In “Protagoras” Plato has Socrates recall a debate he has had with the sophist, Protagoras. Socrates has to urge Protagoras not to give long winded speeches, but to debate him succinctly. Socrates states, “To me, the mutual exchange of a dialogue is something quite distinct from a public address.” The back and forth in conversation is how Socrates prefers to probe for the truth.
In this dialogue, the questions entertained are whether virtue can be taught, and, perhaps even more importantly, what exactly the definition of virtue is to begin with, particularly whether virtue is one thing or can be many. Socrates starts out by explicitly stating that virtue cannot be taught. He says, “The wisest and best of our citizens are unable to transmit to others the virtues that they possess…. I just don’t think that virtue can be taught.” However, Protagoras claims that, while in other fields of expertise one is wise to only let the experts take the lead, in claims of justice and politics, everyone, particularly in democratic Athens, believes that they are qualified to judge. He states, “But when the debate involves political excellence, which must proceed entirely from justice and temperance, they accept advice from anyone, and with good reason, for they think that this particular virtue, political or civic virtue, is shared by all, or there wouldn’t be any cities…. They will say that everyone ought to claim to be just, whether they are or not, and that it is madness not to pretend to justice, since one must have some trace of it or not be human.” The sense of justice in us all is what makes us human, what makes us social, what allows us to develop cities and live together.
Socrates later asks, “Is virtue a single thing, with justice and temperance and piety its parts, or are the things I have just listed all names for a single entity?” There is quite the back and forth between the two philosophers, culminating in a debate on the nature of courage, of knowledge, of pleasure, of self-control, of aspiration, and on goodness and badness. Socrates prods Protagoras, “Those who make mistakes with regard to the choice of pleasure and pain, in other words, with regard to good and bad, do so because of a lack of knowledge, and not merely a lack of knowledge but a lack of that knowledge you agreed was measurement…. So that is what “being overcome by pleasure” is—ignorance in the highest degree…. Are not all actions leading toward living painlessly and pleasantly honorable and beneficial? And isn’t honorable activity good and beneficial?… Then if the pleasant is the good, no one who knows or believes there is something else better than what he is doing, something possible, will go on doing what he had been doing when he could be doing what is better. To give in to oneself is nothing other than ignorance, and to control oneself is nothing other than wisdom…. Now, one goes willingly towards the bad or what he believes to be bad; neither is it in human nature, so it seems, to want to go toward what one believes to be bad instead of to the good. And when he is forced to choose between one of two bad things, no one will choose the greater if he is able to choose the lesser…. If what I said up to now is true, then would anyone be willing to go toward what he dreads, when he can go toward what he does not?… When the courageous fear, their fear is not disgraceful; nor when they are confident is their confidence disgraceful…. So, can we conclude that cowardice is ignorance of what is and is not to be feared?… So the wisdom about what is and is not to be feared is courage and is the opposite of this ignorance?”
In the end, it is Protagoras who points out to Socrates that their positions have seemed to have changed. While pushing the point that virtue is one thing alone, knowledge, Socrates has admitted that it can indeed be taught. Protagoras states that someone looking on at their debate might claim, “Socrates and Protagoras, how ridiculous you are, both of you. Socrates, you said earlier that virtue cannot be taught, but now you are arguing the very opposite and have attempted to show that everything is knowledge—justice, temperance, courage—in which case, virtue would appear to be eminently teachable. On the other hand, if virtue is anything other than knowledge, as Protagoras has been trying to say, then it clearly would be unteachable. But, if it turns out to be wholly knowledge, as you now urge, Socrates, it would be very surprising indeed if virtue could not be taught. Now Protagoras maintained at first that it could be taught, but now he thinks the opposite, urging that hardly any of the virtues turn out to be knowledge. On that view, virtue could hardly be taught at all.”
