The first difficulty is to realize the proper object of true political skill is not the interest of private individuals but the common good. This is what knits a state together, whereas private interests make it disintegrate. If the public interest is well served, rather than the private, then the individual and the community alike are benefited.” That is why, in the ideal State, reason must rule over all. “Knowledge is unsurpassed by any law or regulation; reason, if it is genuine and really enjoys its natural freedom, should have universal power: it is not right that it should be under the control of anything else, as though it were some sort of slave…. Law and regulation, which embody general principles… cannot provide for every individual case.”


In this exemplary society, dictated by the Athenian, obedience and lack of freedom among its citizens is a feature of the system, not a bug. “The vital point is that no one, man or woman, must ever be left without someone in charge of him; nobody must get into the habit of acting alone and independently…. In peace and war alike we must give our constant attention and obedience to our leader, submitting to his guidance even in tiny details…. In short, we must condition ourselves to an instinctive rejection of the very notion of doing anything without our companions; we must live a life in which we never do anything, if possible, except by combined and united action as members of a group…. This is what we must practice in peacetime, right from childhood—the exercise of authority over others and submission to them in turn. Freedom from control must be uncompromisingly eliminated from the life of all men, and of all the animals under their dominion.”


Friday, January 1, 2021

“Philebus” by Plato (translated by Dorothea Frede)

In this dialogue, Socrates debates two Athenian youths, Philebus and Protarchus, on whether pleasure or knowledge is the greater Good. Socrates begins, “Philebus holds that what is good for all creatures is to enjoy themselves, to be pleased and delighted…. We contend that not these, but knowing, understanding and remembering, and what belongs with them, right opinion and true calculations, are better than pleasure and more agreeable to all who can attain them.” Socrates later continues, “Philebus says that pleasure is the right aim for all living beings and that all should try to strive for it, that it is at the same time the good for all things, so that good and pleasant are but two names that really belong to what is by nature one and the same. Socrates, by contrast, affirms that these are not one and the same thing but two, just as they are two in name, that the good and the pleasant have a different nature, and that intelligence has a greater share in the good than pleasure.”

Socrates proceeds to relate the defining quality of the Good. “Any creature that was in permanent possession of it, entirely and in every way, would never be in need of anything else, but would live in perfect self-sufficiency.” Because of this nature, Socrates already conceded that neither pleasure nor intelligence alone, unmixed, can be called the absolute highest Good. “Let him put memory, intelligence, knowledge, and true opinion into one class, and ask himself whether anybody would choose to possess or acquire anything else without that class. Most particularly, whether he would want pleasure, as much and as intensive as it can be, without the true opinion that he enjoys it, without recognizing what kind of experience it is he has, without memory of this affection for any length of time. And let him put reason to the same test, whether anyone would prefer to have it without any kind of pleasure, even a very short-lived one, rather than with some pleasures, provided that he does not want all pleasures without intelligence rather than with some fraction of it…. So neither of these two would be perfect, worthy of choice for all, and the supreme good?… We ought not to seek the good in the unmixed life but in the mixed one.”

Socrates points out that knowledge, in all its degrees, from the highest to the lowest forms, is beneficial to ignorance. “Our love for every kind of knowledge has made us let them all in together.” However, he posits that this is not so with pleasure. He rhetorically addresses knowledge, ““Will you have any need to associate with the strongest and most intensive pleasures in addition to the true pleasures?”…. [Knowledge] might reply, “They are a tremendous impediment to us, since they infect the souls in which they dwell with madness or even prevent our own development altogether. Furthermore, they totally destroy most of our offspring, since neglect leads to forgetfulness. But as to the true and pure pleasures you [Socrates] mentioned, those regard as our kin. And besides, add the pleasures of health and of temperance and all those that commit themselves to virtue as to their deity and follow it around everywhere. But to forge an association between reason and those pleasures that are forever involved with foolishness and other kinds of vice would be totally unreasonable for anyone who aims at the best and most stable mixture or blend.”” Pleasure, unlike knowledge, is unwise to imbibe in to an extreme. “It is obvious that it is in some vicious state of soul and body and not in virtue that the greatest pleasures as well as the greatest pains have their origin.”

Socrates posits that the Good requires three forms. “If we cannot capture the good in one form, we will have to take hold of it in a conjunction of three: beauty, proportion, and truth.” He states how these three are all interrelated, “That any kind of mixture that does not in some way or other possess measure or the nature of proportion will necessarily corrupt its ingredients and most of all itself…. But now we notice that the force of the good has taken refuge in an alliance with the nature of the beautiful. For measure and proportion manifest themselves in all areas as beauty and virtue.” Finally, Socrates gets Protarchus to compare pleasure to reason using these three forms. “Pleasures are perhaps rather like children who don’t possess the least bit of reason. Reason, by contrast, either is the same as truth or of all things it is most like it and most true…. I don’t think that one could find anything that is more outside all measure than pleasure and excessive joy, while nothing more measured than reason and knowledge could ever be found…. No one, awake or dreaming, could ever see intelligence and reason to be ugly; no one could ever have conceived of them as becoming or being ugly, or that they ever will be…. In the case of pleasures, by contrast, when we see anyone actively engaged in them, especially those that are most intense, we notice that their effect is quite ridiculous, if not outright obscene; we become quite ashamed ourselves and hide them as mush as possible from sight, and we confine such activities to the night, as if daylight must not witness such things.” So while Socrates concedes that knowledge, alone, is not the greatest Good, for it must be mixed with a little bit of pleasure, he posits that it is, nonetheless, far superior as a Good than pleasure ever will be. “Whatever the ingredient in the mixed life may be that makes it choiceworthy and good, reason is more closely related to that thing and more like it than pleasure.”

Friday, December 18, 2020

“Timaeus” by Plato (translated by Donald J. Zeyl)

This is not a dialogue, but mainly a long speech delivered by Timaeus, an Italian philosopher, likely invented by Plato. Timaeus attempts to explain the creation of the Universe, followed by the creation of Man. He begins by describing the nature of the universe. “Since the god wanted nothing more than to make the world like the best of the intelligible things, complete in every way, he made it a single visible living thing, which contains within itself all the living things whose nature it is to share its kind.”

After the god formed the lesser gods, the daemons, and the four main elements, next humans were formed. “The first innate capacity they would of necessity come to have would be sense perception, which arises out of forceful disturbances. This they all will have. The second would be love, mingled with pleasure and pain. And they would come to have fear and spiritedness as well, plus whatever goes with having these emotions, as well as their natural opposites. And if they could master these emotions, their lives would be just, whereas if they were mastered by them, they would be unjust. And if a person lived a good life throughout the due course of his time, he would at the end return to his dwelling place in his companion star, to live a life of happiness that agreed with his character.”

Timaeus next speaks of the Soul. “We must pronounce the soul to be the only thing there is that properly possesses understanding. The soul is an invisible thing, whereas fire, water, earth, and air have all come to be as visible bodies. So anyone who is a lover of understanding and knowledge must of necessity pursue as primary causes those that belong to intelligent nature, and as secondary all those belonging to things that are moved by others and that set still others in motion by necessity…. These pursuits have given us philosophy, a gift from the gods to the mortal race whose value neither has been nor ever will be surpassed.” However, Timaeus also speaks of a second Soul housed within man. “And within the body they [the gods] built another kind of soul as well, the mortal kind, which contains within it those dreadful but necessary disturbances: pleasure, first of all, evil’s most powerful lure; then pains, that make us run away from what is good; besides these, boldness also and fear, foolish counselors both; then also the spirit of anger hard to assuage, and expectation easily led astray. These they fused with unreasoning sense perception and all-venturing lust, and so, as was necessary, they constructed the mortal type of soul.”

Timaeus speaks of the dichotomy between the Necessary and the Intellect. “For this ordered world is of mixed birth: it is the offspring of a union of Necessity and Intellect. Intellect prevailed over Necessity by persuading it to direct most of the things that come to be toward what is best, and the result of this subjugation of Necessity to wise persuasion was the initial formation of this universe.” Next, Timaeus speaks of the nature of evil. He states, “no one is willfully evil. A man becomes evil, rather, as a result of one or another corrupt condition of his body and an uneducated upbringing. No one who incurs these pernicious conditions would will to have them.”

Timaeus goes on to relate the nature of Forms and detail the difference between Understanding and Belief. “If understanding and true opinion are distinct, then these “by themselves” things definitely exist—these Forms, the objects not of our sense perception, but of our understanding only. But if—as some people think—true opinion does not differ in any way from understanding, then all the things we perceive through our bodily senses must be assumed to be the most stable things there are. But we do have to speak of understanding and true opinion as distinct, of course, because we can come to have one without the other, and the one is not like the other. It is through instruction that we come to have understanding, and through persuasion that we come to have true belief. Understanding always involves a true account while true belief lacks any account. And while understanding remains unmoved by persuasion, true belief gives in to persuasion. And of true belief it must be said, all men have a share, but of understanding, only the gods and a small group of people do.” Timaeus goes into more detail on the nature of Forms. “That which keeps its own form unchangingly, which has not been brought into being and is not destroyed, which neither receives into itself anything else from anywhere else, nor itself enters into anything else anywhere, is one thing. It is invisible—it cannot be perceived by the senses at all—and it is the role of understanding to study it.” Finally, he states, “There are being, space, and becoming, three distinct things which existed even before the universe came to be.”

Finally, Timaeus speaks about the necessity of proportion in the well-ordered life. “Now all that is good is beautiful, and what is beautiful is not ill-proportioned. Hence we must take it that if a living thing is to be in good condition, it will be well-proportioned…. In determining health and disease or virtue and vice no proportion or lack of it is more important than between body and soul…. There is in fact one way to preserve oneself, and that is not to exercise the soul without exercising the body, nor the body without the soul, so that each may be balanced by the other and so be sound.” Timaeus ends by going back to philosophy and the search for the higher truths. “If a man has seriously devoted himself to the love of learning and to true wisdom, if he has exercised these aspects of himself above all, then there is absolutely no way that his thoughts can fail to be immortal and divine, should truth come within his grasp.” However, we must remember that we cannot ever be sure how much Plato, himself, agreed with this account of Creation, which he has sketched out through the imaginary voice of Timaeus.

Friday, August 2, 2019

“Statesman” by Plato (translated by C.J. Rowe)

This is another dialogue starring the mysterious Visitor of “Sophist” fame. Now, his interlocutor is Socrates’ namesake, the so-called Young Socrates. After bantering around for a bit, they get to the crux of the matter. The Visitor suggests, “that kingly rule was one of the sorts of expert knowledge…. It seems that of constitutions too the one that is correct in comparison with the rest, and alone a constitution, is the one in which the rulers would be found truly possessing expert knowledge, and not merely seeming to do so…. And whether they purge the city for its benefit by putting some people to death or else by exiling them, or whether again they make it smaller by sending out colonies somewhere like swarms of bees, or build it up by introducing people from somewhere outside and making them citizens—so long as they act to preserve it on the basis of expert knowledge and what is just, making it better than it was so far as they can, this is the constitution which alone we must say is correct.” The Visitor seems to be giving utmost leeway to the opinions of experts in ruling the polis. He continues, “It is clear that the art of the legislator belongs to that of the king; but the best thing is not that the laws should prevail, but rather the kingly man who possesses wisdom.” There goes rule of law. It comes down to personal wisdom versus legislation. “Law could never accurately embrace what is best and most just for all at the same time, and so prescribe what is best. For the dissimilarities between human beings and their actions, and the fact that practically nothing in human affairs ever remains stable, prevent any sort of expertise whatsoever from making any simple decision in any sphere that covers all cases and will last for all time.”

The Visitor uses a metaphor to explain the role of the ideal Statesman, “Just as a steersman, always watching out for what is to the benefit of the ship and the sailors, preserves his fellow sailors not by putting things down in writing but offering his expertise as law, so too in the same manner a constitution would be correct, would it not, if it issued from those who are able to rule in this way, offering strength of their expertise as more powerful than the laws?” The Visitor seems to want to let the experts steer the ship of State, as circumstances arise, how they see best, without being constrained by tradition, precedent, and, most certainly, legislation. But who will these expert statesmen be? It is obvious, according to the Visitor, “that a mass of any people whatsoever would never be able to acquire this sort of expert knowledge and so govern a city with intelligence; and that we must look for that one constitution, the correct one, in relation to a small element in the population, few in number, or even a single individual.” The Visitor does worry that false prophets might claim to be experts and claim that mantle to the detriment of the whole State. “If they were to do such a thing without having expert knowledge, they would be undertaking to imitate what is true, but would imitate it altogether badly.” The Visitor next reiterates whom he has in mind as experts. “No large collection of people is capable of acquiring any sort of expertise whatsoever…. Then if some sort of kingly expertise exists, neither the collection of people that consists of the rich, nor all the people together, could ever acquire this expert knowledge of statesmanship.” The Visitor concedes that this is a dangerous proposition as it will attract many false experts. “Then it is in this way that the tyrant has come about, we say, and the king, and oligarchy, and aristocracy, and democracy—because people found themselves unable to put up with the idea of that single individual of ours as monarch, and refused to believe that there would ever come to be anyone who deserved to rule in such a way, so as to be willing and able to rule with virtue and expert knowledge, distributing what is just and right correctly to all. They think that a person in such a position always mutilates, kills and generally maltreats whichever of us he wishes.” Remember, the Visitor is setting out his case for the ideal Statesman, the platonic form, which might never exist in reality, and contrasting it at times, with what actually happens in the polis of reality. To that end, he states, “So then we must also remove those who participate in all these constitutions, except for the one based on knowledge, as being, not statesmen, but experts in faction.” If it is not statesmanship by impartial intelligence, then rule devolves into command by party and faction.

The Visitor next returns to the responsibilities of a proper Statesman. “What is really kingship must not itself perform practical tasks, but control those with the capacity to perform them, because it knows when it is the right time to begin and set in motion the most important things in cities, and when it is the wrong time; and the others must do what has been prescribed for them.” The Visitor goes back to one of his favorite metaphors for the proper occupation of kingship- the weaver, “The one that controls all of these, and the laws, and cares for every aspect of things in the city, weaving everything together in the most correct way—this, embracing its capacity with the appellation belonging to the whole, we would, it seems, most appropriately call statesmanship.” The job of the Statesman is to weave together and balance the various personalities of the best men of the polis to make sure that these men are put in a position to care for the day to day functions of the State. Skill in rhetoric, generalship, and judging of the laws are subordinate to the primacy of statesmanship and, therefore, must be delegated and not necessarily practiced by the king. Achieving balance to set the State in equilibrium is paramount. Neither men of too much courage, nor men of too much moderation must exert undue pull on the levers of State—this balance is the role of the ideal statesman. To that end, the Visitor admonishes, “This is the single and complete task of kingly weaving-together, never to allow moderate dispositions to stand away from the courageous. Rather, by working them closely into each other as if with a shuttle, through sharing of opinions, through honors, dishonor, esteem, and the giving of pledges to one another, it draws together a smooth and ‘fine-woven’ fabric out of them, as the expression is, and always entrusts offices in cities to these in common…. For the dispositions of moderate people when in office are markedly cautious, just and conservative, but they lack bite, and a certain sharp and practical keenness…. And the dispositions of the courageous, in their turn, are inferior to the others in relation to justice and caution, but have an exceptional degree of keenness when it comes to action…. This marks the completion of the fabric which is the product of the art of statesmanship: the weaving together, with regular intertwining, of the dispositions of brave and moderate people—when the expertise belonging to the king brings their life together in agreement and friendship and makes it common between them, completing the most magnificent and best of all fabrics and covering with it all the other inhabitants of cities.”

Friday, July 19, 2019

“Sophist” by Plato (translated by Nicholas P. White)

This is a dialogue between Thaetetus and a philosopher visiting Athens from Elea, simply referred to throughout as the Visitor. It is a very civil conversation, with the two most often agreeing with one another and working together to move the arguments along. The dialogue’s main purpose is ostensibly to define what a sophist is. However, as the two men dig deeper, they must seek to parse out the natures of knowledge, being, belief, negation, sameness, and difference, all the while analyzing the meanings of forms and kinds.

The Visitor begins by explaining the difference between the educated and the ignorant. “Not knowing, but thinking that you know. That’s what probably causes all the mistakes we make when we think…. If someone thinks he’s wise, he’ll never be willing to learn anything about what he thinks he’s clever at…. [Therefore,] refutation is the principal and most important kind of cleansing.” The Visitor goes on to relate the sophist’s methods. “This appearing, and this seeming but not being, and this saying things but not true things—all these issues are full of confusion, just as they always have been.” He quotes his mentor Parmenides’ most famous dictum, “Never shall this force itself on us, that that which is not may be; While you search, keep your thought far away from this path.” The Visitor then asks of Thaetetus, “This form of speech of ours involves the rash assumption that that which is not is, since otherwise falsity wouldn’t come into being…. Do we dare to utter the sound that which in no way is?”

Thaetetus and the Visitor next explore this idea of negation in detail, first just scratching the surface. The Visitor begins, “That which is not can’t be applied to any of those which are…. We always apply this something to a being…. A person who says something has to be saying some one thing?… Someone who does not say something says nothing at all…. Therefore don’t we have to refuse to admit that a person like that speaks but says nothing? Instead, don’t we have to deny that anyone who tries to utter that which is not is even speaking?… But shall we say that any of those which are can ever belong to that which is not?… Whenever we speak of those which are not, aren’t we trying to apply numerical plurality to them?… Do you understand, then, that it’s impossible to say, speak, or think that which is not correctly by itself? It’s unthinkable, unsayable, unutterable, and unformulable in speech.” That is what the Visitor had learned from his mentor, Parmenides. However, the Visitor has already come to see how he contradicts his own thoughts. “I was the one who made the statement that that which is not should not share either in one or in plurality. But even so I’ve continued after all that to speak of it as one, since I say that which is not…. So in trying to attach being to it wasn’t I saying things that were contrary of what I said before?” He ends by challenging Thaetetus, “Try to say something correct about that which is not, without attaching either being, one, or numerical plurality to it.” The Visitor realizes that he will have to apply more scrutiny on his own accepted wisdoms. “In order to defend ourselves we’re going to have to subject father Parmenides’ saying to further examination, and insist by brute force both that that which is not somehow is, and then again that that which is somehow is not.”

Thaetetus and the Visitor continue by examining the natures of being and change. The Visitor begins, “Then both that which changes and also change have to be admitted as being…. The philosopher—the person who values these things the most—absolutely has to refuse to accept the claim that everything is at rest, either from defenders of the one or from friends of the many forms. In addition he has to refuse to listen to people who make that which is change in every way. He has to be like a child begging for “both,” and say that that which is—everything—is both the unchanging and that which changes.” The Visitor tackles this challenge by examining forms and kinds. “It takes expertise is dialectic to divide things by kinds and not to think that the same form is a different one or that a different form is the same…. So if a person can do that, he’ll be capable of adequately discriminating a single form spread out all through a lot of other things, each of which stands separate from the others. In addition he can discriminate forms that are different from each other but are included within a single form that’s outside them, or a single form that’s connected as a unit throughout many wholes, or many forms that are completely separate from others. That’s what it is to know how to discriminate by kinds how things can associate and how they can’t…. Some kinds will associate with each other and some won’t. Some will to a small extent and others will associate a great deal.”

Just when the two men feel that they have made some progress, they plunge back into the depths of confusion. The Visitor states, “The most important kinds we’ve just been discussing are that which is, rest, and change…. But that which is blends with both of them, since presumably both of them are…. But what in the world are the same and the different that we’ve been speaking of? Are they two kinds other than those three but necessarily always blending with them? And do we have to think of them as being five and not three? Or have what we’ve been calling the same and the different turned out, without our realizing it, to be among those three?… It’s impossible for the same and that which is to be one…. In fact, though, it turns out that whatever is different definitely has to be what it is from something that’s different…. It pervades all of them, since each of them is different from the others.”

Thaetetus and the Visitor hope to solve their difficulties by further examining differences along with the principle of negation. The Visitor, as usual, leads the way, “So it has to be possible for that which is not to be, in the case of change and also as applied to all the kinds. That’s because as applied to all of them the nature of the different makes each of them not be, by making it different from that which is. And we’re going to be right if we say that all of them are not in this same way. And on the other hand we’re also going to be right if we call them beings, because they have a share in that which is…. So as concerning each of the forms that which is is extensive, and that which is not is indefinite in quantity…. So even that which is is not, in as many applications as there are of the others, since, not being them, it is one thing, namely itself, and on the other hand it is not those others, which are an indefinite number.” The Visitor continues by parsing out that differences are not necessarily contrary in nature. “It seems that when we say that which is not, we don’t say something contrary to that which is, but only something different from it…. So we won’t agree with somebody who says that negation signifies contrary. We’ll only admit this much: when “not” and “non-” are prefixed to names that follow them, they indicate something other than the names, or rather, other than the things to which the names following the negation are applied.”

The Visitor concludes by trying to apply negation to the nature of being. He asks, “Should we say that just as the large was large, the beautiful was beautiful, the not large was not large, and the not beautiful was not beautiful, in the same way that which is not also was and is not being, and is one form among the many that are?” When Thaetetus agrees that this is so, the Visitor realizes that he has pushed the bounds of Parmenides’ grave warnings. However, the Visitor bravely goes on, “But we’ve not only shown that those which are not are. We’ve also caused what turns out to be the form of that which is not to appear. Since we showed that the nature of the different is, chopped up among all beings in relation to each other, we dared to say that that which is not really is just this, namely, each part of the nature of the different that’s set over against that which is…. Nobody can say that this that which is not, which we’ve made to appear and now dare to say is, is the contrary of that which is. We’ve said good-bye long ago to any contrary of that which is, and to whether it is or not, and also to whether or not an account can be given of it.”