This is another dialogue on the nature of epistemology. It does not end with a satisfactory definition of knowledge. Or, at least, a neat and tidy one. Socrates lays out the purpose, speaking to Theaetetus early on. “You were not asked to say what one may have knowledge of, or how many branches of knowledge there are. It was not with any idea of counting these up that the question was asked; we wanted to know what knowledge itself is.” From there Socrates, Theaetetus, and Theodorus try to work out a satisfactory theory of knowledge.
Theaetetus begins by agreeing with Protagoras, who tried to equate knowledge with perception. Socrates summarizes the tenets of Protagoras’ pupils. They “maintain (a) that all things are in motion and (b) that for each person and each city, things are what they seem to them to be. And upon this basis you will inquire whether knowledge and perception are the same thing or different things.” Socrates responds with his own thoughts, “my perception is true for me—because it is always a perception of that being which is peculiarly mine; and I am judge, as Protagoras said, of things that are, that they are, for me; and of things that are not, that they are not…. If whatever the individual judges by means of perception is true for him; if no man can assess another’s experience better than he, or can claim authority to examine another man’s judgment and see if it be right or wrong; if, as we repeatedly said, only the individual himself can judge of his own world, and what he judges is always true and correct: how could it ever be, my friend, that Protagoras was a wise man, so wise as to think himself fit to be the teacher of other men.” Socrates is saying that if all men’s perceptions were equally judged as correct knowledge, then there would be no need for wise teachers to school ignorant pupils on the truth. Instead, everyone’s perceptions would be equally true. Socrates continues, “if all things are in motion, every answer, on whatever subject, is equally correct, both ‘it is thus’ and ‘it is not thus’—or if you like ‘becomes’, as we don’t want to use any expressions which will bring our friends to a standstill…. One must not even use the word ‘thus’; for this ‘thus’ would no longer be in motion; nor yet ‘not thus’ for here again there is no motion. The exponents of this theory need to establish some other language; as it is, they have no words that are consistent with their hypothesis—unless it would perhaps suit them best to use ‘not at all thus’ in a quite indefinite sense…. We do not yet concede to [Protagoras] that every man is the measure of all things, if he be not a man of understanding. And we are not going to grant that knowledge is perception, not at any rate on the line of inquiry which supposes that all things are in motion.”
Socrates and Theaetetus continue trying to hammer out a definition of knowledge, but it is elusive. Whenever they get close, a refutation is found and the answer escapes them. Socrates states, “we have determined that to ‘possess’ knowledge is one thing and to ‘have’ it is another; accordingly we maintain that it is impossible for anyone not to possess that which he has possession of, and thus, it never happens that he does not know something he knows. But he may yet make a false judgment about it. This is because it is possible for him to ‘have’, not the knowledge of this thing, but another piece of knowledge instead. When he is hunting for one piece of knowledge, it may happen, as they fly about, that he makes a mistake and gets hold of one instead of another…. It follows that a man who has knowledge of something is ignorant of this very thing not through want of knowledge but actually in virtue of his knowledge.” Socrates goes on to state the difference between judgement and knowledge. “Now when a man gets a true judgment about something without an account, his soul is in a state of truth as regards that thing, but he does not know it; for someone who cannot give and take an account of a thing is ignorant about it. But when he has also got an account of it, he is capable of all this and is made perfect in knowledge.” Having built up this definition of knowledge, Socrates, himself, appears intent on once again knocking it down. He states, “We said that the man who defines knowledge as correct judgment together with an account would choose one of three meanings for ‘account’.” Theaetetus responds, “The first was, a kind of vocal image of thought; the one we have just discussed was the way to the whole through the elements” which have both been discredited. Socrates reveals the third and final meaning, “What the majority of people would say—namely, being able to tell some mark by which the object you are asked about differs from all other things.” Socrates addresses this final meaning of ‘account’, “if ‘adding an account’ means that we are required to get to know the differentness, not merely judge it, this most splendid of our accounts of knowledge turns out to be a very amusing affair. For getting to know of course is acquiring knowledge, isn’t it?… So, it seems, the answer to the question ‘What is knowledge?’ will be ‘Correct judgment accompanied by knowledge of the differentness’—for this is what we are asked to understand by the ‘addition of an account.’… And it is surely just silly to tell us, when we are trying to discover what knowledge is, that it is correct judgment accompanied by knowledge, whether of differentness or of anything else? And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither perception nor true judgment, nor an account added to true judgment.” It seems that defining knowledge properly has all of us going around in circles. But the journey itself has, perhaps, been worth the effort.
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