“The Hebrew Bible: The Twelve Minor Prophets” (translated by Robert Alter)

Alter begins his introduction with a most important clarification, “The Twelve Minor Prophets are “minor” only in regard to the quantity of their writings that have come down to us. In fact, in Hebrew they are simply called “the Dozen,” with no mention of minor.”

In Hosea 5:15, Alter explains a bit of theological nuance, “I will go, return to My place. This is an interesting biblical intimation of the idea of deus absconditus. God, in His anger against Israel, withdraws from them to His celestial abode, where He will await the moment they recognize their guilt and seek Him out before He will return to Israel.” In Hosea 6:3, Alter describes a pun in the original Hebrew, “like the latter rain He will shower the earth. As often happens in the Bible, there is a pun hiding close to the surface. God’s instruction to humankind (the word translated as “shower” also means “instruct”) is life-giving, like the rain. But the verb for “teach” or “instruct,” yoreh, is also a homonym of the noun that means “former rain,” often paired with malqosh, “latter rain.” One should also note that in these two lines God is compared first to the sun, then to the rain—both giving life to earth.”

Alter, again, explains the wordplay in the original Hebrew in Joel 1:18, “the flocks of sheep are desolate. The verb here is another reflection of Joel’s fondness for introducing double meanings through similarities of sound. The verb ne’ashmu would ordinarily mean “to be guilty,” but it seems to be a deliberate distortion of nashamu, “to be desolate,” thus intimating a shadow of personifying guilt in the depiction of the desolate animals.” In Joel 4:1, there is more wordplay, “the Valley of Jehoshaphat. The name means “The Lord judges,” and the prophet immediately plays on shafat, “judges,” as he says “come to judgment,” nishpateti.” In Joel 4:10, there is a reference back to another prophet, “Grind your plowshares into swords / and your pruning hooks into spears. This is an obvious—and grim—reversal of the famous verse in Isaiah 2:4 that envisions a wondrous era of peace.”

In Haggai 2:3, Alter details a bit of history, “Who among you remains who saw this house in its former glory? There could be a few in Haggai’s audience who had actually seen the First Temple, but they would be very old because sixty-seven years had passed since its destruction. Is it not as nothing in your eyes? The foundation for the Temple, according to the Book of Ezra, had been laid during the reign of Cyrus, but the work did not go forward, so what met the eye was a half-finished foundation and no structure above it.”

Alter relates the uniqueness of Zechariah’s prophesying in Zechariah 5:1, “and, look, a flying scroll. By this point, it is evident that Zechariah’s mode of prophecy is essentially different from that of his predecessors. They occasionally experience enigmatic visions that are then explained, but their principal vehicle is direct address…. Zechariah, by contrast, witnesses a series of puzzling visions shown him by a divine emissary, and they seem to become progressively more bizarre.” In Zechariah 8:21, Alter notes the biblical introduction of the word Jew, “ten people from all the tongues of the nations shall grasp the border of a Jew’s garment. This vivid image conveys the sense of throngs of foreigners desperate to join the people with whom God dwells. The term yehudi, “Jew,” never appears in earlier biblical literature, although it occurs frequently in Esther, which also belongs to the Persian period. Yehudi is palpably moving toward the meaning of “Jew” because it is now hard to speak of a “Judahite” (Hebrew, ben yehudah), given that the kingdom of Judah no longer exists, having been replaced by the Persian province of Yehud.”

“Vanity Fair” by William Makepeace Thackeray

Thackeray’s most famous novel is a meandering tale which traverses the ballrooms of the aristocracy of London, the dinner clubs of the merchants in the City, the sahibs of India, and the battlefields of Belgium. His narrator, on occasion, breaks the fourth wall. “If, a few pages back, the present writer claimed the privilege of peeping into Miss Amelia Sedley’s bedroom, and understanding with the omniscience of the novelist all the gentle pains and passions which were tossing upon that innocent pillow, why should he not declare himself to be Rebecca’s confidante too, master of her secrets, and seal-keeper of that young woman’s conscience?”

In many ways, this is a novel about gender relations, place, and norms in Victorian society, especially within the dynamics of marriage. “The best women (I have heard my grandmother say) are hypocrites. We don’t know how much they hide from us: how watchful they are when they seem most artless and confidential: how often those frank smiles, which they wear so easily, are traps to cajole or elude or disarm—I don’t mean in your mere coquettes, but your domestic models, and paragons of female virtue. Who has not seen a woman hide the dulness of a stupid husband, or coax the fury of a savage one? We accept this amiable slavishness, and praise a woman for it; we call this pretty treachery truth.”

The novel’s plot centers around Captain Rawdon Crawley, disowned by his rich and eccentric aunt when he marries Rebecca Sharp, his brother’s governess, and, therefore, beneath the family station. Much of the novel centers on the couple’s aims to get back into the benefactress’ good graces. “In all his life he had never been so happy, as, during the past few months, his wife had made him. All former delights of turf, mess, hunting-field, and gambling-table; all previous loves and courtships of milliners, opera-dancers, and the like easy triumphs of the clumsy military Adonis, were quite insipid when compared with the lawful matrimonial pleasures which of late he had enjoyed.”

Some might claim, being disowned was not an easy life; whereas others might claim it was. “The novelist, it has been said before, knows everything, and as I am in a situation to be able to tell the public how Crawley and his wife lived without any income, may I entreat the public newspapers which are in the habit of extracting portions of the various periodical works now published, not to reprint the following exact narrative and calculations—of which I ought, as the discoverer (and at some expense, too), to have the benefit? My son, I would say, were I blessed with a child—you may by deep inquiry and constant intercourse with him, learn how a man lives comfortably on nothing a year. But it is best not to be intimate with gentlemen of this profession, and to take the calculations at second-hand, as you do logarithms, for to work them yourself, depend upon it, will cost you something considerable.” At least, one might be so generous as to say, Captain Crawley was a man of his age and station. “Rawdon Crawley, though the only book which he studied was the Racing Calendar, and though his chief recollections of polite learning were connected with the floggings which he received at Eton in his early youth, had that decent and honest reverence for classical learning which all English gentlemen feel.”

“Theological-Political Treatise” by Baruch Spinoza (translated by Samuel Shirley)

This short text by Spinoza lays out what he sees as the differences in force between religious and civil law. The treatise is also a defense of liberalism, democracy, freedom of conscience, and free speech. As for all of his philosophical works, it was originally written in Latin as the “Tractatus Theologico-Politicus”. Spinoza begins by discussing the Judeo-Christian religious tradition and, specifically, the prophets. “Prophecy is inferior to natural knowledge, which needs no sign, but of its own nature carries certainty…. Moreover, the certainty afforded by prophecy was not a mathematical certainty, but only a moral certainty.” To this end, Spinoza discusses the means of God’s actions and the role of the natural order. “By God’s direction I mean the fixed and immutable order of Nature, or chain of events…. The universal laws of Nature according to which all things happen and are determined are nothing but God’s eternal decrees, which always involve eternal truth and necessity.”

According to Spinoza, it is man’s knowledge of God that makes him a moral creature. “Since the love of God is man’s highest happiness and blessedness, and the final end and aim of all human action, it follows that only he observes the Divine Law who makes it his object to love God not through fear of punishment nor through love of some other thing such as sensual pleasure, fame and so forth, but from the mere fact that he knows God, or knows that the knowledge and love of God is the supreme good. So the sum of the Divine Law and its chief command is to love God as the supreme good…. If we now consider the nature of the natural Divine Law as we have just explained it we shall see: 1. That it is of universal application, or common to all mankind. For we have deduced it from human nature as such…. 2. That it does not demand belief in historical narratives of any kind whatsoever. For since it is merely a consideration of human nature that leads us to this natural Divine Law, evidently it applies equally to Adam as to any other man, and equally to a man living in a community as to a hermit…. 3. We see that the natural Divine Law does not enjoin ceremonial rites, that is, actions which in themselves are of no significance and are termed good merely by tradition…. For the natural light of reason enjoins nothing that is not within the compass of reason…. 4. Finally, we see that the supreme reward of the Divine Law is the law itself, namely, to know God and to love him in true freedom with all our heart and mind.”

For Spinoza, the existence of God is a necessity. “It is only in concession to the understanding of the multitude and the defectiveness of their thought that God is described as a lawgiver or ruler, and is called just, merciful and so on, and that in reality God acts and governs all things solely from the necessity of his own nature and perfection, and his decrees and volitions are eternal truths, always involving necessity.”

After discussing the Torah, Spinoza brings in the teachings of Christ. “Although religion as preached by the Apostles—who simply related the story of Christ—does not come within the scope of reason, yet its substance, which consists essentially in moral teachings, as does the whole of Christ’s doctrine, can be readily grasped by everyone by the natural light of reason.” Spinoza continues on the properties of the Divine Law, “There can be no doubt that the Divine Law has come down to us in this respect uncorrupted. From the Scripture itself we learn that its message, unclouded by any doubt or any ambiguity, is in essence this, to love God above all, and one’s neighbor as oneself…. For this is the basis of the whole structure of religion; if it is removed, the entire fabric crashes to the ground…. Knowledge of God is God’s gift, not a command…. God through his prophets asks no other knowledge of himself than the knowledge of his divine justice and charity…. God is supremely just and supremely merciful, that is, the one perfect pattern of the true life…. The intellectual knowledge of God which contemplates his nature as it really is in itself—a nature which men cannot imitate by a set rule of conduct nor take as their example—has no bearing on the practice of a true way of life, on faith, and on revealed religion, and that consequently men can go far away in this matter without sinning.”

For Spinoza, obedience is the paramount requisite of religion. “The aim of Scripture is simply to teach obedience…. The message of the Gospel is one of simple faith; that is, belief in God and reverence for God, or—which is the same thing—obedience to God…. It is also undeniable that he who by God’s commandments loves his neighbor as himself is truly obedient and blessed according to the Law…. Scripture does not require us to believe anything beyond what is necessary for fulfilling of the said commandment…. Therefore the commandment is the one and only guiding principle for the entire common faith of mankind, and through this commandment alone should be determined all the tenets of faith that every man is duty bound to accept…. All else can legitimately be inferred simply by the process of reason.”

Spinoza expands on the nature of reason and how it complements religion. “Neither is theology required to be subordinate to reason nor reason to theology…. Each has its own domain. The domain of reason, as we have said, is truth and wisdom, the domain of theology is piety and obedience…. Theology defines its religious dogmas only so far as suffices to secure obedience, and it leaves it to reason to decide exactly how these dogmas are to be understood in respect of truth; for reason is in reality the light of the mind…. Theology thus understood, if you consider its precepts and moral teaching, will be found to agree with reason; and if you look to its purpose and end, it will be found to be in no respect opposed to reason, and is therefore valid for all men.”

Finally, Spinoza touches on politics and the nature of the State. “There is nobody who does not desire to live in safety free from fear, as far as is possible. But this cannot come about as long as every individual is permitted to do just as he pleases, and reason can claim no more right than hatred and anger…. In order to achieve a secure and good life, men had necessarily to unite in one body. They therefore arranged that the unrestricted right naturally possessed by each individual should be put into common ownership, and that this right should no longer be determined by the strength and appetite of the individual, but by the power and will of all together…. They had to bind themselves by the most stringent pledges to be guided in all matters only by the dictates of reason…. Every state must necessarily preserve its own form, and cannot be changed without incurring the danger of utter ruin.”

“Psycho-Politics” by Byung-Chul Han (translated by Erik Butler)

Han’s short treatise is a rumination on modernity and the digital age. He covers his usual well-trod themes through the lens of neo-Hegelianism. First, he takes on twenty-first century labor practice. “Today everyone is an auto-exploiting labourer in his or her own enterprise. People are now master and slave in one. Even class struggle has transformed into an inner struggle against oneself…. Conditions are defined by the solitude of an entrepreneur who is isolated and self-combating and practices auto-exploitation voluntarily…. When production is immaterial, everyone already owns the means of production him- or herself.”

Han is worried about dig data and the end of intimacy, subjectivity, and uniqueness. He is wary of a humanity ruled by averages and correlation without causation. He fears the commoditization of the soul. “Today, we are entering the age of digital psychopolitics. It means passing from passive surveillance to active steering…. Big data is a highly efficient psychopolitical instrument that makes it possible to achieve comprehensive knowledge of the dynamics of social communication. This knowledge is knowledge for the sake of domination and control (Herrschaftswissen): it facilitates intervention in the psyche and enables influence to take place on a pre-reflexive level…. Digital psychopolitics transforms the negativity of freely made decisions into the positivity of factual states (Sachverhalte). Indeed, persons are being positivized into things, which can be quantified, measured and steered.”

For Han, each individual has become an optimizing machine. “Now productivity is not to be enhanced by overcoming physical resistance so much as by optimizing psychic or mental processes. Physical discipline has given way to mental optimization…. The neoliberal regime utterly claims the technology of the self for its own purposes: perpetual self-optimization — as the exemplary neoliberal technology of the self — represents nothing so much as a highly efficient mode of domination and exploitation…. The self-as-a-work-of-art amounts to a beautiful but deceptive illusion that the neoliberal regime maintains…. The neoliberal imperative of self-optimization serves only to promote perfect functioning within the system…. It is not concern for the good life that drives self-optimization. Rather, self-optimization follows from systemic constraints —from the logic of quantifying success on the market.”

The idiot stands opposed to psychopolitics. “Every philosopher who has brought forth a new idiom, — a new language, a new way of thinking — has necessarily been an idiot. Only the idiot has access to the wholly Other…. The history of philosophy is a history of idiotisms. Socrates knows only that he does not know; he is an idiot. Likewise, Descartes — who casts doubt on everything — is an idiot. Cogito ergo sum is idiotic…. The idiot is a modern-day heretic. Etymologically, heresy means ‘choice’. Thus, the heretic is one who commands free choice: the courage to deviate from orthodoxy. As a heretic, the idiot represents a figure of resistance opposing the violence of consensus. The idiot preserves the magic of the outsider…. Idiotism stands opposed to the neoliberal power of domination: total communication and total surveillance.”