This treatise is Sidgwick’s attempt to reconcile intuitive ethics, egoistic hedonism, and utilitarianism with common sense morality. He begins by clarifying his terms, “I propose therefore to define Pleasure—when we are considering its “strict value” for purposes of quantitative comparison—as a feeling which, when experienced by intelligent beings, is at least implicitly apprehended as desirable or—in cases of comparison—preferable.” Next, Sidgwick defines his purpose, “The question then remains, whether any general theory can be attained of the causes of pleasure and pain so certain and practically applicable that we may by its aid rise above the ambiguities and inconsistencies of common or sectarian opinion, no less than the shortcomings of the empirical-reflective method, and establish the Hedonistic art of life on a thoroughly scientific basis.”
Next, Sidgwick spells out his meaning of the utilitarian Good, “Each one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own, except in so far as he judges it to be less, when impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable or attainable by him. I before observed that the duty of Benevolence as recognised by common sense seems to fall somewhat short of this. But I think it may be fairly urged in explanation of this that practically each man, even with a view to universal Good, ought chiefly to concern himself with promoting the good of a limited number of human beings, and that generally in proportion to the closeness of their connexion with him.”
After debating the pros and cons of each of the moral systems, Sidgwick makes up his mind, “I find that I arrive, in my search for really clear and certain ethical intuitions, at the fundamental principle of Utilitarianism…. Utilitarianism is thus presented as the final form into which Intuitionism tends to pass, when the demand for really self-evident first principles is rigorously pressed.” He continues by detailing principles that square utilitarianism with intuitionism: the axiom of justice/equity (similar cases deserve similar treatment), prudence (equal rational concern for all temporal parts of one's life), and rational benevolence (the good of any one individual is of no more importance than the good of any other). “In short, the only so-called Virtues which can be thought to be essentially and always such, and incapable of excess, are such qualities as Wisdom, Universal Benevolence, and (in a sense) Justice; of which the notions manifestly involve this notion of Good, supposed already determinate. Wisdom is insight into Good and the means to Good; Benevolence is exhibited in the purposive actions called “doing Good”: Justice (when regarded as essentially and always a Virtue) lies in distributing Good (or evil) impartially according to right rules.”
Finally, Sidgwick details some caveats to utilitarianism, “The doctrine that Universal Happiness is the ultimate standard must not be understood to imply that Universal Benevolence is the only right or always best motive of action. For, as we have before observed, it is not necessary that the end which gives the criterion of rightness should always be the end at which we consciously aim…. By Greatest Happiness is meant the greatest possible surplus of pleasure over pain.”
Sidgwick surmises that Common Sense morality might be the actual system that works best for the everyday affairs of the masses, “Common-Sense morality is really only adapted for ordinary men in ordinary circumstances—although it may still be expedient that these ordinary persons should regard it as absolutely and universally prescribed, since any other view of it may dangerously weaken its hold over their minds. So far as this is the case we must use the Utilitarian method to ascertain how far persons in special circumstances require a morality more specially adapted to them than Common Sense is willing to concede: and also how far men of peculiar physical or mental constitution ought to be exempted from ordinary rules.” Furthermore, he admits, “On Utilitarian principles, it may be right to do and privately recommend, under certain circumstances, what it would not be right to advocate openly; it may be right to teach openly to one set of persons what it would be wrong to teach to others; it may be conceivably right to do, if it can be done with comparative secrecy, what it would be wrong to in the face of the world…. Similarly it seems expedient that the doctrine that esoteric morality is expedient should itself be kept esoteric.”
Sidgwick's entire book builds toward a conclusion he finds genuinely devastating: he cannot rationally reconcile the claims of egoism (rational self-interest) with the claims of utilitarianism (universal good). Both rest on principles that appear self-evident, and reason alone cannot adjudicate between them. He calls this a fundamental contradiction at the heart of practical reason.
Sidgwick’s most enduring contribution is not merely his refinement of utilitarianism, but his argument that ethics confronts a final unresolved tension between the rational pursuit of one’s own happiness and the equally rational demand to promote universal happiness impartially. This “dualism of practical reason” prevents the book from being a simple utilitarian victory lap; it is instead one of the great demonstrations of how difficult it is to ground morality in reason alone.
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