This is the first volume of Parfit’s three-part concluding life’s work, published just before he died. He is an objectivist. “Objectivists appeal to normative claims about what, after ideal deliberation, we have reasons to choose, and ought rationally to choose…. Subjectivists appeal to psychological claims about what, after such deliberation, we would in fact choose…. We ought, I believe, to reject all subjective theories, and accept some objective theory. Our practical reasons are all object-given and value-based…. What we want is often something that is worth doing or achieving. In such cases, these two kinds of theory at least partly agree, since we have value-based object-given reasons to try to fulfill such desires…. Second, we often have such desires because we believe that we have such reasons. We are often motivated by the belief that some act or outcome would be good or best, in the reason-implying sense…. Third, some people accept desire-based theories about well-being. According to some of these theories, the fulfillment of some of our present desires would be in itself good for us…. Fourth, we can rightly appeal to our desires or aims when we describe our motivating reasons, or why we acted as we did. This may lead us to assume that our desires or aims can also give us normative reasons.” What Parfit is after, however, is a theory that is substantively rational, not just procedurally rational. “According to objective theories, we all have decisive reasons to have certain desires, and to be substantively rational we must have these desires. These reasons are given by the intrinsic features of what we might want, or might want to avoid. We have such a decisive object-given reason to want to avoid all future agony. If we did not have this desire, we would not be fully substantively rational, because we would be failing to respond to this reason…. On subjective theories, we have no such object-given reasons, not even reasons to want to avoid future agony. Deliberative Subjectivists appeal to what we would want after deliberation that was merely procedurally rational…. There are no telic desires or aims that we [as Subjectivists] are rationally required to have. We can be procedurally rational whatever else we care about, or want to achieve…. Our preferences draw arbitrary distinction when, and because, what we prefer is in no way preferable. It is arbitrary to prefer one of two things if there are no facts about these things that give us any reason to have this preference.” For Objectivists, on the other hand, there are always chains of reason. “We have instrumental reasons to want something to happen, or to act in some way, when this event or act would have effects that we have some reason to want. As that claim implies, every instrumental reason gets its normative force from some other reason. This other reason may itself be instrumental, getting its force from some third reason. But at the beginning of any such chain of reasons, there must be some fact that gives us a reason to want some possible event as an end, or for its own sake. Such reasons are provided by the intrinsic features that would make this possible event in some way good. It is from such telic value-based object-given reasons that all instrumental reasons get their normative force…. Subjective theories are built on sand. Since all subject-given reasons would have to get their normative force from some desire or aim that we have no such reason to have, and such desires or aims cannot be defensibly claimed to give us any reasons, we cannot be defensibly claimed to have any subject-given reasons.” Parfit concludes, “On the best objective theories, the fact that we have some reason is an irreducibly normative truth. Of those who accept subjective theories, many are Metaphysical Naturalists, who believe that there cannot be such facts or truths.”
Parfit next tackles rationality. “What makes our desires rational or irrational is not the rationality of the beliefs on which these desires causally depend, but the content of these beliefs, or what we believe…. The rationality of our beliefs depends on whether, in having these beliefs, we are responding well to epistemic or truth-related reasons or apparent reasons to have these beliefs. The rationality of our desires and acts depends on whether, in having these desires and acting in these ways, we are responding well to practical reasons or apparent reasons to have these desires and to act in these ways…. Practical and epistemic reasons support answers to different questions, and cannot possibly conflict…. Reasons are, I believe, fundamental. Something matters only if we or others have some reason to care about this thing…. Morality might have supreme importance in the reason-implying sense, since we might always have decisive reasons to do our duty, and to avoid acting wrongly. But if we defend morality’s importance in this way, we must admit that the deepest question is not what we ought morally to do, but what we have sufficient or decisive reasons to do…. According to some writers, we ought to do certain things, such as keeping our promises, saving people’s lives, and doing what would make things go expectably-best. According to some other writers, we ought to try to do these things. We ought, I believe, to make both of these claims.”
From here on in, Parfit gets deep into the weeds comparing and contrasting Kantian contractualism with different consequentialist philosophies, also occasionally alluding to Sidgwick and Scanlon, among others. He begins by building on and parsing out Kant. For Kant, other human beings are always ends in and of themselves, never just means. “We treat someone merely as a means if we both use this person in some way and regard her as a mere tool, someone whose well-being and moral claims we ignore, and whom we would treat in whatever way would best achieve our aims. We do not treat someone merely as a means, nor are we even close to doing that, if either (1) our treatment of this person is governed in a sufficiently important way by some relevant moral belief, or (2) we do or would relevantly choose to bear some great burden for this person’s sake…. It is wrong to regard anyone merely as a means. But the wrongness of our acts never or hardly ever depends on whether we are treating people as a means…. We can deserve many things, such as gratitude, praise, and the kind of blame that is merely moral dispraise. But no one could ever deserve to suffer.”
Korsgaard claims that Kant’s “standard of conduct… is designed for an ideal state of affairs: we are always to act as if we were living in the Kingdom of Ends, regardless of possible disastrous results.” Parfit adds to that what he calls, “the Kantian Contractualist Formula: Everyone ought to follow the principles whose universal acceptance everyone could rationally will.” Parfit then defends Kant against Rawls’ veil, “Rawls’s veil of ignorance is in part intended to eliminate inequalities in bargaining power. The Kantian Formula achieves this aim in a better way. Since there is no need to reach agreement, there is no scope for bargaining, so no one would have greater bargaining power. When we ask which principles everyone could rationally choose, we can therefore suppose that everyone knows all of the relevant, reason-giving facts, and could therefore respond to all these reasons.” Parfit continues on with Kant, “For the Kantian Formula to succeed, what we can call its uniqueness condition must be sufficiently met. It must be true that, at least in most cases, there is some relevant principle, and only one such principle, that everyone could rationally choose.” Expanding to Contractualism more broadly, “When we apply some Contractualist formula, such as the Kantian and Scanlonian Formulas, we don’t consider particular acts on their own. We ask which are the principles that everyone could rationally choose, or that no one could reasonably reject, if we were choosing the principles that everyone would accept. In answering this question, we must take into account the effects of everyone’s accepting, and being known to accept, these principles.”
Parfit next tries to bring Kant in agreement with Consequentialist principles. “Kantians could claim: (A) Everyone ought to follow the principles whose universal acceptance everyone could rationally choose, or will. (C) There are some principles whose universal acceptance would make things go best. (F) Everyone could rationally will that everyone accepts these principles. (H) These are the only principles whose universal acceptance everyone could rationally will. Therefore UARC [Universal-Acceptance Rule Consequentialism]: These are the principles that everyone ought to follow…. This argument’s premises are not, however, Consequentialist. The argument assumes that outcomes can be better or worse in the impartial reason-implying sense…. This argument also assumes that there are some principles whose universal acceptance would make things go best…. Consequentialists appeal to claims about what would be best in the impartial-reason-implying sense…. Contractualists appeal to the principles that it would be rational for everyone to choose, if we were all choosing in some way that would make our choices sufficiently impartial.” Parfit continues to attempt to square the circle, “Kantians, I have claimed, can argue: KC [Kantian Contractualism]: Everyone ought to follow the principles that everyone could rationally will to be universal laws. (J) There are certain principles whose being universal laws would make things go best. (K) These are the only principles that everyone could rationally will to be universal laws. Therefore RC [Rule Consequentialism]: Everyone ought to follow these optimific principles. KC and RC are the most general statements of Kantian Contractualism and Rule Consequentialism.” Parfit sums it up with “Kantian Rule Consequentialism: Everyone ought to follow the optimific principles, because these are the only principles that everyone could rationally will to be universal laws.”
Parfit concludes by reiterating that the differences in these moral philosophies are really not as extreme as initially thought. “Of our reasons for doubting that there are moral truths, one of the strongest is provided by some kinds of moral disagreements…. These disagreements are deepest when we are considering, not the wrongness of particular acts, but the nature of morality and moral reasoning…. If we and others hold conflicting views, and we have no reason to believe that we are the people who are more likely to be right, that should at least make us doubt our view…. It has been widely believed that there are such deep disagreements between Kantians, Contractualists, and Consequentialists. That, I have argued, is not true. These people are climbing the same mountain on different sides.” Parfit summarizes the conclusions on what he takes from the best of Kant. “Kant’s most important claims are these: (R) Everyone ought to treat everyone only in ways to which they could rationally consent. (S) Everyone ought to regard everyone with respect, and never merely as a means. Even the morally worst people have as much dignity or worth as anyone else. (T) If all of our decisions are merely events in time, we cannot be responsible for our acts in any way that could make us deserve to suffer, or to be less happy. (U) Everyone ought to follow the principles whose being universal laws would make things go best, because these are the only principles whose being universal laws everyone could rationally will. We ought, I believe, to accept (S) and (T), and we have strong reasons to accept (R) and (U).” Parfit concludes on a note of cautious optimism, “Some of our descendants might live lives and create worlds that, though failing to justify past suffering, would give us all, including those who suffered, reasons to be glad that the Universe exists.”
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