Showing posts with label Charles Taylor. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Charles Taylor. Show all posts

Friday, July 26, 2024

“Cosmic Connections” by Charles Taylor

In this philosophical treatise, Taylor uses the lens of Romantic poetry to describe the human desire for a cosmic connection with the objects of nature and the world at large, as well as humanities place within it, across time and space. Taylor posits, “The human being is a microcosm, in which the order of the cosmos is repeated in miniature…. We need to understand the larger order to know ourselves, but we explore this order through the hints that we find in ourselves.” Taylor describes the tensions within modern society, “Our freedom required that we develop the powers of abstract reasoning, which objectifies our world, and obscures some of its meanings for us. This enabled us to develop a consciousness of radical autonomy…. But our complete fulfillment comes in a recovery of this contact on a higher level, integrating our gains of reason and freedom. This completes our self-realization…. The Romantic appropriation of these Renaissance theories moves the emphasis away from knowledge (scientia, episteme), in the sense of a clear, self-conscious (or self-aware) grasp of reality; it moves it away also from the kind of knowledge which enables control; it focuses rather on the experience of connection.” 


Taylor describes a realm of life that he refers to as the interspace, “the space of interaction between us and the world.” He continues, “Our attitude in the modern world toward earlier societies who saw themselves as living in an enchanted universe, where animals have souls, and sacred spaces emanate power, is generally one of dismissive condescension. These poor people were just deluded, projecting all sorts of wild features onto a dead, neutral universe. Once we grasp the independent status of the interspace, we can see that this condescension is misplaced…. We will not be ready to accept these earlier world views as literal truths, but we can now recognize them as earlier attempts to grapple with issues that we are not that good at dealing with, the more so in that many of us want to deny that they exist.”


Finally, Taylor invokes the concept of reenchantment with the cosmic powers alive throughout nature. “Post-Romantic poetry is a response to modern, particularly post-Enlightenment, disenchantment, in a broad sense. This broad sense covers more than the removal of magic forces and powers from the world (the original etymological sense of Entzauberung); it also can extend to a picture of the universe as the realm of mechanical causation, without intrinsic human meaning. Much of this poetry, and art in general, can be seen as an attempt to “reenchant” the cosmos.” Taylor concludes, “The “landscapes” of meaning we live by are never fully explicable by features of the world beyond our experience but have to be explained and justified hermeneutically. Many of the crucial meanings that our world has for us are only identifiable in what I have called here the “interspace.””


Friday, April 26, 2024

“The Language Animal” by Charles Taylor

This is slight departure from Taylor’s usual oeuvre. At first glance, this is a more scientific than philosophic endeavor. The book specifically deals with how, teleologically and historically, humans have used language—specifically how our species has used language to separate our mental representations from other animals. Taylor begins, “Linguistic beings are capable of new feelings which affectively reflect their rich sense of the world…. Linguistic beings can be sensitive to distinctions which are lost on prelinguistic animals. Important among these are distinctions involving moral or other values…. Only language beings can identify things as worthy of desire or aversion. For such identifications raise issues of intrinsic rightness. They involve a characterization of things which is not reducible simply to the ways we treat them as objects of desire or aversion. They involve a recognition beyond that, that they ought to be treated in one way or another…. Being in the linguistic dimension not only enables a new kind of awareness of the things which surround us, but also a more refined sense of human meanings…. Speech is the expression of thought. But it isn’t simply an outer clothing for what could exist independently. It is constitutive of reflective, that is, linguistic thought…. Our power to function in the linguistic dimension is tied for its everyday uses, as well as its origins, to expressive speech, as the range of actions in which it is not only communicated, but realized.”


Taylor makes the case that it is impossible to separate the growth of language from the evolution of human culture. “We can’t explain language by the function it plays within a pre- or extralinguistically conceived framework of human life, because language through constituting the semantic dimension transforms any such framework, giving us new feelings, new desires, new goals, new relationships, and introduces a dimension of strong value…. We acquire the range of meanings which make up our world through an interplay of embodied expression, and of articulation…. Language allows us to think in universals, as we might say, using concepts and not just proper names…. To understand reality is to break it down into its component parts, and then map how they combine…. This epistemology stressed that our knowledge of the world was built from particulate “ideas”, or inner representations of outer reality. We combine them to produce our view of the world…. Reasoning is combining, and language helps us to do this expeditiously and on a grand scale.”


Language is more than just a third person-objective scientific description of the outer world and of nature. It is embodied in human reality and as such cannot be entirely separated from the subjective viewpoint. Taylor asks, “Would it be possible for us to drop all these other things: tropes, images, symbols, templates, and of course, gestures and literature, and just have this austere language of description and explanation? (I won’t even ask the question whether this would be desirable.) This is a question about human beings; we are not asking whether some kinds of beings which could be imagined could meet these austere and limiting specifications…. It is one of my basic claims in this book that this kind of restricted language is a human impossibility…. [There is an] impossibility of human language in the narrow sense outside the whole range of “symbolic forms”.”


Human language cannot be completely separated from subjective human expressions. “Possessing a language is to be continuously involved in trying to extend its powers of articulation. In other words, we always sense that there are things we cannot properly say, but we would like to express.” Taylor quotes the polymath Wilhelm von Humboldt, “[There is always a] feeling that there is something which the language does not directly contain, but which the [mind/soul], spurred on by language must supply.” Taylor continues, “This endless striving to increase articulacy is the real point behind the famous Humboldt saying about using finite means to infinite ends. The “finite means” here doesn’t refer to an existing stock of words, as the Chomskian interpretation seems to assume; rather it is the finite stock of sounds at our disposal, with which we can find expression for an unlimited range of phenomena…. What Humboldt is on to here is the experience of wanting to say what we cannot yet satisfactorily express…. We need to find a formula which figures the phenomenon we are trying to disclose, be this through metaphor, or analogy, or creative extension of existing terms, or whatever…. The “right word” here discloses, brings the phenomenon properly into view for the first time…. We devise an expression which allows what we are striving to encompass to appear.”


In using language to map our reality, Taylor is describing a generative process. “To grasp a new meaning is to discover a new way of feeling, of experiencing our world. This cannot precede expression…. The constitutive power of language operates here in different ways, one might say at a different level, than it does in our description of independent objects…. In the realm of metabiological meanings, expression opens new and unsuspected realms. The new enacted and/or verbal expressions open up new ways of being in the world. We are in the domain of cultural innovation…. Many of the meanings in our lives come to exist for us when we mark distinctions heretofore unnoticed in our life experience…. After articulation, it becomes part of the explicit shape of meaning for us…. Articulation here alters the shape of what matters to us. It changes us…. The new articulated descriptions allow the world to impinge on us, to moves us, in new ways. That is why we call them “constitutive”.”


Taylor concludes, “The basic thesis of this book is that language can only be understood if we understand its constitutive role in human life…. I have tried to explain this constitutive force of language in terms of the “linguistic dimension”, where the uses of either words or symbols, or expressive actions, is guided by a sense of rightness…. Linguistic awareness is not limited to that facet of the semantic dimension, where the designative logic prevails; in other words, to that set of language games where we are concerned with accurate description of independent objects…. Language is also used to create, alter, and break connections between people. This is indeed, ontogenetically its “primordial” use…. And language can also open new spaces of human meanings: through introducing new terms, and/or through expression-enactment…. It is through story that we find or devise ways of living bearably in time.”


Friday, April 1, 2022

“The Ethics of Authenticity” by Charles Taylor

Taylor, in this monograph, defends modern culture’s affinity for authenticity from its traditionalist detractors, while pointing out its deficiencies to those who proclaim the supremacy of subjectivism and instrumental reason, untethered to morality and community. Taylor does not seek a middle ground of compromise, but forges his own path towards a more enduring and objective authenticity.


Taylor cautions modernity’s defenders against “the individualism of self-fulfillment [which] involves a centring on the self and a concomitant shutting out, or even unawareness, of the greater issues or concerns that transcend the self, be they religious, political, historical.” Taylor continues, “The culture of self-fulfillment has led many people to lose sight of concerns that transcend them. And it seems obvious that it has taken trivialized and self-indulgent forms…. That the espousal of authenticity takes the form of a kind of soft relativism means that the vigorous defence of any moral ideal is somehow off limits…. In adopting the ideal [of self-fulfillment], people in the culture of authenticity, as I want to call it, give support to a kind of liberalism, which has been espoused by many others as well. This is the liberalism of neutrality…. The good life is what each individual seeks, in his or her own way…. The affirmation of the power of choice as itself a good to be maximized is a deviant product of the ideal.”


Taylor begins by looking back historically, “In Rousseau’s work [self-determining freedom] takes political form, in the notion of a social contract state founded on a general will, which precisely because it is the form of our common freedom can brook no opposition in the name of freedom…. Although Kant reinterpreted this notion of freedom in purely moral terms, as autonomy, it returns to the political sphere with a vengeance with Hegel and Marx…. Herder put forward the idea that each of us has an original way of being human. Each person has his or her own “measure”…. There is a certain way of being human that is my way. I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone else’s. But this gives a new importance to being true to myself. If I am not, I miss the point of my life, I miss what being human is for me…. Being true to myself means being true to my own originality.”


Taylor stresses that an enduring authenticity does not separate the idea of the personal Good from that of others’ in a sort of subjective nihilism. “Our understanding of the good things in life can be transformed by our enjoying them in common with people we love…. Some goods become accessible to us only through such common enjoyment…. The making and sustaining of our identity, in the absence of a heroic effort to break out of ordinary existence, remains dialogical throughout our lives…. More particularly, I want to show that modes that opt for self-fulfillment without regard (a) to the demands of our ties with others or (b) to demands of any kind emanating from something more or other than human desires or aspirations are self-defeating, that they destroy the conditions for realizing authenticity itself.”


Modernity has lost the component of authenticity that regards the other’s viewpoint. At its worst, modern culture no longer seeks to mesh together a common understanding of the good life. “The contemporary culture of authenticity slides towards soft relativism. This gives further force to a general presumption of subjectivism about value…. It is clear that a rhetoric of “difference,” of “diversity” (even “multiculturalism”), is central to the contemporary culture of authenticity…. [However,] difference so asserted becomes  insignificant…. Self-choice as an ideal makes sense only because some issues are more significant than others…. Which issues are significant, I do not determine…. So the ideal of self-choice supposes that there are other issues of significance beyond self-choice…. To shut out demands emanating beyond the self is precisely to suppress the conditions of significance, and hence to court trivialization…. I can define my identity only against the background of things that matter…. Authenticity is not the enemy of demands that emanate from beyond the self; it supposes such demands.”


Modern man is not born into a predetermined station in life. Man is no longer born into a social hierarchy. He creates his own identity. However, for that identity to make sense, others must recognize him as such. Man has never lived in a bubble. He depends on how others’ view him to assert himself as himself. “The development of an ideal of inwardly generated identity gives a new and crucial importance of recognition…. The thing about inwardly derived, personal, original identity is that is doesn’t enjoy this recognition a priori. It has to win it through exchange, and it can fail.” At worst, modern authenticity devolves into narcissism. “The self-centred forms are deviant…. They tend to centre fulfillment on the individual, making his or her affiliations purely instrumental; they push, in other words, to a social atomism. And they tend to see fulfillment as just of the self, neglecting or delegitimating the demands that come from beyond our own desires or aspirations, be they from history, tradition, society, nature, or God; they foster, in other words, a radical anthropocentrism.” Taylor proposes an alternative, “We ought to be trying to persuade people that self-fulfillment, so far from excluding unconditional relationships and moral demands beyond the self, actually requires these in some form…. Authenticity points us towards a more self-responsible form of life. It allows us to live (potentially) a fuller and more differentiated life, because more fully appropriated as our own.”


To live a fuller life, modernity has to get away from life as subjective relativism, in which all morals and life’s goals are up for grabs. “Things centre more and more on the subject, and in a host of ways. Things that were once settled by some external reality—traditional law, say, or nature—are now referred to our choice. Issues where we were meant to accept the dictates of authority we now have to think out for ourselves. Modern freedom and autonomy centres us on ourselves…. The sacrifices that runaway instrumental reason imposes on us are obvious enough, in the hardening of an atomistic outlook, in our imperviousness to nature.” Taylor suggests taming instrumental reason. “Technology in the service of an ethic of benevolence towards real flesh and blood people; technological, calculative thinking as a rare and admirable achievement of a being who lives in the medium of a quite different kind of thinking.” For Taylor, this also requires a new kind of political culture—a return to the polis. It requires common aims and objective morals that are anathema to special interests, rent-seeking, and identity-politics. “The danger is not actual despotic control but fragmentation—that is, a people increasingly less capable of forming a common purpose and carrying it out…. This fragmentation comes about partly through a weakening of the bonds of sympathy, partly in a self-feeding way, through the failure of democratic initiative itself…. The idea that the majority of the people might frame and carry through a common project comes to seem utopian and naive. And so people give up…. A fragmented  society is one whose members find it harder and harder to identify with their political society as a community. This lack of identification may reflect an atomistic outlook, in which people come to see society purely instrumentally. But it also helps to entrench atomism, because the absence of effective common action throws people back on themselves…. A fading political identity makes it harder to mobilize effectively, and a sense of helplessness breeds alienation.”

Friday, March 4, 2022

“Hegel” by Charles Taylor

I think it would be fair to say this book is almost as much about the philosophy of Taylor as it is about the philosophy of Hegel. Or at the very least, Hegel through a Taylorian lens. Because of this, it is fascinating. Taylor begins, “Hegel’s spirit, or Geist, although he is often called ‘God’, and although claimed to be clarifying Christian theology, is not the God of traditional theism; he is not a God who could exist quite independently of men…. He is a spirit who lives as spirit only through men. They are the vehicles, and the indispensable vehicles, of his spiritual existence, as consciousness, rationality, will. But at the same time Geist is not reducible to man, he is not identical with the human spirit, since he is also the spiritual reality underlying the universe as a whole.”  Hegel stated, “The geological organism is only vitality in itself, the truly living organism is its other.” Taylor expands, “For the mature Hegel, man comes to himself in the end when he sees himself as the vehicle of a larger spirit.”


Hegel’s Geist can be thought of as the embodiment of reason. “Our conception of spirit and its self-realization must have a place for reason if man is to be the vehicle of cosmic spirit and yet retain his autonomy…. Rational understanding is not possible without a clear consciousness of the distinction between subject and object, self and other, the rational and the affective. And just because of this, Hegel will insist that the ultimate synthesis incorporate division as well as unity…. Thus Hegel in his mature system developed an original stand vis-a-vis the generation to which he belonged in time and aspiration. He did not slough off their aspirations—to combine the fullest moral autonomy of the subject with the highest expressive unity within man, between men and with nature. He shared the hope that this unprecedented and epoch-making synthesis could be made only if one could win through to a vision of a spiritual reality underlying nature, a cosmic subject, to whom man could relate himself and in which he could ultimately find himself.” Hegel proclaimed, “In self-consciousness as the concept of Geist, consciousness comes to a turning point, at which it steps out of the multi-colored show of sensible immanence and the empty night of suprasensible transcendence into the spiritual daylight of presence.” Furthermore, Hegel believed it fell upon philosophy the task of “the cancellation of division.” He went on, “The Absolute itself is thus the identity of identity and non-identity; opposition and unity are both in it.” Taylor explains, “In Hegel’s final position, philosophy occupies the highest place, just because it is the only fully adequate expression of the highest unity, the medium in which spirit comes totally to itself, and hence the development of philosophical thought is essential to the perfection of this highest synthesis.”


Hegel considered himself a Christian. He tried to square the circle between reason and faith. Taylor exposits, “Faith triumphantly returns; indeed, [Hegel] would not agree to call it ‘faith’; it is the cornerstone of his philosophical system, the Hegelian notion of Vernunft (Reason)…. The fact that he pondered so long on man’s religious and social development made him use the categories of post-Kantian idealism with a much richer field of reference and to incomparably greater effect…. With Hegel philosophy is used to illuminate the whole field of human history—political, religious, philosophical, artistic.” Hegel had this to say about the effect of disenchantment brought on by the Protestant Enlightenment, “Christianity has depopulated Valhalla, hewn down the sacred groves, and rooted out the phantasy of the people as shameful superstition, as a diabolical poison.” He would also claim, “The Enlightenment, this vanity of the understanding, is philosophy’s most forceful opponent.”


Taylor describes Hegel’s dialectics of thought and being, as well as between subject and object, “Our thinking as finite subjects, turns out to be that of the cosmos itself, or the cosmic subject, God, whose vehicles we are. In the higher vision of speculative philosophy, the world loses its otherness to thought, and subjectivity goes beyond finitude, and hence the two meet. We overcome the dualism between subject and world, between knowing man and nature, in seeing the world as the necessary expression of thought, or rational necessity, while we see ourselves as the necessary vehicles of this thought, as the point where it becomes conscious…. This means that we come to see ourselves not just as finite subjects, with our own thoughts as it were, but as vehicles of a thought which is more than just ours, that is in a sense the thought of the universe as a whole, or in Hegel’s terms, God…. Hegel solves the problem of uniting finite to infinite spirit without loss of freedom through his notion of reason…. The rational agent loses none of his freedom in coming to accept his vocation as vehicle of cosmic necessity…. The infinite subject is such that in order to be he must have an external embodiment; and who says external embodiment says embodiment in space and time, an embodiment which is somewhere and sometime, in a particular living being, with all that this involves. The infinite subject can only be through a finite one.” Hegel pontificated, “The Oriental world knew only that one man was free—the king represented the absolute principle…. The Greek world won through to an intuition of freedom, but saw only that some were free…. Only with Christianity do we win through to the intuition that man as such is free.”


In the middle of this tome, Taylor goes into minute detail breaking down the chapters of “The Phenomenology of Spirit” (PhG) line by line. It is a critique in which he seeks to articulate how Hegel returns again and again to the basics of his dialectic, as he moves forward through human history, “The PhG intends to start with our ordinary consciousness of things (das naturliches BewuBtsein), and to take us from there to the true perspective of Geist. The work is called a ‘phenomenology’ because it deals with the way things appear for consciousness, or with forms of consciousness. But ‘appearance’ here is not to be contrasted with ‘reality’; what is most real, the absolute, is essentially self-appearance…. Our ordinary consciousness takes us to be individual, finite subjects set over against the world. The perspective of Geist, on the other hand, shows us as vehicles of a spirit which is also expressed in the world, so that this world is no longer distinct from us…. It is to show how ordinary consciousness carefully examined breaks down in contradiction and itself points beyond itself to a more adequate form…. This means that we must follow the dialectical movement in consciousness…. If the argument follows a dialectical movement, then this must be in the things themselves, not just in the way we reason about them…. And yet these partial realities, just because they exist externally, each alongside the others, make a standing claim to independence which belies their status as posited vehicles of the whole…. The whole furniture of the world is there in order to embody Geist and to manifest what he essentially is, self-knowing spirit, self-thinking thought, pure rational necessity.”


In the PhG, Hegel continued on with the concept of self-consciousness. Taylor argues, “With self-consciousness, the dialectic will be between the idea of ourselves, what we claim to be, and what we actually are. These are the two moments Hegel calls self-certainty and truth…. The dialectic of self-consciousness is thus a dialectic of human longing and aspiration, and their vicissitudes…. What is aimed at is integral expression, a consummation where the external reality which embodies us and on which we depend is fully expressive of us and contains nothing alien. This goal, which we can call a state of total integrity, is identified in Hegel with his conception of infinity, a condition in which the subject is not limited by anything outside…. The real thing can only be attained when men come to see themselves as emanation of universal Geist. For it is only then that they will not see the surrounding universe as a limit, an other.” Vocation is the means by which the self-consciousness is reconciled with external reality. Taylor states, “Work thus plays a crucial role in man’s struggle for integrity…. This is why the principal path to integrity lies through recognition by another…. Man can come to see himself in the natural environment by making it over in conformity with his own project…. In transforming things we change ourselves. By creating a standing reflection of ourselves as universal beings we become such beings.” Taylor reasserts Hegel’s dialectic of the finite reconciled with the infinite, “We are condemned to particular existence as finite spirits. All we can do is to work through our particular existence in order to realize a form of life capable of carrying universal consciousness. We have to work through sin to atonement; sin itself is unavoidable.” Hegel stressed, “Only inaction is innocent, like the way of being a stone, but not even that of a child.”


Taylor next returns to Hegel’s conception of the movement of the world through history—the dialectic of particular and infinite existence through the process of death and becoming. “Hence infinity, the self-subsistent whole which we are forced to assume once we grasp the mortality of the finite, can only be the whole system of changing determinate beings. There is no foundation for finite things outside the system of the finite. Hence there is no source outside the system on which we can draw to explain the coming to be of new finite things. Their coming to be is just the passing away of their predecessors…. Not only the passing away but the coming to be of finite things happens of necessity…. Thus the infinite as the whole system of changing finite things is the unfolding of conceptual necessity, for these things change and deploy themselves in a perpetual attempt to resolve contradiction. Contradiction is the motor of things. And it touches everything, so that everything is swept along in a perpetual becoming…. It is a totality, a whole whose parts are intrinsically related to each other, that is, where each can only be understood by its relations to the others…. It makes all the difference between seeing the whole as a contingent grouping of finite things, and seeing it as a totality which deserves to be called ‘infinite’ in Hegel’s sense of the term, and in which the finite is seen as having its truth in the Idea…. But Infinity is still a poor and abstract version of the Idea. For we only know that it has a necessary structure deployed in space and time.” Taylor later expands, “The infinite only achieves its identity by reconciling contradiction, by finding itself in its other…. The Idea is thus a process of positing its other and then recovering its unity with itself in its other (EL, 215, WL, II, 412)…. Thus the unity of Idea and reality cannot be simply an sich [in itself], as it is in Life, it must also be fur sich [for itself].” Hegel opined, “The Idea, by virtue of the freedom which the Concept attains in it, has also the most stubborn opposition within itself; its repose consists in the security and certainty with which it eternally creates and eternally overcomes this opposition, and comes together with itself in it [in ihm mit sich selbst zusammengeht].”


Taylor next interrogates Hegel’s conception of freedom. “The freedom of a civilized man is not to be found in defiance of the laws which necessitate his being other than he immediately is, but rather in his finding his own identity in this change, in this transformation of himself. He then understands and lives the rational necessity which corresponds to his own nature, which came first in the guise of external necessity, but which as rational, and his own, is freedom. Freedom is in living in rational, i.e., one’s own, necessity.” Hegel contrasted this with an absolute freedom, “Universal freedom can produce no positive work or deed; only negative action remains to it; it is only the fury of destruction.”


Unlike Kant, Hegel felt that mankind could grasp ontological reality. The real was not destined to be forever masked behind a veil of appearances. Taylor states, “The search for self-subsistent necessity only reaches its end in a vision of reality as a necessary totality…. Reality constituted a totality governed by necessity and which manifested this necessity…. The whole must display contingency on its surface, as it were, since this is inseparable from exteriority…. Reality as absolute or unconditioned necessity is structured by concepts…. Subjective thought reaches the same culmination as reality, that the concept in the mind is fundamentally one with the ontological concept…. The motor of this development is the ‘absolute contradiction’ (EL, 194) which consists in the fact that the real is at once a totality, whose parts are thus inwardly related, and yet also made up of parts which are integral and independent (selbstandig and vollstandig)…. We start off with things purely external and independent. Each thing is external and indifferent to the others. But this means that it is a mere aggregate in itself, for there is no reason to draw boundaries of a thing or object at any given level…. In teleology we have the fullest embodiment of internal necessity…. For this is the notion of a sense or purpose which is inherent in the object itself. The purpose is its essence, its most profound characterization…. Their form is also a necessity…. To conform to it is freedom for them.” Hegel related, “But men have a fate because they act out of their universal nature, and yet inevitably sin against this nature, fate being the retribution of the genus on the particular acting man.”


Taylor returns once again to the dialectic of embodied particulars, living in contingency, against the universal Idea, “We only achieve the return of Being to itself with the Idea, that is, with the understanding that reality is the locus of a double movement, only one of which starts from Being. The other, which is the more fundamental one, starts from the inner necessity, from the Idea, itself…. The multiplicity of determinate beings is bound together by necessity. The real return to unity comes when we see this necessity as absolute. But if necessity is absolute, then everything that exists, all being, exists for a purpose. So that the starting point is really this purpose itself, the inner formula of necessity, or the Idea…. So Hegel establishes his ontology. What is primary is subject or reason or conceptual necessity…. Hence both that the world exists and what it is like are necessary, given that reason, subject, necessity must be…. For in starting with Being, the simplest, emptiest, most inescapable postulate, that there is (some kind or other) of reality, he claims to have shown that the dependence of everything on reason or the Idea follows inescapably. Hence the circle is closed…. The teleology is internal.”


Taylor finishes by delving into Hegel’s views on history, politics, culture, art, religion, and philosophy. It is in the nature of man to relate to other men through the external world. Man is, by necessity, embodied, finite, and particular. Taylor begins by relating Hegel to Herder’s theory of language, “When we think of a human being, we do not simply mean a living organism, but a being who can think, feel, decide, be moved, respond, enter into relations with others; and all this implies a language, a related set of ways of experiencing the world, of interpreting his feelings, understanding his relation to others, to the past, the future, the absolute, and so on. It is the particular way he situates himself within this cultural world that we call his identity…. What we are as human beings, we are only in a cultural community…. The life of a language and culture is one whose locus is larger than that of the individual.” This culture has its unity in the State. Hegel claimed, “The state is not there for the sake of the citizens; one could say, it is the goal and they are its instruments. But this relation of ends and means is quite inappropriate here. For the state is not something abstract, standing over against the citizens; but rather they are moments as in organic life, where no member is end and none means…. The essence of the state is ethical life [die sittliche Lebendigkeit].” Hegel further explained how the individual and the State related to each other, “The principle of modern states has prodigious strength and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the extreme of self-subsistent personal particularity, and yet at the same time brings it back to the substantive unity and so maintains this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself.” Taylor claims, “Thus what is strange and contestable in Hegel’s theory of the state is not the idea of a larger life in which men are immersed, or the notion that the public life of a society expresses certain ideas, which are thus in a sense the ideas of the society as a whole and not just of the individuals, so that we can speak of a people as having a certain ‘spirit’. For throughout most of human history men have lived most intensely in relation to the meanings expressed in the public life of their societies…. But where Hegel does make a substantial claim which is not easy to grant is in his basic ontological view, that man is the vehicle of cosmic spirit, and the corollary, that the state expresses the underlying formula of necessity by which this spirit posits the world… the thesis that men—and hence in their own way these Volkgeister [spirits of the peoples]—are vehicles of a cosmic spirit which is returning to self-consciousness through man…. Thus his ideal is not a condition in which individuals are means to an end, but rather a community in which like a living organism, the distinction between means and ends is overcome, everything is both means and ends…. The rational state will restore Sittlichkeit [ethics], the embodiment of the highest norms in an ongoing public life.”


Taylor expands on Hegel’s conception of morality. In this, Hegel somewhat follows Kant’s deontological reasoning. Taylor states of Hegel, “Man is a moral agent because as a bearer of will he ought to conform his will to universal reason…. But as the subject of morality man still figures as an individual. The demand of morality is that I come to recognize that I am under the obligation of willing universal reason, simply in virtue of being a man…. The demands of morality in other words are inner as well as outer…. I have to do the right because it is the right; and it follows from this that I have to understand the right myself…. Morality touches our intentions and not just our acts.” As a self-professed Christian, for Hegel, religion comes into ethics. Taylor asks, “How does a Hegelian philosopher pray? Certainly the prayer of petition has no meaning for him. Nor can he really thank God. What he does is to contemplate his identity with cosmic spirit…. Thus the Hegelian ontology itself in which everything can be grasped by reason because everything is founded on rational necessity is ultimately incompatible with Christian faith. Hegel’s philosophy is an extraordinary transposition which ‘saves the phenomena’ (that is, the dogmas) of Christianity, while abandoning its essence.” Taylor concludes, “Hegel himself was the first ‘death of God’ theologian. For we have seen that Christ’s death plays a crucial and necessary role as the indispensable basis for the coming of the Spirit and hence the Spiritualization of God’s presence, which is the same as the building of this presence into the life of the community. Men must first of all see God concentrated in a single man. But this point of concentration has to disappear, if the fuller truth is to emerge that men carry God as a community, that God is in each and beyond each. God is like a flame which passes from mortal candle to mortal candle, each destined to light and go out, but the flame to be eternal.”


Friday, May 14, 2021

“A Secular Age” by Charles Taylor

Taylor writes about our modern age of western secularization from a Catholic perspective. He begins, “I would like to claim that the coming of modern secularity in my sense has been coterminous with the rise of a society in which for the first time in history a purely self-sufficient humanism came to be a widely available option. I mean by this a humanism accepting no final goals beyond human flourishing, nor any allegiance to anything else beyond this flourishing…. The general understanding of the human predicament before modernity placed us in an order where we were not at the top. Higher beings, like Gods or spirits, or a higher kind of being, like the Ideas or the cosmopolis of Gods and humans, demanded and deserved our worship, reverence, devotion or love.”


Taylor posits that a series of successive stages were necessary to enable the intellectual and psychological leaps to a secular society. The first major step was the Protestant Reformation. Reform consisted primarily of a “return to a more inward and intense personal devotion, a greater uneasiness at “sacramentals” and church-controlled magic, and then laterally the new inspiring idea of salvation by faith, which erupted into a world riven with anxiety about judgment and a sense of unworthiness…. One issue which was hard to settle by reform was that of the sacred in the church. In the term ‘sacred’, I'm pointing to the belief that God's power is somehow concentrated in certain people, times, places or actions. Divine power is in these, in a way it is not in other people, times, etc., which are “profane”. The sacred played a central role in the practices of the mediaeval church. Churches were holy places, made more so by the presence of relics; feasts were holy times, and the sacraments of the church were holy actions, which supposed a clergy with special powers…. Lutherans and moderate Catholics could've agreed on this whole range of issues, even the Eucharist, and various formulae were even worked out. But the temptation to see the other on both sides in the perspective of irreconcilable difference—as rejecting the sacrament utterly, or else falling into Papist idolatry—was too strong.”


Along with the Reformation, another crucial turn on the path to secularism was the embrace of the divinity of nature. “I've been identifying two spiritual motives for the renewed interest in nature as autonomous: devotion to God as the creator of an ordered cosmos, whose parts themselves exhibited standing marvels of micro-order (this applies, of course, especially to human beings, but not only to them); and a new evangelical turning to the world, to bring Christ among the people…. Living a godly life in this world is something very different from living in the ordered Aristotelian Cosmos of Aquinas or the hierarchy of Pseudo-Dionysios. It is no longer a matter of admiring a normative order, in which God has revealed himself through signs and symbols. We rather have to inhabit it as agents of instrumental reason, working the system effectively in order to bring about God’s purposes; because it is through these purposes, and not through signs, that God reveals himself in his world. These are not just two different stances, but two incompatible ones. We have to abandon the attempt to read the cosmos as the locus of signs, reject this as illusion, in order to adopt the instrumental stance effectively…. The same crucial features recur here as in the story of the ultimate effects of the Reformation: disenchantment, the active instrumental stance towards the world, and the following of God’s purposes, which means beneficence. And these are the key features of the new emergent exclusive humanism.”


The turn away from orthodox Catholicism was also, for some, a return to Neo-Pagan belief. “The ideal of civility, with its core image of taming raw nature, already involves what we might call a stance of reconstruction towards ourselves…. The great ancient ethics, those of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, called for the subordination, or even, in the case of the Stoics, the elimination of baser desires (in the Stoic case, passion, as a kind of false opinion, disappears altogether from the soul of the wise). But the dominant image of virtue was that of a soul in harmony. The master idea was of a form which was already at work in human nature, which the virtuous person has to help emerge, rather than of a pattern imposed ab extra.” Justus Lipsius, in fact, around 1590, proposed a Neo-Stoicism, which he merged with Christianity. Taylor explains, “Christianity sees us as in need of God’s grace, as needing God’s help to liberate the good will which is potentially ours; where Stoicism appeals purely to our powers of reason and self-control…. Christianity sees the fullest realization of the good will in us in agape, our love for our neighbor. Stoicism sees the wise person as having attained apatheia, a condition beyond passion…. Christ in the Gospels is portrayed as being moved “in the bowels” by compassion (splangnizesthai); and his cries on the cross were hardly manifestations of apatheia…. [Lipsius] rejects miseratio, or misericordia, the compassion of feeling, in favour of the compassion of active intervention, but on the basis of a fuller inner detachment…. Everything that happens comes about through the Providence of God. God has his own purposes in putting us through the trials we suffer. It is vain and foolish to resist. Rather we should obey…. Lipsius, in a way, which is typical of this whole modern epoch, departs from Stoicism in his activism. We might say he is closer to the Roman, or Senecan, version than to that of Epictetus…. It is not a matter just of doing one’s duty in the world, but of waging active struggle for the good…. Lipsius firmly believes in our free will.” Taylor explains how this turn was a very different kind of Christianity. “The eclipse of certain crucial Christian elements, those of grace and of agape, already changed quite decisively the centre of gravity of this outlook. Moreover, there didn’t seem to be an essential place for the worship of God, other than through the cultivation of reason and constancy; that was in a sense, the strength of this philosophy…. God is still very crucial, because he is the source of reason, and in following it we are following his image in us. But it appears that what we have to do to do his will is to become an excellent human being, and nothing further.”


At this point, Taylor makes a useful turn back to Augustine, to contrast his conception of the City of God with the City of Man. “The earthly city was the site of sin. It had an inherent tendency to violence and strife. Government itself could be conceived as an agent of violence on a grander scale. But it was nevertheless indispensable…. On this rather low view of the state, its role was to keep some kind of order within a fallen world…. A Christian state could help the church, repress heretics and false cults, but it couldn’t improve its citizens; only the city of God, represented by the Church, could aspire to that…. For Augustine, and he was followed in this by late mediaeval Catholicism, and even more by Calvinism, the number of the saved was very small. They were a small elite among the mass of the damned…. They saw a dispensation in which the elect would rule, and discipline the whole society.”


Next, Taylor moves on to the conception of Natural Law, as formulated by Grotius, Pufendorf, and Locke. “Grotius’ derivation of Natural Law doesn’t follow the path of an Aristotelian-Thomist definition of the ends of human nature. It proceeds almost more geometrico. In the first pages of De jure belli ac pacis, Grotius derives natural law as what “suits” (convenit) a being who is both rational and sociable…. No form is proposed as already at work here, but there is a way that things (in this case, humans) fit together “rationally”…. The Law would hold, “etsi Deus non daretur” [even if God did not exist]…. Locke brings the stance of reconstruction to a new pitch, with his psychology of the human mind as a tabula rasa…. Why did the reconstructors need something like natural law? Why didn’t they just develop a theory of human nature as malleable (as Locke most strikingly did) and leave it at that? Because they needed a firm underpinning for an agreed public order….. One of the most important things it was meant to offer was a basis for rational agreement on the foundations of political life, beyond and in spite of confessional differences.”


Many would argue that Descartes was the philosopher who definitively ushered in the age of modernity. “The emphasis shifts from the notion of a form which tends to realize itself, but requires our collaboration, to that of a form imposed ab extra on our life by the power of will. In the seventeenth century, this move towards an ethic of poiesis is consummated in a new coherent theory of disengaged agency, and a new understanding of virtue as dominance of the will over passion…. The transition can be conceived as one which takes us from an ethic grounded on an order which is at work in reality, to an ethic which sees order as imposed by will…. Forms and their expression belong exclusively in the domain of minds. Matter is to be explained by mechanism…. Both science and virtue require that we disenchant the world, that we make the rigorous distinction between mind and body, and relegate all thought and meaning to the realm of the intra-mental. We have to set up a firm boundary, the one, as we have seen, which defines the buffered self.” Descartes’ dualism setup a separate mechanistic realm for the body, apart from the workings of the soul.


The next big shift in Christian thought was the move to Deism. “The plan of God for human beings was reduced to their coming to realize the order in their lives which he had planned for their happiness and wellbeing. Essentially, the carrying out of the order of mutual benefit was what God created for us. The sense that there is a further vocation for human being, beyond human flourishing, atrophies in the climate of “Deism.” This shift in turn is set in a very long-lasting bent in European culture towards Reform, in the widest sense. I mean by this, the attempt by elites to make over society, and the life and practices of non-elites, so as to conform to what the elites identify as higher standards…. First, the modern image of human flourishing incorporates an activist, interventionist stance, both towards nature and to human society. Both are to be re-ordered, in the light of instrumental reason, to suit human purposes…. Secondly, the new humanism has taken over universalism from its Christian roots; or else moves to retrieve it from Stoic sources…. By this, I mean that it accepts in principle that the good of everyone must be served in the re-ordering of things…. But more, the new humanism supposes that we are motivated to act for the good of our fellow human beings. We are endowed with a specific bent in that direction…. What has always been stressed in Christian agape is the way in which it can take us beyond the bounds of an already existing solidarity…. This active charity, stepping beyond the bounds of community can be placed in the context of a super-community of all the children of God, thus replicating something close to the Stoic cosmopolis. But this is seen more as something to be built, an eschatological concept. And the paradigmatic stepping beyond of agape, the incarnation and submission to death of Christ, is not motivated by pre-existing community or solidarity. It is free gift of God. This active, community-transcendent beneficence is reflected in the moral psychologies of modern exclusive humanism, in the frequently recurring idea that human beings are endowed with a capacity of benevolence…. The idea is there that human motivation includes a bent to act for the good of others, just in virtue of their being fellow humans, independently of any perception of common inner purpose…. Its scope is in principle universal. This is the historical trace, as it were, of agape…. It not only shuts out God, it attributes this great power of benevolence or altruism to humans…. The main thrust of modern exclusive humanism has tried rather to immanentize this capacity of beneficence, and this is very far from being a return to ancient wisdom…. The successor to agape was to be held strictly within the bounds of measure, instrumental reason, and perhaps also good taste.”


Taylor continues by veering back to the roots of Deism proper, “There is a drift away from orthodox Christian conceptions of God as an agent interacting with humans and intervening in human history; and towards God as architect of a universe operating by unchanging laws, which humans have to conform to or suffer the consequences.” There was a definite anti-orthodox strain that sparked Deism. “The slide to Deism was not just the result of “reason” and “science”, but reflected a deep-seated moral distaste for the old religion that sees God as an agent in history….. The prevailing doctrines of majority damnation and divine grace were calculated to make God look an arbitrary tyrant, playing favourites in a capricious manner, and more concerned with arcane points of honour than with the good of his creatures.” Deism, in this way, strove to explain away the paradox of theodicy. One must remember that, at that time, Deism, now seen as a stepping stone to secularism, was itself a radical doctrinal move. “God's relation with us comes to be seen as mediated by an impersonal, immanent order. As an immanent order, it is self-contained; that is, apart from the issue of how it arose, its workings can be understood in its own terms. On one level, we have the natural order, the universe, purged of enchantment, and freed from miraculous interventions and special providences from God, operating by universal, unrespondent causal laws. On another level, we have a social order, designed for us, which we have to come to discern by reason, and establish by constructive activity and discipline. Finally the Law which defines this order, whether as political/constitutional law, or ethical norms, can be expressed in rational codes, which can be grasped quite independent of any special relationship we might establish with God, and by extension with each other. The human relationships which matter are those prescribed in the codes (e.g., Natural Law, the Utilitarian principle, the Categorial Imperative). These codes, of course, centre on the purely human flourishing.”


Taylor comes back time and again to the theme of the disenchantment of the world. It becomes a world firmly rooted in the immanent and stripped of all its transcendence. “Where our ancestors used to see their world as a locus of spirits and forces, and understood it as a fixed, ordered cosmos, independently of whether they grasped and accepted any particular picture of this cosmos, we experience the universe as limitless, that is, unencompassable in imagination, but only at best in highly abstract theory, which is beyond most of us; and we feel it to be changing, evolving. Where our ancestors were able to ignore without difficulty the signs which point us to these two features—vastness and evolution—they stand out for us…. We live in a nature of deep time and unfathomable spaces, from which we emerged. It is a universe which is in many ways strange and alien, and certainly unfathomable. This nourishes on one hand a sense of kinship and filiation. We belong to the earth; it is our home. This sensibility is a powerful source of ecological consciousness. It also means that we are led to think of ourselves as having a deep nature, which we need to retrieve, or perhaps overcome, something which we can find out how to do by examining our dark genesis…. This complex of theories, unreflective understanding and moral imagination is the dominant one in Western Civilization in our time. It saturates our world.” For Taylor, the certainty of science is a position modernity has come to have accepted as objective fact, rather than as just one lens for viewing a deeper reality. “We can see from all this how much the appeal of scientific materialism is not so much the cogency of its detailed findings as that of the underlying epistemological stance, and that for ethical reasons. It is seen as the stance of maturity, of courage, of manliness, over against childish fears and sentimentality.”


Modern man has become excarnated. The life of the mind has replaced the life of the body. At the same time, instead of looking out at the world, man has turned inward. Truth has come to be found in the interiority of the Self. “The rise of the buffered identity has been accompanied by an interiorization; that is, not only the Inner/Outer distinction, that between Mind and World as separate loci, which is central to the buffer itself; and not only the development of this Inner/Outer distinction in a whole range of epistemological theories of a mediational type from Descartes to Rorty; but also the growth of a rich vocabulary of interiority, an inner realm of thought and feeling to be explored. This frontier of self-exploration has grown, through various spiritual disciplines of self-examination through Montaigne, the development of the modern novel, the rise of Romanticism, the ethic of authenticity, to the point where we now conceive of ourselves as having inner depths. We might even say that the depths which were previously located in the cosmos, the enchanted world, are now more readily placed within.”


Modern ethics has come to be defined by duties, rather than the ancient search for the best life and best society. “A lot needs to be said as well about the widespread take on moral philosophy today, with its exclusive focus on questions of obligatory action, the question of what is the right thing to do. It in fact abandons wider issues of the nature of the good life, of higher ethical motivation, of what we should love…. Underlying this change are massive shifts in the understanding of human agency and the human good…. The basis of ethics is seen as something obvious, and there seems no call to examine the understanding of the incomparably higher underlying all this, much less raise the question whether it points to something transcendent…. If the transcendental view is right, then human beings have an ineradicable bent to respond to something beyond life. Denying this stifles. And in fact, even for those who accept the metaphysical primacy of life, this outlook can itself come to seem imprisoning.”


Finally, Taylor looks at the modern trend towards distancing. “Now in a certain way a strategy of distancing is implicit in the modern disengaged stance. You see the problem, but you don't allow it to get to you. You can allow in a certain compassion, concern, but you don't let yourself be overwhelmed by it…. So distancing works both by holding oneself back from being engulfed by suffering, and also by exclusion based on the limits of practical action…. The positive side, what this distancing preserves, is the sense of yourself as disengaged subject, moved by impersonal benevolence; the liberal self, benevolent towards all mankind, but within the limits of the reasonable and possible…. Another form that this distancing can take we see, for instance, in the Bolshevik stance. This has similar roots to the liberal, the benevolent disengaged sense. But there also is a tremendous sense of power, in exercising titanic control over history. All benevolence is now invested in this all-powerful ameliorative action; so that what is out of reach of this can be sacrificed or ruthlessly set aside…. Moving along a spectrum from the Bolshevik, we can come to a stance which has abandoned universal benevolence and the moral order of mutual benefit. This is a Nietzschean stance, which rejects equality and benevolence because it sees them as leveling, and catering to the lowest in us, to comfort and security. It seeks heroism…. Here the first positive part of the answer is no longer benevolence, but the idea that the human type demands realization of its excellence, and only the few can do this; so they must go ahead. The rest can perhaps get some satisfaction in knowing that they subserve this, but if not, they have to be sacrificed. The enemy here is not suffering, but a sinking into sloth, mediocrity, meaninglessness.” For Taylor, a life in search of transcendence is the only logical response in an attempt to find the fullness in each life. “Running through all these attacks is the spectre of meaninglessness; that as a result of the denial of transcendence, of heroism, of deep feeling, we are left with a view of human life which is empty, cannot inspire commitment, offers nothing really worth while, cannot answer the craving for goals we can dedicate ourselves to. Human happiness can only inspire us when we have to fight against the forces which are destroying it; but once realized, it will inspire nothing but ennui, a cosmic yawn. This theme is indeed special to modernity.”


Friday, July 3, 2020

“Sources of the Self” by Charles Taylor

With Derek Parfit’s recent passing, Taylor might well be considered today’s greatest living philosopher. In his most famous book, Taylor traces how the changing conceptions of the Self have shaped modern notions of morality. In modernity, human welfare (and the conception of the “good life”) has come to be concerned not with the extraordinary, but with the ordinary life. “This sense of the importance of the everyday in human life, along with its corollary about the importance of suffering, colours our whole understanding of what it is truly to respect human life and integrity. Along with the central place given to autonomy, it defines a version of this demand which is peculiar to our civilization, the modern West…. There is a peculiarly modern sense of what respect involves, which gives a salient place to freedom and self-control, places a high priority on avoiding suffering, and sees productive activity and family life as central to our well-being.” For Taylor, as opposed to consequentialists like the utilitarians, life must be qualitatively, not just quantitatively, measured and judged. “I have been arguing that in order to make minimal sense in our lives, in order to have an identity, we need an orientation to the good, which means some sense of qualitative discrimination, of the incomparably higher. Now we see that this sense of the good has to be woven into my understanding of my life as an unfolding story. But this is to state another basic condition of making sense of ourselves, that we grasp our lives in a narrative…. In order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a notion of how we have become, and of where we are going.” Taylor makes the argument that some goods are not rank-able, they are qualitatively incomparable. “The modern naturalist-utilitarian hostility to ‘higher’ goods and defence of ordinary, sensuous happiness emerge from what I have been calling the affirmation of ordinary life, which in early modern times brought about a similar repudiation of supposedly ‘higher’ modes of activity in favour of the everyday existence of marriage and the calling. The original form of this affirmation was theological, and it involved a positive vision of ordinary life as hallowed by God.”

Modern man changed the conception of the Self and its relation to the world it inhabits. “Our visions of the good are tied up with our understandings of the self…. We have a sense of who we are through our sense of where we stand to the good…. Being a self is inseparable from existing in a space of moral issues, to do with identity and how one ought to be. It is being able to find one’s standpoint in this space, being able to occupy, to be a perspective in it.” With modernity grew the idea that each Self was actually in control of their own individual life. “If we follow the theme of self-control through the vicissitudes of our Western tradition, we find a very profound transmutation, all the way from the hegemony of reason as vision of cosmic order to the notion of a punctual disengaged subject exercising instrumental control. And this, I would argue, helps to explain why we think of ourselves as ‘selves’ today…. The modern ideal of disengagement requires a reflexive stance. We have to turn inward and become aware of our own activity and of the processes which form us. We have to take charge of constructing our own representation of the world…. Disengagement demands that we stop simply living in the body or within our traditions or habits and, by making them objects for us, subject them to radical scrutiny and remaking. Of course the great classical moralists also call on us to stop living in unreflecting habit and usage. But their reflection turns us towards an objective order. Modern disengagement by contrast calls us to a separation from ourselves through self-objectification. This is an operation which can only be carried out in the first-person perspective.”

The modern conception of the Self began with the Enlightenment thinkers. “Enlightenment naturalism didn’t only have an effect on our conceptions of cosmic time; it also generated its own forms of personal and historical narration…. These notions of reason and nature define a certain perfection for human beings, where the full exercise of self-responsible reason yields the fullest clarity about their own nature and its significance.” Kant’s morality gave primacy to a Self governed only by reason and focused on humanism. “This is a more radical definition of freedom, which rebels against nature as what is merely given, and demands that we find freedom in a life whose normative shape is somehow generated by rational activity…. Kant explicitly insists that morality can’t be founded in nature or in anything outside the human rational will…. And, like Descartes, at the centre of his moral view is a conception of human dignity. Rational beings have a unique dignity. They stand out against the background of nature…. Everything else in nature, in other words, conforms to laws blindly. Only rational creatures conform to laws that they themselves formulate. This is something incomparably higher…. The moral person may lead the same external life as the non-moral one, but it is inwardly transformed by a different spirit.” Reason rules.

Taylor nexts deals with one facet of the counter-Enlightenment, Romanticism. “If our access to nature is through an inner voice or impulse, then we can only fully know this nature through articulating what we find within us. This connects to another crucial feature of this new philosophy of nature, the idea that its realization in each of us is also a form of expression…. Leibniz was an important source of expressivism. His notion of a monad already effected the connection between the Aristotelian idea of nature and a subject-like particular. The monad was a proto-self. Expressivism was the basis for a new and fuller individuation…. Just the notion of individual difference is, of course, not new. Nothing is more evident or more banal. What is new is the idea that this really makes a difference to how we’re called on to live.” A major critique of Enlightenment utilitarianism was its unapologetic instrumentalism, in which competing moral claims might be impossible to reconcile. “One of the great objections against Enlightenment disengagement was that it created barriers and divisions: between humans and nature; and perhaps grievously, within humans themselves; and then also, as a further consequence, between human and human. This last seems to follow both because of the atomist affinities of naturalism and because the purely instrumental stance to things allows for no deeper unity in society than that of sharing common instruments.” For the Romantics, nature wasn’t something to be conquered; nature was all-consuming life itself. “The Romantics developed an expressive view of nature, sometimes seen as a great current of life running through everything, and emerging also in the impulses we feel within.”

Modern man has had to reconcile the competing notions of the Enlightenment and Romanticism. “The result for us has been a split-screen vision of nature. On one side is the vast universe which scientific discovery continually reveals, huge and in some ways baffling, stretching far beyond our imaginative powers in both the gigantic and the minuscule; indifferent to us and strangely other, though full of unexpected beauty and inspiring awe. On the other side is the nature whose impulse we feel within, with which we can feel ourselves out of alignment and with which we can aspire to be in attunement.” However, with regards to notions of the Self, these two dispositions share much in common too. “The ideals of disengaged reason and of Romantic fulfillment both rely in different ways on a notion of the unitary self. The first requires a tight centre of control which dominates experience and is capable of constructing the orders of reason by which we can direct thought and life. The second sees the originally divided self come to unity in the alignment of sensibility and reason. Now to the extent that both of these come to be seen as facets of a world and an outlook whose claims to embrace everything we want to escape, to the degree we adopt a post-Schopenhauerian vision of inner nature, the liberation of experience can seem to require that we step outside the circle of the single, unitary identity, and that we open ourselves to the flux which moves beyond the scope of control or integration.”

Modernity has become attached to the Whig theory of history, where morality is progressing ever-forward towards a better (and more rational) future. There is a certain inevitability to it all. “The very picture of history as moral progress, as a ‘going beyond’ our forebears, which underlies our own sense of superiority, is very much a Victorian idea…. Our history since 1800 has been the slow spreading outward and downward of the new modes of thought and sensibility to new nations and classes, with the transfer in each case involving some kind of adapting transformation of the ideas themselves…. The Enlightenment has bequeathed to us… a moral imperative to reduce suffering… the significance of ordinary life and the ideal of universal benevolence…. What is universal in the modern world is the centrality of freedom as a good…. These ideas of freedom and dignity, in association with the promotion of ordinary life, have steadily eroded hierarchy and promoted equality.”

Taylor concludes by reminding us of his division of the “moral sources into three large domains: the original theistic grounding for these standards; a second one that centres on a naturalism of disengaged reason, which in our day takes scientistic forms; and a third family of views which finds its sources in Romantic expressivism or in one of the modernist successor visions.” Prevailing morals are inescapably linked to current notions of Selfhood. “What I hope emerges from this lengthy account of the growth of the modern identity is how all-pervasive it is, how much it envelops us, and how deeply we are implicated in it: in a sense of self defined by the powers of disengaged reason as well as of the creative imagination, in the characteristically modern understandings of freedom and dignity and rights, in the ideals of self-fulfillment and expression, and in the demands of universal benevolence and justice.” Taylor’s own normative idea of morality is one that engenders the ‘best life’ based on higher ideals. Morality is not transactional, subjective, or concerned only with negative rights. “Prudence constantly advises us to scale down our hopes and circumscribe our vision. But we deceive ourselves if we pretend that nothing is denied thereby of our humanity.”