“Stubborn Attachments” by Tyler Cowen

This is a book of moral philosophy, with an emphasis on political (or at least communal) issues. It is a treatise about values and what humanity, as a whole, needs to care about. As such, it is a forward looking book. Its aim is to influence humanity’s future. Cowen suggests, “there exists an objective right and an objective wrong. Relativism is a nonstarter.” However, while clearly not a moral relativist, he is a moral pluralist, perhaps in the traditions of Isaiah Berlin, Alexander Herzen, and Giambattista Vico. Cowen affirms, “I hold pluralism as a core moral intuition…. Pluralist theories are more plausible, postulating a variety of relevant values.” He states his philosophical starting points as “1. “Right” and “wrong” are very real concepts which should possess great force. 2. We should be skeptical about the powers of the individual human mind. 3. Human life is complex and offers many different goods, not just one value that trumps all others.”

Cowen’s theme, throughout this book, is that sustained economic growth should be an over-arching policy rule, except in extreme rights-based exceptions. He asks to “look for social processes which are ongoing, self-sustaining, and which create rising value over time.” His term “Wealth Plus” refers to basic measured GDP, plus values such as leisure time, household production, and environmental amenities. Cowen comes around to three major questions- “1. What can we do to boost the rate of economic growth? 2. What can we do to make our civilization more stable? 3. How should we deal with environmental problems?”

The simple reason that sustained economic growth is so important is that the mechanism of compounding is so powerful in adding to the betterment of all lives in society over time. “At a growth rate of ten percent per annum, as has been common in China, real per capita income doubles about once every seven years. At a much lower growth rate of one percent, such an improvement takes about sixty-nine years.” The growth of wealth, an end in itself, is also a means to other ends. “The more rapidly growing economy will, at some point, bring about much higher levels of human well-being—and other plural values—on a consistent basis…. If the gains to the future are significant and ongoing, those gains should eventually outweigh one-time costs by a significant degree, and they will likely carry along other plural values as well.” These gains might come in fits and starts, but, with a long enough time horizon, they can be assured and they will be massive. “When a higher rate of economic growth is at stake, the relevant comparisons become quite obvious after the passage of enough time…. At some point these cumulative benefits will be sufficiently robust to outweigh particular instances of irrational or misguided preferences.”

This rule favoring sustained economic growth should be tempered by human rights. “Rights—if we are going to believe in them at all—have to be tough and pretty close to absolute in importance if they are to survive as relevant to our comparisons.” There are some things that we just should never do, even in the name of higher growth. Rights, therefore, should be negative, not positive in nature. “Numerous violations of the rule or law may seem harmless enough, but enough of them can be dire once we consider the longer-run expectation and incentive effects.”

Cowen claims that we, in the present, do not value humanity in the distant future enough. With Derek Parfit, he wrote, “Why should costs and benefits receive less weight, simply because they are further in the future? When the future comes, these benefits and costs will be no less real.” The future cannot influence today’s decision makers and, therefore, is neglected. “When it comes to non-tradable and storable assets, markets do not reflect the preferences of currently unborn individuals…. Future generations cannot contract in today’s markets.” Time preference and discounting should be greatly reduced. The temporal distance of a human should be viewed with the same moral regard as the spatial distance of a human. However, “discounting for risk is justified in a way that discounting for the pure passage of time is not. If a future benefit is uncertain, we should discount that benefit accordingly because it may not arrive.”

Cowen makes the case that the further we look out into the time horizon the less wealth redistribution makes sense. “The case for redistribution would be stronger if the world were going to end in the near future. If the time horizon is extremely short, the benefits of continued higher growth will be choked off and the scope for compounding over time would be correspondingly limited…. A high degree of redistribution also makes sense in a lot of “lifeboat” settings…. [where] these examples typically involve an implicit assumption of a zero or negative rate of return on investment.” No one plans for the next generation’s wealth when drifting in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. To this end, Cowen feels, “the attitude of historical pessimism is therefore one of the most important critiques of my arguments. If historical pessimism holds true…. expected rates of return are negative.” Finally, Cowen compares the Solow model of growth with the increasing returns model. “Under the increasing returns model, a one-time negative shock harms the long-run rate of growth, which implies that we must take great care to avoid or limit each and every possible negative shock. The Solow model suggests a picture of greater resilience, since catch-up effects prevent each and every mistake from compounding over time…. Individuals who believe in the increasing returns model should be much more skeptical of non-growth enhancing redistribution than individuals who believe in the Solow catch-up model…. The key question is whether gains and losses compound over time or dwindle into longer-run insignificance.”

Cowen ends by addressing the uncertainty humanity faces as it confronts its more distant future. “We don’t know whether our actions today will in fact give rise to a better future…. The effects of our current actions are very hard to predict…. The epistemic critique suggests that the philosophic doctrine of consequentialism cannot be a useful guide to action because we hardly know anything about long-run consequences.” Therefore, “consequentialism is strongest when we pursue values that are high in absolute importance.” Cowen suggests this utmost value should be a very strong intuition towards sustainable growth. “Anything we try to do is floating in a sea of long-run radical uncertainty, so to speak. Only big, important upfront goals will, in reflective equilibrium, stand above the ever-present froth and allow the comparison to be more than a very rough one. Putting too many small goals at stake simply means that our moral intuitions will end up confused…. Given the radical uncertainty of the more distant future, we can’t know how to achieve preferred goals with any kind of certainty over longer time horizons. Our attachment to particular means should therefore be highly tentative, highly uncertain, and radically contingent…. Our attitudes to others should therefore be accordingly tolerant…. There are many such opposing views, so even if yours is the best, you’re probably still wrong.”

“Effingers” by Gabriele Tergit (translated by Sophie Duvernoy)

This is an epic novel that spans four generations of a few branches of two Jewish families in Germany, intertwined by blood and marriage. The story begins in 1883 and continues to the tragic end of World Dar II. The Effinger pater familias is a watchmaker in Kragsheim in Bavaria. He marries his daughters off in the nearby countryside, but his sons leave to seek their fortunes on the road, in London, and in Berlin. Two marry sisters and into a family of wealthy Berlin bankers, the Oppners,  while setting up a manufacturing factory on the outskirts of the city, starting with screws and eventually producing cars, as the years go by. While two of the brothers from Berlin, Ludwig and Emmanuel work at a private bank, the third, Waldemar is a practicing lawyer, barred from a professorship because of his faith. A liberal, he has lost his religion, except culturally. “Instead of religion, we now have the laws of nature, which promise ever-greater happiness. Science is our religion. What you call eternal life, we call the permanence of matter…. Fear of God, and the belief that the sins of the fathers will be visited upon the third and fourth generations, breed false morality, rather than an honest consideration of right and wrong. True morality can only come from true freedom.”

Emmanuel’s son, Theodor, like many of his generation and class, was a dilettante and aesthete, who preferred to gaze at art than be tutored at the family bank. “Theodor, who was seventeen and an apprentice at his father's firm, was in the process of tying his tie. He found their home life deeply distasteful. He was disgusted by these businessmen, their silly pastimes, their childish games, their idle tinkling on the piano, their dreadful hypocrisy in a time in which the struggle for existence was paramount, and the evolution of the species was the great philosophical topic of the era.”

Waldemar, urged on by his more liberal colleagues, is tempted to convert for his career, but quickly dismisses the notion. “I could imagine accepting baptism because I take the view that Christianity represents the evolution of the ancient religion of the Prophets into a milder, gentler ethics, centuries later. But the moment baptism confers material benefits, these considerations become irrelevant. It is morally repugnant that an act that should spring from one's deepest personal conviction can lead to professional advancement. They've put a premium on men who lack principles.”

The two Effinger sons, married into the Opener banking clan, could not be more different in disposition. “Karl probably wasn't saving a penny. Paul considered this a moral failing. Karl and Annette frivolously ignored the Effingers' age-old principle of saving money. The Effingers had always prayed, worked, and saved as much as possible for old age, hard times, and their children. But these people no longer believed in hard times. Paul felt this whole business went against everything his ancestors had taught him.” Theodor, now stuck in a loveless marriage but still consumed with art, reconsiders his life’s path, as well. “Here we are, the tired children of this fading century. We try to be good sons to our strong fathers, to lead their factories and banks and affairs of state. I'm only a subject, but even the man on the throne, the Kaiser, twirls his mustache, raises his baton, and thunders at the world, yet he secretly listens to refined, decadent counts who compose sweet songs. Hasn't a bohemian succeeded the bourgeois queen in England? I wanted to be healthy, productive, good, and strong. But what has that led to? All our efforts are futile; we've done the wrong thing. I will need to wear a mask—perhaps many. "We all must act; those who know it are wise." I will be good to Beatrice, that stupid, frigid child, and keep up appearances, buy paintings and be a good subject to the Kaiser.”

As nationalism, fascism, and socialism are on the rise worldwide, the true classical liberal is having hard time making it in the world. Nonetheless, Waldemar stays true to his beliefs and tries to caution the youth of his family. He cautions his grand-nephew, Erwin, “For half a century, we believed in Darwinism, that man is a product of his environment, in human progress. The world is now taking a disastrous turn toward pessimism. It now believes in the completely opaque concept of race, which is common currency among Pan-Slavists and Nietzschean blond beasts alike. It believes in the inevitable impoverishment of the masses through capitalist greed. We believed that fundamental ethical concepts were not up for discussion. But people have abandoned the desire for truth—they value self-interest and power instead. The will to power has led man beyond good and evil. Every worldview now considers itself infallible. And Zionism doesn't resist this new evil, and instead uses every argument of this dreadful new time for its own purposes. It's fighting on a false front. From the point of view of blood and extreme nationalism, antisemitism is justified.”

Waldemar gives words of wisdom to his grand-niece, Marianne, a socialist, as well, “Intellectuals are always unwanted. They must work to make themselves heard. But if you prefer to live in an ivory tower rather than be a speaker, a teacher, or a revolutionary, don't be surprised when the fools or the masses come to tear it down without knowing what they should build instead…. Socialism is only a better form of bureaucracy. It began as a religion, but now it's turned into social welfare. People can get excited about religion, but welfare? It's just collecting coupons, nothing more. Religion has moved on to communism.”

By 1933, Marianne has given up the socialist cause in the face of Hitler, turning, instead, to Zionism. Waldemar again cautions, while reminding her of her true Jewish and German heritage, “Where is our enthusiasm for equality, the same equality our ancestors upheld in ancient times, despite their hardship? We may be powerless, but we carry the knowledge of the injustice we have endured throughout history. This knowledge has ennobled our people for centuries and given it the unparalleled power of passive resistance. We are optimists. 'And God saw all he had made, and behold, it was good.' The secret to our immortality lies in our optimism and our commitment to peace. But across the world, optimistic, liberal ideas are dying. A mystical blood brotherhood is now considered more significant than the air you've breathed for thousands of years or the language you've spoken for centuries. The peaceful coexistence of people who are not all alike is considered intolerable. The facts are plain: The rule of law is gone. The man with better party connections is the man who is right. And what follows? Everyone who doesn't belong to the party is exterminated, and we're thrust back into the Stone Age…. Your grandfather fought on the barricades for the rights of the powerless in 1848, and I, my child, have devoted my life to the rights of individuals and peoples. I have never believed in a personal God, but I believe that the ethics of the prophets, indeed, of all world religions, are more important than ever today. A lie must be called a lie. That is the difference between those who worship power and those who believe in justice, between those who justify the persecution of other people with slogans, and those who fight for the laws of Sinai, no matter their people or nation. This is not the difference between today and tomorrow; this is eternal. It's the difference between Yahweh and Amalek.”

“The Methods of Ethics” by Henry Sidgwick

This treatise is Sidgwick’s attempt to reconcile intuitive ethics, egoistic hedonism, and utilitarianism with common sense morality. He begins by clarifying his terms, “I propose therefore to define Pleasure—when we are considering its “strict value” for purposes of quantitative comparison—as a feeling which, when experienced by intelligent beings, is at least implicitly apprehended as desirable or—in cases of comparison—preferable.” Next, Sidgwick defines his purpose, “The question then remains, whether any general theory can be attained of the causes of pleasure and pain so certain and practically applicable that we may by its aid rise above the ambiguities and inconsistencies of common or sectarian opinion, no less than the shortcomings of the empirical-reflective method, and establish the Hedonistic art of life on a thoroughly scientific basis.”

Next, Sidgwick spells out his meaning of the utilitarian Good, “Each one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own, except in so far as he judges it to be less, when impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable or attainable by him. I before observed that the duty of Benevolence as recognised by common sense seems to fall somewhat short of this. But I think it may be fairly urged in explanation of this that practically each man, even with a view to universal Good, ought chiefly to concern himself with promoting the good of a limited number of human beings, and that generally in proportion to the closeness of their connexion with him.”

After debating the pros and cons of each of the moral systems, Sidgwick makes up his mind, “I find that I arrive, in my search for really clear and certain ethical intuitions, at the fundamental principle of Utilitarianism…. Utilitarianism is thus presented as the final form into which Intuitionism tends to pass, when the demand for really self-evident first principles is rigorously pressed.” He continues by detailing principles that square utilitarianism with intuitionism: the axiom of justice/equity (similar cases deserve similar treatment), prudence (equal rational concern for all temporal parts of one's life), and rational benevolence (the good of any one individual is of no more importance than the good of any other). “In short, the only so-called Virtues which can be thought to be essentially and always such, and incapable of excess, are such qualities as Wisdom, Universal Benevolence, and (in a sense) Justice; of which the notions manifestly involve this notion of Good, supposed already determinate. Wisdom is insight into Good and the means to Good; Benevolence is exhibited in the purposive actions called “doing Good”: Justice (when regarded as essentially and always a Virtue) lies in distributing Good (or evil) impartially according to right rules.”

Finally, Sidgwick details some caveats to utilitarianism, “The doctrine that Universal Happiness is the ultimate standard must not be understood to imply that Universal Benevolence is the only right or always best motive of action. For, as we have before observed, it is not necessary that the end which gives the criterion of rightness should always be the end at which we consciously aim…. By Greatest Happiness is meant the greatest possible surplus of pleasure over pain.” He surmises that Common Sense morality might be the system that actually works best for the everyday affairs of the masses, “Common-Sense morality is really only adapted for ordinary men in ordinary circumstances—although it may still be expedient that these ordinary persons should regard it as absolutely and universally prescribed, since any other view of it may dangerously weaken its hold over their minds. So far as this is the case we must use the Utilitarian method to ascertain how far persons in special circumstances require a morality more specially adapted to them than Common Sense is willing to concede: and also how far men of peculiar physical or mental constitution ought to be exempted from ordinary rules.”

Sidgwick's conclusion leaves him flummoxed: he cannot rationally reconcile the claims of egoism (rational self-interest) with the claims of utilitarianism (universal good). Both rest on principles that appear self-evident, and reason alone cannot adjudicate between them. He calls this a fundamental contradiction at the heart of practical reason. Sidgwick’s most enduring contribution is not merely his refinement of utilitarianism, but his argument that ethics confronts a final unresolved tension between the rational pursuit of one’s own happiness and the equally rational demand to promote universal happiness impartially. This “dualism of practical reason” prevents the book from being a simple utilitarian victory lap. It is instead one of the great demonstrations of how difficult it is to ground morality in reason alone.

Furthermore, Sidgwick admits, “On Utilitarian principles, it may be right to do and privately recommend, under certain circumstances, what it would not be right to advocate openly; it may be right to teach openly to one set of persons what it would be wrong to teach to others; it may be conceivably right to do, if it can be done with comparative secrecy, what it would be wrong to in the face of the world…. Similarly it seems expedient that the doctrine that esoteric morality is expedient should itself be kept esoteric.”

“Moral Origins: The Evolution of Virtue, Altruism, and Shame” by Christopher Boehm

Boehm credits Darwin for speculating on the evolutionary origins of the human conscience from his very first thoughts on evolution in “On the Origin of Species” and the “Descent of Man”. Darwin, in fact, conducted a far-flung anthropological survey, across the British colonies, that proved that blushing to show shame was cross-culturally universal and, therefore, an intrinsic trait. However, culture does play on genes through group selection and sex selection and thus has effects on evolutionary biology. Humans evolved into egalitarian bands. This occurred primarily as proto-humans divvied up the meat from large animal kills: an activity that required large group cooperation and required all members of the group to be adequately nutritioned to contribute. Capital punishment of non-egalitarians had dire effects on aggressive gene selection, whether they be of bullies (alpha-males), cheats, or thieves. This had the effect of both a debilitation of aggressive responses and strengthening inhibitory controls in surviving genotypes. Through many generations genes that selected for altruism were selected for both by group selection, the groups with higher altruistic propensity outcompeted more selfish groups, and within group sex selection, as females picked the altruistic males within the group and aggressive individualists were labeled as deviants or effectively shamed into repressing their aggressive tendencies. In this way humans gradually developed a more mature conscience that valued empathy and group cohesion.